Captain RICHMOND. Yes. They did not at that time hold as many hearings as we have held. For one reason, they did not have the investigative staff set up and they waited for a complaint to come to the office and they would in turn attempt to get the witnesses to come to them. By that time, many of the witnesses were dispersed and the cases could not be prosecuted because you did not have the evidence to prove the case one way or the other.

Summarizing this, we feel that the examining function is presently performed in the most economical fashion possible by individuals who by training, experience, and interests insure a fair and impartial hearing to all, and secondly, that this bill has been drawn for the purpose of continuing this sound practice. We feel that failure to pass this bill will necessitate the creation of additional positions in Government with no comparable decrease in other personnel.

It is very difficult to give a specific estimate for two reasons. One is at first we have only a very general idea as to what ratings these examiners will have when appointed. We have estimated that they will probably be P-5 positions. If we attempt to set that off against the salaries of the officers involved we feel on the minimum number of examiners we believe necessary that the extra cost would run in the neighborhood of $150,000, but that is an estimate pure and simple. Mr. KEATING. You mean the extra cost of others doing it? Captain RICHMOND. Under our present system.

Mr. GRAHAM. Have you finished?

Captain RICHMOND. Yes, sir.

Mr. GRAHAM. All right, Mr. Spingarn, is there anything you want to add now?

Mr. SPINGARN. Yes, I will take only 2 or 3 minutes, Mr. Chairman. We have already explained section 1 of the bill, which provides that commissioned officers of the Coast Guard may hold hearings in lieu of civil-service examiners.

I would like to briefly mention section 2 of the bill so that will be covered. That is made necessary by section 5 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, which is the so-called separation-of-functions provision of the act. Among other things, that section provides that officers who preside at hearings shall not be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of any officer or agent engaged in prosecuting or investigative functions for any agency.

The Coast Guard is organized on a regional basis with 14 districts, with a Coast Guard officer in charge of its activities in each district. Since that Coast Guard officer, known as the district commander. supervises the investigative and prosecuting functions in the district. there is some question whether officers who are examiners can be under his jurisdiction, even with respect to their nonhearing functions. This hearing work is only part of the work of the Coast Guard officers who act as hearing officers. The other work is administrative and inspection work not related to hearings, but there is the question whether under the Administrative Procedure Act, such an officer can be subject to the supervision of the Coast Guard district commander. Obviously, it is impossible for the Coast Guard Commandant in Washington, Admiral Farley, to supervise the work at the district level, so, as a necessary corollary, the bill also provides that as to their nonhearing work only, these Coast Guard officers who

hold hearings will be subject to the supervision of the district commander.

Now, all I have to say in addition to the above is this: as we have pointed out, we think this bill is the most economical and efficient way of handling the matter and a substantial saving will result and it will mean we will use Coast Guard personnel who will be fully occupied, rather than having civilian examiners who will be busy only part of their time and who we will not be able to use for the rest of the time. However, if the committee, for any reason, should not agree with that reasoning, we sincerely hope you will send us back to the Appropriations Committee with a statement of your views on the matter which will enable us to obtain sufficient funds to carry on this work under the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. Moreover, in view of the fact that without the fault of anyone, we have been treading water on this for several months, we hope in such event you will give us a legislative deferment of 6 months because we are confronted with the June 11 deadline and we could not possibly recruit and get civilian examiners by that time, so even if the committee should decide against the bill, we hope we will get a deferment on the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.

Mr. KEATING. How would you feel, the men and officers of the Coast Guard, to have the United States Navy review all courts-martial proceedings of men and officers of the Coast Guard? Would you be opposed to that?

Mr. SPINGARN. You mean the Navy would review Coast Guard courts-martial?

Mr. KEATING. Yes.

Mr. SPINGARN. I assume we would be opposed to it while the Coast Guard is under the Treasury. While it is under the Navy, no. Mr. KEATING. Who are they under now?

Mr. SPINGARN. The Treasury Department; Coast Guard is under the Treasury in time of peace and under the Navy in time of war.

Mr. KEATING. You, in time of peace, would not want to have the United States Navy investigating and conducting cases against men and officers of the Coast Guard?

Mr. SPINGARN. No, sir. I do not think so.

Mr. KEATING. That is precisely the attitude of the men and officers of the merchant marine that they do not care to have the Coast Guard do that either. They feel that the Coast Guard is a military outfit which is either too severe or tends to be toc severe, depending upon your point of view, and I wonder how much merit there is that.

Mr. SPINGARN. Could I say something on that, Mr. Keating?
Mr. KEATING. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPINGARN. It is true the Coast Guard is organized on a military basis. So are other agencies of the Government, which are largely civilian, such as the Coast and Geodetic Survey. The Coast Guard during time of peace is devoted to saving life at sea, antismuggling, and aids to navigation, which are its principal activities. It is true they serve under the Navy in time of war, just as you served under the Army and as did other civilians, but the Coast Guard is not a truly military organization.

In the second place, I think you want to consider that the whole purpose of section 4450 is to improve safety at sea. The Congress found

in 1936 when it strengthened that section that some terrible marine disasters had taken place and they wanted competent and responsible personnel in the merchant marine.

Mr. KEATING. That was passed when?

Mr. SPINGARN. The original statute was passed in 1871, but in its present form it was amended by the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.

May I also point out further that any agency that runs this, whether the Department of Commerce, or the Coast Guard, is going to come in for criticism. At any rate the Department of Commerce was severely criticized and now we are.

Mr. KEATING. Except we have here, and set me straight if I am wrong, the testimony of officers and men of the merchant marine that they prefer to have this handled under the provisions of the existing Administrative Procedure Act by civilians rather than by officers of the Coast Guard.

Is there any testimony from the merchant marine to the contrary? Mr. SPINGARN. There has been none yet, but I have seen Mr. Haddock's statement, which I believe he will file here, and his statement is extremely critical of the Department of Commerce when it performed these functions.

I think Mr. Haddock would indicate-I cannot speak for him, but he has so told us informally that the Coast Guard has actually improved the handling of the functions previously exercised in this field by the Department of Commerce.

Mr. GORSKI. The merchant marine was administered by the Commerce Department?

Mr. SPINGARN. From 1903 until 1942. Prior to that it was administered by the Treasury.

Mr. KEATING. It is not feasible in your opinion to have the merchant marine handle its own discipline. That is not sufficient?

Mr. SPINGARN. No, sir. I suppose you could say up until 1936 that was essentially the situation with respect to the seamen, and it was that unsatisfactory situation apparently that led the Congress to strengthen the act at that time.

Mr. GRAHAM. Is that all, Mr. Spingarn?
Mr. SPINGARN. That is all, sir.

I simply want to say in conclusion this bill does not present as wide issues as have been aired here and we hope that without regard to those considerations we can get a prompt decision on the bill. It is most urgent from our standpoint.

Mr. GRAHAM. Is Mr. Haddock present? He is the gentleman who requested we meet early.

Mr. REEVES. Who is Mr. Haddock?

Mr. GRAHAM. He is the CIO representative.

Mr. REEVES. Does he know about this session?

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, sir. Here is Mr. Haddock now.

STATEMENT OF HOYT S. HADDOCK, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, CIO MARITIME COMMITTEE

Mr. HADDOCK. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if all the members present have had a chance to read the prepared statement I made.

Mr. GRAHAM. I have. I do not know about the others.

Mr. HADDOCK. Well, I had better go into it then.

My name is Hoyt S. Haddock. I am executive secretary of the CIO maritime committee.

The CIO maritime committee is composed of 6 unions whose membership totals over 200,000. Our unions represent licensed officers, merchant seamen, radio-operators, longshoremen, and allied maritime workers.

We appear today in opposition to H. R. 2966, a bill amending the Administrative Procedure Act to enable Coast Guard officers to preside in place of civilians at the taking of evidence in proceedings under R. S. 4450, as amended, inquiring into the misconduct of seamen.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF R. S. 4450

R. S. 4450 (46 U. S. C. 239) was enacted in 1871, and amended in 1896. At that time it only dealt with the power to suspend or revoke licenses of licensed officers, for acts of incompetence or misconduct. More recently, on May 27, 1936, this section was amended and completely revamped. That action was taken by Congress following the Morro Castle and Mohawk diseasters, to remedy a condition which, it was felt, was responsible for those disasters. As amended, the section also became applicable to unlicensed merchant seamen.

On November 10, 1936, Secretary of Commerce Roper stated in setting up the various marine investigating boards:

Pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by the act of May 27, 1936 (Public, No. 622, 74th Cong.), amending section 4450 R. S., entitled, "An act to provide for a change in the designation of the Bureau of Navigation and Steamboat Inspection, to create a Marine Casualty Board and increase efficiency in administration of the steamboat inspection laws, and for other purposes," I hereby promulgate the following rules and regulations for the investigation of marine casualties and accidents, or acts of incompetency or misconduct in connection therewith committed by licensed officers and holders of certificates of service or efficiency, as provided under section 4 of the act of May 27, 1936.

It will thus be noted that the boards were set up to investigate acts of incompetency or misconduct in connection with investigations of marine casualties and accidents solely. Nevertheless the board was soon utilized to suspend and revoke the certificates of unlicensed crew members, based upon incidents which were in no way related to marine casualties and accidents.

The reason for this was, that the board, in the main, was composed of retired captains, chief mates, chief engineers and first engineers; and they seized upon this occasion to employ R. S. 4450 as a means for upholding the steamship companies, and the officers of vessels, in their disputes with unlicensed crew members, in the miscellaneous and varied situations which arose.

Dr. Paul Maxwell Zeis, in a book entitled "American Shipping Policy," published by the Princeton University Press in 1938, said of the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation:

A portion of the blame for the unsafe conditions of American ships was directed at the Department of Commerce, which through its Bureau of Navigation, was supposed to see that vessels and crews complied with the navigation laws. The activities of the Bureau fell into such disrepute that no commercial underwriter could accept its findings as a basis for insurance.

Mr. KEATING. May I inquire who Dr. Zeis is?

Mr. HADDOCK. I know very little about his background, except he wrote this book. He is presently employed in the Department of Commerce as a shipping expert.

Not only did they seem to favor ship operators in the inspection of hulls but they also began to favor them by using R. S. 4450 as a weapon to be applied against merchant seamen when labor disputes arose.

Thus, when seamen would walk off vessels on strike, exercising their rights under the Wagner Act, they frequently found themselves faced with misconduct proceedings under R. S. 4450, under which their certificates might be revoked or suspended; that is, the exercise of the right to strike became fraught with the possibility that it might, and frequently did, mean depriving seamen of their right to earn a livelihood in the future, regardless of the merits of the dispute.

Mr. KEATING. But that did not happen many times?

Mr. HADDOCK. Yes; many times.

Mr. KEATING. Did it happen prior to the war?

Mr. HADDOCK. Yes; it did happen prior to the war. I would like to state one of the primary reasons for the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act was the bias which existed with regard to conducting these hearings against merchant seamen.

The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, in its pamphlet Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation, 91940, had the following to state, at pages 10 and 11:

The Bureau has given instructions to assistant inspectors that they are to act as counsel for an accused person whenever requested so to do, but in no case has an accused person ever been known to request an assistant inspector to serve as his counsel. The reason for this, it is said, is that seamen consistently regard inspectors as prejudiced against them. That most inspectors are former captains or engineers of vessels is said to give them a point of view at variance with that of seamen and especially antagonistic to the interests of labor unions.

The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure also stated as follows:

The A boards, the chairmen of which are lawyers, adequately develop records, but the B and C boards, who are without legal talent, sometimes act in rather markedly unconventional ways in conducting proceedings. In one trial in which one of the defendants was not present the board merely "noted" his counsel's objection to proceeding in his absence and went on. Boards are sometimes apparently at a loss to know what ruling to make on motions and objections. For example, when a witness began to explain the workings of his mind to state his beliefs, counsel for the defense objected and a long colloquy between counsel and the board members ensued, but no ruling was made and the witness proceeded with his testimony, not knowing whether he could expound his opinions or not. * * * One wonders whether those primarily trained to be inspectors of hulls and boilers are necessarily well qualified to adjudicate cases of this kind. Cases of collisions, grounding, foundering, and stranding call for understanding of navigation rather than for minute knowledge of ship construction. A single able magistrate having some understanding of maritime experience and some familiarity with legal forms could no doubt perform the C board's task with greater expedition.

The process of proof: Both investigation proceedings and trial proceedings follow the same judicial pattern. All witnesses are under oath and subject to cross-examination. It is said that the rules of evidence are substantially followed, but it is obvious that the members of the B and C boards cannot be expected to apply technical rules. One individual in the Bureau says that the rules of evidence are followed, but "such rules are not permitted to defeat the objects for which such boards are convened".

The cavalier attitude with which formerly the boards, and now the Coast Guard examiners, approach the rules of evidence, may be seen by their prevailing practice of accepting log books in evidence in misconduct cases, as evidence against an accused seaman. This, even