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SECTION 10.

§ 333. Penalties for violations of act by carriers.

334. Amendments to the section.

335. The amendment of 1903.

336. Illegal combinations under section 10.

337. The incidental interference with commerce by a peaceable strike

not a violation of the section.

338. Construction of the statute.

389. Removal of indicted persons to other districts for trial. 10. Limitation of criminal prosecution under the act.

[Penalties for violations of Act by carriers or when the car-
rier is a corporation, its officers, agents, or employees: Fine
and imprisonment.]

§ 333. Penalties for violations of act by carriers.-SEC. 10. (As Amended March 2, 1889, and June 18, 1910.) That any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act, or, whenever such cmmon carrier is a corporation, any director or officer thereof, or any receiver trustee, lessee, agent, or person acting for or emIloyed by such corporation, who, alone or with any other corJoration, company, person, or party, shall willfully do or cause to be done, or shall willingly suffer or permit to be done, any act, matter, or thing in this act prohibited or declared to be lawful, or who shall aid or abet therein, or shall willfully omit or fail to do any act, matter, or thing in this act required to be done, or shall cause or willingly suffer or permit any act, matter, or thing so directed or required by this act to be done not to be so done, or shall aid or abet any such omission or failure, or shall be guilty of any infraction of this act for which no penalty is otherwise provided, or who shall aid or abet therein, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction thereof in any district court of the United States within the jurisdiction of which such offense was committed, be subject to a fine of not to exceed five thousand dollars for each offense. Provided, That if the offense for which any person shall be convicted as aforesaid shall be an unlawful discrimination in rates, fares, or charges for the transportation of passengers or property, such person shall, in addition to the fine herein before provided for, be liable to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not exceeding two years, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

[Penalties for false billing, etc., by carriers, their officers or
agents: Fine and imprisonment.]

Any common carrier subject to the provision of this act, or, whenever such common carrier is a corporation, any officer or agent thereof, or any person acting for or employed by such

corporation, who, by means of false billing, false classification, false weighing, or false report of weight, or by any other device or means, shall knowingly and willfully assist, or shall willingly suffer or permit, any person or persons to obtain transportation for property at less than the regular rates then established and in force on the line of transportation of such common carrier, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction thereof in any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction within the district in which such offense was committed, be subject to a fine of not exceeding five thousand dollars, or imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court, for each offense. [Penalties for false billing, etc., by shippers and other persons: Fine and imprisonment.]

Any person, corporation, or company, or any agent or officer thereof, who shall deliver property for transportation to any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act, or for whom, as consignor or consignee, any such carrier shall transport property, who shall knowingly and willfully, directly or indirectly, himself or by employee, agent, officer, or otherwise, by false billing, false classification, false weighing, false representation of the contents of the package or the substance of the property, false report of weight, false statement, or by any other device or means, whether with or without the consent or connivance of the carrier, its agent, or officer, obtain or attempt to obtain transportation for such property at less than the regular rates then established and in force on the line of transportation; or who shall knowingly and willfully, directly or indirectly, himself or by employee, agent, officer, or otherwise, by false statement or representation as to cost, value, nature, or extent of injury, or by the use of any false bill, bill of lading, receipt, voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate, affidavit, or deposition, knowing the same to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, or to contain any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry, obtain or attempt to obtain any allowance, refund, or payment for damage or otherwise in connection with or growing out of the transportation of or agreement to transport such property, whether with or without the consent or connivance of the carrier, whereby the compensation of such carrier for such transportation, either before or after payment, shall in fact be made less than the regular rates then established and in force on the line of transportation, shall be deemed guilty of fraud, which is hereby declared to be a misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction thereof in any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction, within the district in which such offense was wholly or in part committed, be subject for each offense to a fine of not exceeding five thousand dollars or imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court:

Provided, That the penalty of imprisonment shall not apply to artificial persons.

[Penalties for inducing common carriers to discriminate un-
justly: Fine and imprisonment. Joint liability with carrier
for damages.]

If any such person, or any officer or agent of any such corporation or company, shall, by payment of money or other thing of value, solicitation, or otherwise, induce or attempt to induce any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act, or any of its officers or agents, to discriminate unjustly in his, its, or their favor as against any other consignor or consignee in the transportation of property, or shall aid or abet any common carrier in any such unjust discrimination, such person or such officer or agent of such corporation or company shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction thereof in any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction within the district in which such offense was committed, be subject to a fine of not exceeding five thousand dollars, or imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court, for each offense; and such person, corporation, or company shall also, together with said common carrier, be liable, jointly or severally, in an action to be brought by any consignor or consignee discriminated against in any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction for all damages caused by or resulting therefrom.

§ 334. Amendments to the section. This section as origiinally enacted contained only the general penalty clause in the first paragraph. By the amendment of March 2, 1889, the substance of the remainder of the section was added, including specific penalties for false billing, classification, etc., recommended by the commission. The amendment of 1910 specifically included corporations.

§ 335. The amendments of 1903.-In the original act and until the enactment of the Elkins Law of 1903, this action contained all the provisions relating to criminal responsibility for violation of the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act. Very important amendments were made by the act of February 19, 1903, or Elkins Act, infra, § 422, which in view of the multitude of prosecutions for rebating, has become of great importance in the enforcement of the act. Under the original Elkins Act, the penalty of imprisonment was abolished, and the only penalties for offenses, whether committed before or after the passage of the Elkins Act, was the imposition of fines, which

were limited from a minimum of one thousand dollars to a maximum of twenty thousand dollars. By the amendment of 1906, this penalty of imprisonment was restored. For the construction of the Elkins Act, see infra, § 423 et seq.

§ 336 (256). Illegal combinations under section 10.-The most important application of section 10 has been made in connection with labor combinations, and attempted boycotts of interstate railroad traffic by employes of other interstate railroads on account of strikes among classes of employes of such railroads. The law of conspiracy has been invoked under section 5440 R. S. U. S., which provides that if two or more persons conspire to commit an offense against the United States, and one or more of such parties do any act to effect that object for the conspiracy, all parties to the conspiracy shall be liable to the penalty prescribed. (Supra, chapter VI.) See United States v. Stephens, 44 Fed. 132 (1890), where the statute was applied to the case of a conspiracy to commit acts made misdemeanors by section 13 of the Census Act.

In the case of Toledo, A. A. & N. W. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 730 (1893), the court, Taft, J., held that Rule No. 12 of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, then in force, declaring that the handling of the property of a railroad, when the brotherhood was at issue with such company, was in violation of the obligation of the brotherhood, constituted a combination to induce the violation of section 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act, providing for the interchange of facilities by railroads engaged in interstate commerce, and made criminal by section 10, and that the chief of the brotherhood and all members engaged in enforcing that rule were equally guilty with him as principals, and all guilty of conspiring to commit an offense against the United States subject to the penalties of section 5440, R. S. U. S. The court granted a mandatory injunction to compet the interchange of facilities. It was said however that the defendants could avoid obedience to the injunction by actually ceasing to be employes of the company, although if they left the service of the company under rule 12 of their order so as to compel the defendant company to injure the complainant company, they were doing an unlawful act and rendering themselves liable in damages for any injuries which are thereby inflicted,

and might be liable to a criminal penalty. The arm of a court of equity could not be extended by mandatory injunction to compel the performance of personal services. See 54 Fed. 746 (1893), where one of the engineers was adjudged guilty of contempt. See also C., B. & Q. R. Co. v. B., C. R. & N. R. Co., 34 Fed. 481 (1888). See also Arthur v. Oakes, 11 C. C. A. 209, 63 Fed. 310 (1894).

In Beers v. Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railroad Co., 34 Fed. 244 (1889), the court made the same holding as to rule 12 of the brotherhood, and as the railroad was operated by a receiver, the court said the receiver could not refuse to receive from and deliver to a connecting road, although by doing so his own road may be involved in a strike with its employes.

§ 337 (257). The incidental interference with commerce by a peaceable strike not a violation of the section.-While the employes of a railroad corporation cannot lawfully combine to compel their employer to discriminate against the traffic of a connecting railroad for any reason, the incidental interference with interstate traffic resulting from a combined cessation of employment by railroad employes for the purpose of bettering their own conditions of service does not constitute a criminal conspiracy or an offense under section ten of the Interstate Commerce Act. See Arthur v. Oakes, 11 C. C. A. 209, 63 Fed. 310 (1894). The point was directly ruled by Adams, J., in the case of the Wabash Railroad Co. v. Hannahan et al., 121 Fed. 563 (1903), where the court dissolved a temporary injunction granted without notice against the officers of the brotherhoods of trainmen and firemen restraining them from ordering a strike on the Wabash Railroad. The court said that while the employes, the members of the brotherhoods, had the right to combine in leaving their employment, the court would retain jurisdiction of the case so that in the event of any molestation of or interference with interstate commerce by them after leaving employment, the lawful powers of the court could be invoked to restrain such interference.

See also Hopkins v. United States, 171 U. S. 578, 43 L. Ed. 290 (1898), Taft, J., in Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. O. Railroad, 62 Fed. 803. This subject of what constitutes a

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