That product, however, is a substance, a composition of matter. If it was new and useful they were entitled to a patent for it. If entitled to a patent for it at all, they were entitled to one for it however made. So, if the claim covered it without those words, it covered it as fully for the purposes of a patent as with them, and they did not enlarge nor vary the meaning of the claim, nor have any effect upon the patent at all. It is further said that the patent professes to be, and is in fact, a patent for a result, which is not patentable at all. It is true the claim does not make use of the word "result." If it was used to signify an abstraction, it seems true enough that it would not be for anything patentable. But it is to be read with the rest of the words with which it is connected; and, when so read, its meaning is plain. The claim is for the product that will be produced by those processes. It so says. Then, when it says" or by any other method which will produce a like result," it means any other method which will produce a like product resulting. So the claim is all the way for a thing tangible, and not for a mere idea. It is also suggested that the substance is not so described in the patent as to make what it is determinable with sufficient exactness. It is called artificial alizarine. That may not be the most exact nor a very exact name. But the patent law does not prescribe how patented articles shall be named. It is described by an exact mode of production that will not produce anything else. Those who are able to produce it and those who use it, have no difficulty in knowing or using it. Its character is so complex and intricate that everything to be found in it could not be told then, and, perhaps, cannot be now. But there is nothing in the law that requires all its constituent parts to be described, set forth, or known. The law required the inventors to file such written description of it, and of the manner and process of making, compounding, and using it, "in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms, as to enable any person skilled in the art or science to which it appertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, construct, compound, and use the same." (Act of 1836, § 6; 1870, § 26; Rev. Stats., sec. 4888.) This is all the law required in this behalf, and it is shown by the testimony, both of those skilled in the art and science to which this subject appertains and with which it is most nearly connected, and those dealing in and making practical use of it, has been done. Those wishing to use it know what to apply for to obtain it, and how to make use of it when obtained. It is not a mere scientific abstraction, but is an article of commerce, useful in the art of coloring, that can be bought, sold, handled, and consumed. The inventors appear to have done all that could be done, and all that was required or would be useful, in describing it. It is insisted that, at the time of this invention, this product was old, and as well known as it was afterward, and that what was invented was in reality merely a new process of producing it. Whether the product was new with the invention, or was known before, is a question of fact to be determined upon the evidence. Chemically pure alizarine was unquestionably well known among chemists. Madder alizarine was well known among chemists and artists in dyes. If this is the same as either, it could not be a new invention. If not the same as either, it is not claimed that it is the same as any other known thing. The chemists examined as witnesses on each side are of such eminent learning and undoubted character, that the solution of this question is not involved with such difficulties as are sometimes to be encountered in settling questions of fact. A careful examination of the testimony of Professor Chandler, a witness for the defendants, and that of President Morton and Professors Hedrick and Ordway, witnesses for the plaintiff, shows that he differs from them more about names of things, the construction of terms, and inferences to be drawn, than about the actual existence of material facts. Madder alizarine contains chemically pure alizarine, expressed by the chemical notation C1HO4. So does this product. So far the witnesses agree; and, so far as that particular ingredient is concerned, the two substances are identical. He regards that as the important thing, and the presence of the other things which each contains as unimportant and useless, if not injurious accidents. That other things do exist in each, as they testify, he does not deny. They say that this product contains isopurpurine, anthrapurpurine, monoxanthrakinon, and some other less important ingredients not named, which were not only not ingredients of either pure alizarine or madder alizarine, but were not known at all until they were brought out by this invention. He says that purpurine was discovered by Colin in 1828, and anthrakinon by Dumas and Laurent in 1832. Purpurine is chemically different from isopurpurine or anthrapurpurine, and anthrakinon from monoxanthrakinon, as here understood. He does not say that any dye-stuff before that of Graebe and Liebermann ever contained isopurpurine, anthrapurpurine, and monoxanthrakinon with pure alizarine, as theirs did and does. So, upon the testimony that is not really contradictory, their product was a new composition of matter. He says these things are mere impurities, whose presence is not wanted, and which are tolerated because it is better to endure them than removing them, and he produces exhibits to show what colors may be made upon fabrics with them and without them. The others say that they are useful coloring agents, and exhibits are produced to show that fact. From all, it appears that they are influential as coloring agents in producing results different from those that can be produced without them. So that the product of these inventors containing them was not only a new composition, but a new dye-stuff. That it is useful, as other coloring materials are useful, is beyond any question. From these considerations, it appears that Graebe and Liebermann invented a new and useful composition of matter, for which they properly obtained their original patent, and, so far as is open to inquiry here, their reissued patent. The claim that the defendants do not infringe rests, apparently, upon the idea that they only use the product of a different process, and not that they do not use or vend dye-stuff substantially the same as this. The case of Badische Anilin and Soda Fabrik v. Hamilton Manufac turing Company (13 OFFICIAL GAZETTE, 273), in the district of Massachusetts, before the late and eminent circuit judge, Shepley, covers most of the questions made in this case, but not all of them, for there is evi dence in this case that does not appear to have been in that, and some questions are made here that do not appear to have been made there. So far as that case goes it is an ample authority for the decision here reached. And, upon the facts found here, it goes nearly, if not quite, as far as this case does. Let a decree be entered for the plaintiff, establishing the validity of the patent, and for an injunction and an account of profits and damages occasioned by the infringement, according to the prayer of the bill, with costs. (Circuit Court of the United States-Northern District of New York.] (O. G., vol. xiv, p. 448.) Decided July 12, 1878. 1. The grant of the full and exclusive right to use and sell the invention within a limited territory, the grantor reserving a right (not the exclusive right) to make: Held, under all the circumstances, to vest a right to make in the grantees. 2. If the invention could not be made except at the will or after further arrangement with the grantor, then the right to use and sell is valueless, and the consideration paid is without return. 3. So, too, if the exclusive right to make never left the grantor, the words of reservation retaining in himself a right to make are useless, and their presence in the deed of conveyance without significance. 4. To give effect to every part of the instrument, it was ruled that the exclusive right to make within the territory was enjoyed in common by grantor and grantees.. 5. "Legal representatives” includes assignees as well as executors and administrators in its terms, under the particular circumstances. Mr. W. H. Bright for the plaintiff. Mr. H. R. Selden for the defendants. BLATCHFORD, J.: This suit is founded on letters patent of the United States granted to Palmer Hamilton, December 5, 1865, for "improvements in saw-mills," of which the plaintiff claims to be the owner. The defendants interpose plea to the bill. The matters set up in the plea are as follows: Palmer Hamilton, on the 1st of August, 1866, assigned to Milton A. Hamilton all the right, title, and interest of Palmer Hamilton in the invention covered by the patent, "as it is or may be applied to muley or single up right mill-saws," for the whole of the United States. Milton A. Hamilton, on the 27th of August, 1866, assigned to Clinton A. Lombard and John Thompson, "and to their legal representatives," for the consideration of $3,000, "the full and exclusive right to use and to sell to be used the said saw-hangings" (the invention being previously in the assignment stated to be known as Hamilton's oscillating and reciprocating saw-hangings), " as they are or may be applied to muley or single upright mill-saws, as secured by the said letters patent, for and in the State of New York, I excepting and reserving the right to manufacture the said invention for myself and legal representatives." Lombard & Thompson, on the 29th of April, 1868, for the consideration of $10,000, assigned to Robert P. Russell, Montgomery Reese, and the firm of Strong & Woodbury, in equal shares of one-third each, all the right, title, and interest of Lombard and Thompson in the invention patented, for, to, and in the State of New York. Reese, on the 15th of July, 1868, in consideration of $1,200, assigned to Russell and the firm of Strong & Woodbury, in equal shares of one-half to each, all the right, title, and interest of Reese in the invention patented, for, to, and in the State of New York. Strong & Woodbury, on the 10th of December, 1869, in consideration of $1,000, assigned to the defendants all the right, title, and interest of Strong & Woodbury in the invention patented, for the State of New York, except the counties of Cayuga and Franklin. "The defendants did not make or sell any machines containing the patented invention" prior to the assignment from Strong & Woodbury to them, except that within a year prior to that time they made for Strong & Woodbury, and at their request, a small number of said machines, and since said assignment they have not made, used, or sold any machine containing said invention, except that they have made and sold muley and single upright mill-saws containing said invention within the State of New York other than in the counties of Cayuga and Franklin in that State. The bill sets up an assignment by Palmer Hamilton to Milon A. Hamilton, on the 1st of August, 1866, of the entire patent, and an assignment by Milton A. Hamilton to Palmer Hamilton, on the 12th of March, 1867, of the entire patent, and an assignment by Palmer Hamilton to the plaintiff, on the 18th of April, 1873, of the entire patent. The plea alleges that the assignment set up in the bill from Milton A. Hamilton to Palmer Hamilton was not recorded in the Patent Office until after the time when the defendants made the purchase from Strong & Woodbury, and received from them the said assignment; that the defendants had no notice of such assignment from Milton A. Hamilton to Palmer Hamilton until after this suit was brought; and that they made the purchase from Strong & Woodbury and received from them said assignment, and paid them therefor in good faith the consideration of $1,000, therein expressed, without any knowledge or notice that any such assignment as that from Milton A. Hamilton above mentioned there or ever existed, and in the full belief that the said assignment from Strong & Woodbury gave to them a perfect title to such interest in the patent as it purported to convey. The bill alleges that the defendants, in violation of the rights conferred by the patent, and in infringement thereof, have made and sold, without the license of Palmer Hamilton, or Milton A. Hamilton, or the plaintiff, large numbers of machines containing the patented inventions, and have cut large amounts of lumber with such machines, and have realized large profits from such infringement. It also alleges that the plaintiff is the owner, by assignment, of all the rights of action for infringement of the patent which occurred to either Palmer Hamilton or Milton A. Hamilton. The plea alleges that the assigment from Milton A. Hamilton to Lombard & Thompson was recorded in the Patent Office on the 22d of October, 1866; that the assignment from Lombard & Thompson was recorded in the Patent Office on the 7th of August, 1868; and that the assignment from Reese was recorded in the Patent Office on the 7th of August, 1868. It is contended for the defendants on the hearing in the bill and plea that the assignment from Milton A. Hamilton to Lombard & Thompson gave to the latter the exclusive right to use and sell to be used the said hangings as applied to muley or single upright mill-saws within the State of New York, and the right to manufacture the same for such use or sale, in common with a right to manufacture the same, reserved to said Milton A. Hamilton. For the plaintiff it is contended that by the assignment to Lombard & Thompson the privilege granted to them is limited to the right to use and sell, and that Milton A. Hamilton expressly reserved to himself the right to manufacture. The language of the assignment to Lombard & Thompson is inartificial and awkward, but the meaning of it is, I think, clear. The grantor, having the right to the patent for the whole of the United States, for its application to muley or single upright mill-saws-that is, the exclusive right for the whole of the United States to make, use, and sell sawhangings according to the patent as applied to muley or single upright mill-saws-conveys to Lombard & Thompson, for $3,000, the exclusive right to use and sell saw-hangings according to the patent as applied to muley or single upright mill-saws for and in the State of New York, and excepts and reserves to himself the right to manufacture the patented invention. He conveys the exclusive right to use and sell in the State of New York. He does not convey the exclusive right to make in that State, because he reserves the privilege of making himself in that State. He retains the exclusive right to use and sell in other States, and the privilege of making in the State of New York for use and sale in other States, if desirable to him. He does not except and reserve the exclusive right to make in the State of New York, but merely a right to make. On all proper rules of construction the exception and reservation must be held to be an exception and reservation of something which, but for such exception and reservation, would pass by the granting part to the grantee. A right to use and sell, and especially an exclusive right to |