tiffs any Federal rights duly claimed by them in the state court, and we have no right to inquire further. er to tax this interest in the mining claim and enforce the collection of the tax by sale. The tax deed conveyed merely the right of possession and affected no interest of the United States. 2. The tax deed under which the defendant in error Wood claims title was executed in pursuance of a sale made upon*a notice published only in a Sunday newspaper. This fact does not appear from the deed itself, as an analogous infirmity appeared in the tax deed before the court in Redfield v. Parks, 132 U. S. 239, 33 L. ed. 327, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83. The deed upon its face was a valid instrument, and could be impeached only by evidence aliunde. The state court did not deem it necessary to consider whether such a notice was sufficient, because it held that a state statute the sufficiency of the notice, and that possession under such a deed for the prescribed period met the requirements of the state statute of limitations. The decision therefore did not reach the only Federal question which can be imagined with respect to this part of the case, namely, that a sale upon such a notice was wanting in due process of law, but rested upon entirely adequate grounds of a non-Federal nature. Whether the decision of the question of state law was right or wrong, we may not consider. It is enough that the judgment proceeded solely upon the state law, and that the state law was adequate to dispose of the case without reaching any Federal question. Leathe v. Thomas (November 11, 1907), 207 U. S. 93, ante, 30, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30. We need not, therefore, consider whether this Federal question was properly raised in the court below, or whether a sale upon such a notice would be a denial of due process of law, in violation of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution. 1. The title to the land on which this mining claim was located was in the United States. It was a part of the public lands, and although proceedings had been begun by the owners of the claim for the acquisition of the title to the land by patent, they were not concluded at the time of the assess ment of the tax, and apparently no patent has ever been issued. Obviously the land was not taxable as the property of Wilhelmina Gude. The act by which the people of the territory of Colorado were enabled to form a state (§ 4 of act approved March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. at L. 474, chap. 139) provided that no taxes should ever be imposed upon lands or property of the United States. The claim of a Federal right was based up-made such a deed prima facie evidence of on this statute. But, assuming that under this statute a Federal question is raised, there was no taxation of the land in the case at bar. A statute of Colorado author ized the taxation of mining claims, whether patented or entered for patent or not, in these words: "In case the mine or mining claim shall not be patented, or entered for a patent, but shall be assessable and taxable under this act, on account of producing gross proceeds, then, and in that case, the possession shall be the subject of the assessment, and if said mining property be sold for taxes levied, the sale for such taxes shall pass the title and right of possession to the purchaser, under the laws of Colorado." Laws 1887, pp. 340, 341, Mills's Anno. Stat. § 3222-3225. The construction of this statute and the conformity to it of the proceedings of the taxing officials were questions exclusively for the supreme court of the state, and we have no authority to review its determination of them. That court held that what was assessed was not the land on which the mining claim was located, but the claim itself; that is to say, the right of possession of the land for mining purposes. It is agreed that the Comstock lode was a "valid subsisting mining location," and, at the time of the assessment of the tax, Wilhelmina Gude was the owner of the undivided interest in it which is in controversy here. Such an interest from early times has been held to be property, distinct from the land itself, vendible, inheritable, and taxable. Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U. S. 762, 24 L. ed. 313; Belk v. Meagher, 104 U. S. 279, 283, 26 L. ed. 735, 737; Manuel v. Wulff, 152 U. S. 505, 510, 38 L. ed. 532, 534, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 651; St. Louis Min. & Mill. Co. v. Montana Min. Co. 171 U. S. 650, 655, 43 L. ed. 320, 322, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 61; 1 Lindley, Mines, §§ 535 to 542, inclusive. The state, therefore, had the pow The plaintiffs in error have shown no violation of Federal right, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado is affirmed. (208 U. S. 198) UNITED STATES V. A. GRAF DISTILLING COMPANY. Internal revenue-forfeiture-grounds. 1. The sale of a barrel of whisky to which has been added, after such barrel has been properly stamped by a revenue officer, burnt sugar, or caramel, as coloring matter, does not authorize the seizure and forfeiture to Rev. Stat. § 3455, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, the United States provided for by U. S. p. 2279, when a barrel or other package contains anything else at the time of sale than *199 the contents which were therein when law- | the barrels and packages at the time of the fully stamped. Internal revenue-forfeiture-grounds. 2. Substances which are not in themselves taxable under the laws of the United States are not embraced in the words "anything else," as used in U. S. Rev. Stat. § 3455, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2279, providing for a seizure, forfeiture, and penalty for selling packages which contain, at the time of sale, anything else than the contents when the same were lawfully stamped by a revenue officer, even where there is no intent to defraud, and for a much heavier penalty where there is such fraudulent in tent. [No. 24.] sales last aforesaid containing things else than the contents which were therein when said barrels and packages were so lawfully stamped, branded, and marked by said officer of the revenue, as aforesaid, to wit, burnt sugar, commonly called caramel, which had been added to and placed in said spirits before said last-mentioned sales thereof, in violation of § 3455 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2279), whereby and by force of said statute said barrels and packages and all the contents thereof became and are forfeited to the United States." * The claimant, A. Graf Distilling Company, demurred to the information on the (Argued December 16, 1907. Decided Jan- ground that it was insufficient in law to auuary 27, 1908. thorize a decree of forfeiture. The demurrer was sustained by the disN A CERTIFICATE from the United trict court, and, the United States declining 0 States Circuit Court of Appeals for to plead further, it was adjudged that the the Eighth Circuit, presenting questions as to whether the addition of burnt sugar, or caramel, before sale, to a barrel of whisky which has been stamped by a revenue officer, authorizes a seizure and forfeiture, and whether the phrase "anything else," as used in the statute providing for such seizure and forfeiture, includes substances that are not in themselves taxable. Both questions answered in the negative. Statement by Mr. Justice Peckham: This case comes here on a certificate from the United States circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit. The proceeding was commenced in the district court of the United States for the eastern district of Missouri, January 4, 1905, by the United States district attorney for that district, who filed therein an amended information, praying for a decree of forfeiture, condemnation, and sale of three barrels of whisky, which had theretofore bees seized by the collector of internal revenue and were still in his possession and custody. barrels of whisky be restored to the claimant. The ground of the decision of the district court was that the purpose of § 3455 of the Revised Statutes is to prevent the disposition of packages stamped, branded, or marked, when empty, or when containing a taxable substance other than the contents which were therein when they were so lawfully stamped, branded, or marked by an officer of the revenue; and that burnt sugar, or caramel, not being taxable, is not within the meaning of the phrase "anything else," as contained in the section referred to. The circuit court of appeals, in order to a correct determination of the cause, desired the instruction of this court upon the following questions: "1. Does the sale of a barrel of whisky, stamped, branded, and marked so as to show that the contents have been duly inspected, and that the tax thereon has been paid, into which burnt sugar, or caramel, has been introduced after such stamping, branding, and marking by an officer of the revenue, au the United States under the provisions of § 3455 of the Revised Statutes of the United States? "2. Does the phrase 'anything else,' as employed in § 3455 of the Revised Statutes, include substances that are not in themselves taxable under the laws of the United States?" The sole ground for the seizure and for-thorize a seizure and forfeiture thereof to feiture averred in the information is contained in the following paragraph thereof, as certified by the circuit court of appeals: "That prior to the times of said seizure of said barrels and packages, they, and each of them, had been purchased and received by A. Graf & Company, they then being stamped, branded, and marked so as to show that the contents thereof were distilled spirits of a certain proof, which had before then been duly inspected by an officer of the revenue, to wit, a United States gauger. That afterwards, and before said seizure, said barrels and packages, and each of them, and the contents therein then contained, were sold to divers persons, each of Section 3455 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2279), under which the seizure of the whisky was made, is set forth in the margint † Sec. 3455. Whenever any person sells, gives, purchases, or receives any box, barrel, bag, vessel, package, wrapper, cover, or *200 •204 203 Assistant Attorney General Cooley for increase or decrease the amount of the tax the United States. Mr. Warwick M. Hough for the A. Graf Distilling Company. Mr. Justice Peckham, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court: otherwise payable on the spirits so colored. The government, however, contends that it is wholly immaterial whether the coloring matter added is not itself taxable; it is, within the terms of the statute, something "else than the contents which were" in the barrel when it was lawfully stamped by the Other phases of this controversy have officer of the revenue; and, if the person appeared in the courts below and are re- who adds the coloring matter subsequently ported in 125 Fed. 52, and 63 C. C. A. 263, sells the barrel and contents, such act sub129 Fed. 329. After the reversal of the jects them to forfeiture, and renders the judgment of forfeiture and the granting of person making the sale subject to the pena new trial by the circuit court of appeals, alty named in the first part of the section. as disclosed by those reports, the informa The counsel for the government insists that tion was amended by making the allegations there is no room for construction other than contained in the foregoing statement, and such as the plain language of the statute the original averment as to placing other calls for; and it is contended that to hold distilled spirits of a different quality in the otherwise destroys the statute and opens barrels after being stamped is not before us. the door to fraud which is not easy to deWe are here called upon to determine tect, and which the statute was intended to what is the proper construction of the lan- prevent. In a very careful review of the guage of the statute when it speaks of sell- various provisions of the internal revenue ing a barrel and its contents after it has statute, counsel for the government has been properly stamped, and which, at the called attention to many acts which are fortime of sale, contained anything else than bidden and which would seem to be innothe contents which were therein when the cent, but which were, nevertheless, thought barrel was stamped by the revenue officer. to be of such a character as to open the Does the addition, after such stamping, door for fraud upon the revenue, and hence of burnt sugar, or caramel, placed in the it is argued that this addition of coloring barrel for the sole purpose of coloring the matter was an act which although it might contents (in this case whisky), and without seem to be innocent in itself, yet nevertheintent to defraud the revenue or any per- less comes within the plain prohibition of son, render the seller liable to the penalty this section, and effect must be given to that provided by the statute, and the barrel and prohibition, because it may tend to preits contents liable to forfeiture? This col- vent some subsequent fraud, however harsh or unreasonable the provision might otheroring matter was not itself taxable. There wise seem to be. We must first, however, is no charge that it is unhealthy, and it is be satisfied that this alleged total, absolute, plain that its use defrauds no one, within and unconditional prohibition was the real the legal meaning of that term. The stat- intention of Congress, to be gathered from ute is not a health law, nor is its purpose the language of the section when read in to prevent the coloring of whisky before its connection with the language of the whole sale to the consumer. The matter which statute. There is no doubt that many of was added to the contents of the barrel, its provisions are harsh beyond anything after it was stamped and branded, did not known heretofore in our history (United envelope of any kind, stamped, branded, or any box, barrel, bag, vessel, package, wrapmarked in any way so as to show that the per, cover, or envelope, stamped, branded, contents or intended contents thereof have or marked, as above described, or stamps, been duly inspected, or that the tax thereon brands, or marks the same, as herein before has been paid, or that any provision of the recited, shall be liable to penalty as before internal revenue laws has been complied provided in this section. And every person with, whether such stamping, branding, or who violates the foregoing provisions of this marking may have been a duly authorized section, with intent to defraud the revenue, act or may be false and counterfeit, or or to defraud any person, shall be liable to otherwise without authority of law, said a fine of not less than one thousand nor box, barrel, bag, vessel, package, wrapper, more than five thousand dollars, or to imcover, or envelope being empty, or contain-prisonment for not less than six months nor ing anything else than the contents which were therein when said articles had been so lawfully stamped, branded, or marked by an officer of the revenue, he shall be liable to a penalty of not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars. And every person who makes, manufactures, or produces stamped, or more than five years, or to both, at the dis- ⚫206 States v. Ulrici, 3 Dill. 532, 539, Fed. Cas. I added to the contents of the barrel before No. 16,594), and yet we cannot persuade ourselves that the act proved in this case comes within the law. The section is one of many dealing with the subject of collecting a revenue from the taxation of the articles therein mentioned and in the manner therein provided. The aim of the whole statute is to make all of the taxable articles actually pay the tax, and to that end it prohibits those acts which might possibly lead to an evasion of the payment of the tax due upon any taxable article. When, therefore, in the course of the many provisions for collecting the tax and for preventing any evasion of its due payment the statute prohibits the putting of anything else in the barrel or package, etc., after it has been branded or stamped, it seems to us the natural meaning of the language limits the addition to anything of a taxable nature, and does not include an article which is not taxable, is wholly harmless, and added for a purpose not illegal or is itself improper. We concur, of course, in the rule which has been upheld in this court, that a stat ute like this one, for the raising of a revenue, even when accompanied by provisions of a very highly penal nature, is still to be construed as a whole and in a fair and reasonable manner, and not strictly in favor of a defendant. United States v. Stowell, 133 U. S. 1, 33 L. ed. 555, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 244. Construed under this rule, we are unable to conclude that the section applies to this case. The language used, when considered in connection with the whole statute, is not so plain as to preclude the application of those general rules of construction of statutes which frequently interpret language in accordance with what seems to be the real meaning of the legislature, although not in exact and literal obedience to the wording of the law. they were emptied that would, in such case, aid the attempted fraud, for such coloring matter would probably have been emptied with the other contents of the barrel. The opportunities for fraud commenced at the time the liquor dealer emptied the contents of the barrel without destroying the stamp, and that opportunity was not in the slightest degree affected by the addition, and the attempted fraud of the distiller is not made more easy of accomplishment because of such addition. We cannot see, therefore, that any reasonable purpose could be attributed to Congress in prohibiting an addition, such as is charged in this case, and we cannot construe the section on the mistaken theory that, though the act was*really innocent, yet it might aid in the evasion of payment of some portion of a tax, and hence must be regarded as prohibited. The statute in question, although there has been no intent to defraud, makes a person violating it liable to the lighter penalty, while, if the intent to defraud be alleged, the article is still liable to forfeiture and the person may be fined a much larger sum and also imprisoned. On this ground it is contended the statute is intended to meet just such a case as the one before us, where there was no intent to defraud and where there was no addition of anything which was itself taxable, but where, nevertheless, something else had been added after the stamping and branding, which was not a part of the contents of the barrel when it was so stamped. It is therefore urged that, as the section provides for a forfeiture of the article and a fine upon the person guilty of the addition, even when no intent to defraud is alleged or proved, it emasculates the section to hold that the addition must be something which is itself taxable. We do not think so. When there has been an addition of anything that was taxable, the We do not think that the opportunities statute applies, although there was no infor perpetrating a fraud upon the revenue tention to defraud; while, if there were are in any way extended by reason of the such intention, a much heavier penalty is addition in question. A liquor dealer hav-imposed. The two portions of the section ing a properly stamped barrel in his pos- are distinct, and each may be enforced, howsession might violate the law and empty the contents of the barrel without destroying the stamps, and might then dispose of the barrel, so stamped, to an illicit distiller, who might then endeavor to perpetrate a fraud upon the revenue by filling the barrel with nontax-paid spirits, but we do not see that the prior addition, as mentioned, of coloring matter to the contents of the barrel, would aid him in his attempt, nor would the absence of such matter tend in any degree to its prevention or detection. It is not the coloring matter which was ever harsh the first may appear to be, when imposed in a case where the action was really without any intention to defraud the revenue or any person. It has been held under other sections of this act, somewhat similar, that the addi tion of water to the contents of a barrel or package is no ground of forfeiture. We do not say that the language is exactly the same, but only that it is somewhat similar. United States v. 32 Barrels of Distilled Spirits, 5 Fed. 188; 3 Packages of Distilled Spirits, 14 Fed. 569; United States v. Bar *207 Carriers discriminating rates. in an action against interstate carriers to recover the amount of money reparation directed by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Affirmed. See same case below, 70 C. C. A. 23, 137 Fed. 343. Statement by Mr. Justice Peckham: The plaintiff in error, who was plaintiff below, seeks to review a judgment of the circuit court of appeals for the third circuit (70 C. C. A. 23, 137 Fed. 343), reversing absolutely and without allowing a writ of venire facias de novo, the judgment of the circuit court of the United States for the western district of Pennsylvania in favor of the plaintiff company for $8,579, with interest from May 15, 1894; in all, $12,706.92. This sum was made up of the charge of 14 cents for the weight of the barrel in which oil was transported to Perth Amboy from the Pennsylvania oil fields, from September 3, 1888, the time when such charge commenced, to May 15, 1894, the time when the hearing on the claims was had before the Interstate Commerce Commission. 1. Carriers cannot be charged with discriminating against shippers of oil in barrels from the Pennsylvania oil fields to Perth Amboy, New Jersey, because they charge for the barrel package without making a corresponding charge upon shipments in tank cars owned by those shippers The proceeding resulting in the petition who can afford to build and furnish them, herein to the circuit court was originally the carriers having none of their own, where commenced before the Interstate Commerce the transportation by tank cars is more reCommission, and thereafter conducted purmunerative to the carriers than the trans-suant to §§ 13 to 16 of the act creating the portation by barrels, and the barrel ship Commission (24 Stat. at L. 379, 384, chap. pers have made no demand for tank cars, and cannot use them economically for ship- 104), as amended by the act of 1889 (25 ments to Perth Amboy, on account of the Stat. at L. 855, 859, chap. 382, U. S. Comp. lack of facilities for unloading at that Stat. 1901, p. 3165), to obtain relief from point. * certain alleged illegal practices of the railroad companies in the way of overcharges for the transportation of oil for the complainants in the petition, and to obtain reparation therefor. 1 Connecting carriers discriminating rates. 2. A connecting carrier which takes the cars as they are delivered to it by the initial carrier is not liable for a discrimination in favor of shippers of oil in tank cars and against shippers of oil in barrels which may be practised by the initial carrier, merely because such connecting carrier has participated in the adoption of a joint through rate for barrel shipments which is, in itself, reasonable, although, by the act of February 4, 1887 (24 Stat. at L. 379, chap. 104), § 8, a carrier which "shall do, cause to be done, or permit to be done, any act, matter, or thing in this act prohibited or declared to be unlawful," shall be liable to the full amount of the damages sustained by one injured thereby. [No. 27.] Argued October 18, 21, 1907. Decided January 27, 1908. Three substantially contemporaneous, yet also separate, petitions, were filed with the Commission, two on the 4th of December, 1888, and one on the 30th of January, 1889, by the Independent Refiners' Association of Titusville, Pennsylvania, and the Independent Refiners' Association of Oil City, Pennsylvania, against several railroad companies. The petitioners were associations of some sixteen separate refining companies, operating distinct and separate works in the oil regions of Pennsylvania, near the city of Titusville or Oil City. The petitions were filed for the purpose of obtaining relief from certain charges made by the defendant companies against the petitioners for the transportation of N ERROR to the United States Circuit their oil from those oil fields to tidewater IN Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in New Jersey, and specially to Perth am to review a judgment reversing a judgment of the Circuit Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, in favor of plaintiff, boy, in that state, and described as a point in New York harbor, and also to Boston and points in that vicinity. Their petition Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 9, Carriers, § 22. tEd. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 9, Carriers, § 22 |