Lapas attēli
PDF
ePub

It was ruled by the commission in 7 I. C. C. R. 323, that in the absence of some agreement or understanding with a connecting line by which the joint tariff rates were authorized, a given carrier cannot lawfully apply any other rates than those which is fixed by the transportation between the points fixed by its railroad; and the rates so fixed are the only lawful rates which the carrier may charge for any transportation service which it may perform. The only rates authorized by the act are the rates established by a single carrier upon its route and the joint rates over continuous lines or routes operated by more than one carrier.

But while a carrier is not bound to make through routing, and in the absence of such agreements for through routing may charge its regular tariff rates, those charges must be reasonable for the service.

In Augusta Southern Ry. Co. v. Wrightsville & T. R. Co., 74 Fed. 522, the court held that in the absence of through routing the carrier was not entitled to charge the full local rate permitted by the state law on freight which was not in reality local, but through freight. The decision in this case however cannot be reconciled with the authorities cited above unless upon the ground that the rate was unreasonable per se for the service.

§ 284. The right of exclusive through routing.—Through routing rests upon contract between the carriers except, of course, where the power of ordering a through routing is exercised by the commission under the act as amended in 1906. It follows, therefore, that a carrier may lawfully make a contract with one connecting carrier for through routing to the exclusion of another.

This subject has been extensively litigated in exclusive contracts in what are known as the Live Stock cases. While it is the duty of a railroad company to provide suitable facilities for receiving and delivering live stock at its station without additional compensation other than the regular transportation charge, it may provide these facilities by making an exclusive contract with one stockyards company, and as long as this company imposes no charge for delivering live stock when that stock is taken by the consignee within a reasonable time, such contract is not obnoxious to law. Covington v. Keith, 139 U. S.

128, 35 L. Ed. 73; Butchers & Drovers Stockyards Co. v. L. & N. R. Co., 67 Fed. 35, Central Stockyards Co. v. L. & N. R. Co., 55 C. C. A. 63, 118 Fed. 113, 192 U. S. 568, 48 L. Ed. 565. In the case of the Interstate Stockyards Co. v. Indianapolis Union R. Co., supra, the Indiana circuit court held that a belt line connecting with the different carriers and making agreements for continuous shipments of interstate commerce had no right to discriminate against different stockyards by refusing to deliver stock at one of the yards, though consigned to the owner for care, and the court granted a temporary injunction against the discrimination. In this case however the terminal road was expressly. required by the state statute and its city franchises to render such services without discrimination, and it seems that the track connection had been made and the injunction was against the interruption of the service theretofore rendered.

§ 285 (217). Contract rights of trackage.—In the absence of statute the rights of a railroad company under a lawful agreement for the specified use of the tracks of another railroad company are measured in respect to the direct use in the terms of the contract, and the provisions of the act to regulate commerce apply to the situation created by the contract, and add no authority for a different use of the track. 3 I. C. C. R. 519, 2 Int. Com. Rep. 771. In this case it was ruled by the commission that the Rock Island Company which operated the Union Pacific tracks between Kansas City and Topeka upon condition that no intermediate business should be done by the Rock Island Company on any part of the line used under the agreement, the Pacific Company retaining the control of the road and supplying accommodations between the intermediate points and Kansas City. The majority of the commission said that such running arrangements existed in many parts of the country and were of great service in transportation. Chairman Cooley doubted the validity of the contract, but agreed that the commission had no jurisdiction to interfere with the arrangement.

In Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 163 U. S. 564, 41 L. Ed. 265 (1896), the supreme court held that a later contract made between the same parties for trackage rights by the Rock Island Company over the Union Pacific

tracks from Council Bluffs to South Omaha, and giving the Union Pacific Company the right to operate the Rock Island tracks between South Omaha and Lincoln, was valid, and the court said that such business arrangements were in accord with the policy in favor of continuous lines declared by congress in the act of 1866 (supra, § 42), and that a railroad could contract to give another running rights over its tracks without express statutory authority, and the decree of the court below specifically enforcing the contract was affirmed. The contract in this case provided that the Union Pacific Company should do no intermediate business on the Rock Island's tracks.

§ 286. Rights of connecting carriers as to milling in transit privileges. As through routing is based upon contract and the relation is not created by any application of the common law or requirement of statute, except where ordered by the commission, it follows that any railroad company may decline to become a party to any agreement for through routing unless the terms and conditions are satisfactory to it.

This principle has been applied by the commission, 9 I. C. C. R. 311, to the privilege of milling in transit granted by some roads. As before shown the commission has approved of this practice as promotive of commerce but no authority is given by the act, to the commission, to regulate the granting of such privileges. The commission ruled however that the Boston & Maine Railroad, receiving traffic from the west, was not compelled to apply that rate on shipments of feed, ground in transit; and that it was not bound by a private arrangement existing between the shipper and the carrier from whom he received the privilege, to grind his corn in transit. It was ruled in the same case however, that while the connecting carrier was bound by the arrangement for milling in transit, it could impose an arbitrary charge in addition to the regular through rate on the milled product.

As to right of carriers to judicial protection in the interchange of traffic, see infra, section 8, and as to unlawful combinations interfering with such interchanges, see infra, section 10.

§ 287. Exclusive contracts for station facilities not unlawful. In Donovan v. Pennsylvania Company, 199 U. S. 279, 50 L. Ed. p. 192 (1905), the supreme court affirmed the United States circuit court of appeals for the seventh circuit, 120 Fed. 215,

124 Fed. 1016, in affirming a decree of the circuit court enjoining cabmen from entering a railway station and grounds to solicit customers, and from congregating on the sidewalk in front of the station so as to interfere with the ingress and egress of passengers and employes entering the railway station and grounds of the railroad of complainant in Chicago. The railway company had made an agreement with a local transfer company to furnish at its passenger station all the vehicles necessary for the accommodation of passengers arriving there on its trains or on the trains of other railroad companies using the station; and the court held that it could rightfully exclude from the station and depot grounds all other hackmen or cabmen seeking entrance for the purpose of soliciting for themselves the custom or patronage of passengers. The court said that the licensed hackmen or cabmen, when not forbidden by valid municipal regulations, could within reasonable limits use the public sidewalks about the main entrance to the railway passenger station in prosecuting their calling; but they were not entitled to so congregate as to interfere with the ingress and egress of passengers and employes. The court also held that the absence of adequate legal remedy justified a resort to injunction.

In 20 I. C. C. R. 458, the commission followed this case in sustaining the arrangement made by the Wabash Railroad with a fruit auction company to conduct its business as an auctioneer of fruit and vegetables on the terminal premises of the defendant in St. Louis. The commission said there was no element of discrimination as between the different shippers that wished to use the auction company's service. The commission said that the right to grant exclusive privileges of this general nature in passenger stations had been much discussed in the courts of this country and in England, and had generally been sustained, although in a few of the states it had been denied, but that the decision in the supreme court in the case above cited had settled the matter. The commission said that it could not take cognizance of any claims except those of the traveling or shipping public.

SECTION 4.

288. Long and short haul provisions.

289. History of the section and its amendments.

290. Construction of the section prior to the amendment of 1910. 291. "Over the same line."

292. Application to the commission.

293. The burden of proof.

294. Construction of section by commission and application to different classes of rates.

295. Ruling of commission as to export and import rates under sec

tion.

296. The commission on application for relief under the fourth sec

tion.

297. The five trade zones for transcontinental traffic.

§ 288. Long and short haul provisions.-SEC. 4. (As amended June 18, 1910.) That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act to charge or receive any greater compensation in the aggregate for the transportation of passengers, or of like kind of property, for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line or route in the same direction, the shorter being included within the longer distance, or to charge any greater compensation as a through route than the aggregate of the intermediate rates subject to the provisions of this Act; but this shall not be construed as authorizing any common carrier within the terms of this Act to charge or receive as great compensation for a shorter as for

[Commission has authority to relieve carriers from the oper-
ation of this section.]

a longer distance: Provided, however, That upon application to the Interstate Commerce Commission such common carrier may in special cases, after investigation, be authorized by the Commission to charge less for longer than for shorter distances for the transportation of passengers or property; and the Commission may from time to time prescribe the extent to which such designated common carrier may be relieved from the operation of this section: Provided, further, That no rates or charges lawfully existing at the time of the passage of this amendatory Act shall be required to be changed by reason of the provisions of this section prior to the expiration of six months after the passage of this Act, nor in any case where application shall have been filed before the Commission, in accordance with the provisions of this section, until a determination of such application by the commission.

« iepriekšējāTurpināt »