Wayne, quere—the court being equally divided on the question. People v. Police Justice, 456.

2. Justices of the Peace and the Police Justice of Detroit, under the statute giving them jurisdiction of criminal offenses where the punishment does not exceed a fine of one hundred dollars, or three months imprisonment, or both, have no jurisdiction of cases where the maximum punishment allowed by law exceeds those limits. Matter of Berry, 466.

POSSESSION OF LANDS.

See CIRCUIT COURT COMMISSIONERS, 1; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS,

PRACTICE IN CIRCUIT COURTS.

See ATTACHMENTS; CIRCUIT COURT COMMISSIONERS.

PRACTICE IN SUPREME COURT.

1. Where one party to a cause, in this court, concedes that the judgment of the court must be for his adversary, to the full extent of what he could claim on argument, the court will not hear an argument, for the purpose of expressing their opinion on points thus rendered unnecessary to a decision of the cause. -Sanger v. Truesdail, 9.

2. A question as to whether a principle heretofore decided by the court is or is not applicable to a case now brought here by writ of error, is one to be discussed on the hearing, and not on motion to dismiss. - Fowler v. Detroit and Milwaukee R. R. Co., 10.

3. The question whether the plaintiff in error appeared and argued the cause in the court below, or consented to the judgment there entered, is one which can not be raised on affidavit, on motion to dismiss the writ of error. Ibid.

4. Where error was brought on a judgment taken by confession on a promissory note, and the errors assigned consisted of mere irregularities in the entering up of judgment, held a proper case under the statute for awarding damages to defendant in error, on affirming the judgment, for the delay and Watervexation consequent upon issuing the writ of error. man v. Toms, 78. 5. A motion based upon the irregular action of the opposite party

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must be made at the earliest opportunity, and will not be entertained after the lapse of a term, unless some very satisfactory reason is shown for the delay. — O'Flynn v. Eagle, 306. 6. The court will not require attorneys to produce their authority to prosecute a writ of error on behalf of one of the plaintiffs, when there is no showing that they are not duly authorized, and, on the contrary, it appears that the attorneys were employed by the other plaintiff to take charge of the case generally, and that the one so employing them was, in fact, the party responsible in the case, and bound to protect the other from liability. — Ibid.

7. Costs on motions are allowed the prevailing party as a matter of course, unless some special reason is shown why they should not be imposed. — Ibid.

8. Where an amendment has been made in the court below, since the cause was removed to this court by writ of error, but no further return has been had, the court can not entertain a motion, based upon such amendment, on affidavit that such an amendment has been made. -- Ibid.

.

9. The court will not set aside a writ of error for want of a proper return, after the lapse of several years, during the most of which time the papers have been in possession of counsel for defendant in error, and joinder in error filed while the counsel had the return in his hands. — Wattles v. Warren, 309. 10. Where the circuit court made an order that the parties be examined as witnesses, and they were examined accordingly, it is not error to refuse to permit one of them to be sworn as a witness on his own behalf on a subsequent trial — the other not being in attendance. -- Lester v. Sutton, 329.

11. Where, on error, the judgment of the circuit court was reversed with costs, and new trial ordered, -- Held, That plaintiff in error was not entitled to tax in his bill of costs the costs which had accrued in the circuit court, but that, unless otherwise specially directed, they must abide the result of the new trial. - Ibid.

12. No agent for the service of papers can be recognized under the rules, unless residing at Detroit or Lansing. Maynard v. Penniman, 333.

13. When notices are served upon the agent of an attorney, the distance of the attorney's residence from the place of holding the court will determine the time for which notice must be given, and not the distance of the agent's residence from the court. Ibid.

14.

Where several exceptions were taken to the charge of the court, and the same embodied in a bill of exceptions, an assignment of errors in this court "that there is error in this, to wit, that the judge of the said circuit court, at the trial of said cause, gave the several instructions to the jury asked by the defendant, and refused to give the several instructions, or any or either of them, asked for by the plaintiffs," is sufficiently special, and the words "several instructions," must be rendered distributively, and as applying to each. - Niles v. Rhodes, 374.

15. Where, six months after errors had been assigned in this court, the defendant in error obtained an amendment to the record in the court below, with the view to obviate the errors assigned, and then moved this court for an order for a further return to bring up this amendment, Held, that he was too late in his action, and the application should be denied. Holmes, 454.

O'Flynn v.

16. It seems that the proper practice, in such case, would be to apply to this court, on affidavit showing the reasons for the amendment, to remit the record for that purpose; and this court can then judge whether the case is a proper one to permit an amendment with a view to affect proceedings already taken in this court. Ibid.

17. On case made after judgment, only those questions are before this court which appear to have been passed upon by the court below, Van Kleek v. Eggleston, 511.

PROHIBITORY LIQUOR LAW.

1. Where a contract in violation of law has been carried into effect, the law will not aid either party to undo what has been done, and to divest a title that has passed. - Bagg v. Jerome, 145.

2. A mortgage of intoxicating drinks under which possession has been taken by the mortgagee, can not be treated as void under the Prohibitory Liquor Law of 1855, as between the mortgagor and mortgagee, nor as between the latter and the creditors of the former, unless made to defraud such creditors. Ibid. 3. Where plaintiff presented to defendant an account, for what purported to be foreign wines and ales, opposite each item of which were added the words "imported and sold in the original packages," and defendant admitted the correctness of the account,-Held, that this was not such "positive proof" that they were "imported under the laws of the United States, and in accordance therewith, and contained in the original packages in which

they were imported, and in quantities not less than the laws of the United States prescribe," as is required by the Prohibitory Liquor Law to entitle the seller to recover therefor. - Niles v. Rhodes, 374.

4. Whether the admission of the party could, in any case, be considered positive proof within the meaning of this provision, quære. - Ibid.

PROMISSORY NOTES.

See BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES.

PURCHASERS BONA FIDE.

See BONA FIDE PURCHASERS.

QUANTUM MERUIT.

See ASSUMPSIT.

RAILROAD CORPORATIONS.

1. Under the General Railroad Act, the liability of corporations organized under it, and their agents, for damages which may result from the neglect of the corporation to erect and maintain fences on the sides of the line of the road, attaches as soon as they have possession of the route for the purpose of constructing the road. - Gardner v. Smith, 410.

2.

A contractor for the construction of the road, is an agent of the corporation within the meaning of this provision. — Ibid.

3. But as contractor, possessing and exercising the power of the corporation over the road for the purpose of its construction, and assuming its control, he assumed also the responsibilities which the law imposed upon the corporation respecting its use, and the liabilities for its improper use. He is, therefore, primarily liable to the same extent that the corporation would have been for the same acts or omissions. — Ibid.

4. Where, therefore, while a contractor was engaged in constructing a railroad through certain premises, and had taken away the fences across the line for that purpose, and sheep of the owner of the premises escaped through the opening so made and were lost, -Held, that the contractor was liable to the owner for the loss. Ibid.

5. It does not affect the liability that the owner turned the sheep into the field through which the line ran, after the route was SO taken possession of, and while the contractor was constantly throwing down the fences for his purposes. — Ibid. 6. A railroad company are not liable as common carriers, for property deposited in their warehouse, to await orders from the owner for its transportation. -M. S. & N. I. Railroad Co. v. Shurtz, 515.

7. And where the company are prohibited by their charter from charging as warehousemen for storage, they can be liable as gratuitous bailees only, for property so deposited with them and awaiting orders. — Ibid.

RECEIVERS BY FOREIGN APPOINTMENT.

1. Where, under a creditor's bill, in the court of Chancery of New York, a receiver was appointed, and the debtor, in pursuance of the order of the court, made a general assignment to the receiver of all his property, reciting in it the proceedings had in the cause, and the assignment was made in due form for the transfer of an interest in lands under our statutes, Held, That the assignee might file his bill in chancery, in this state, to foreclose a mortgage interest, or to enforce a right of redemption, held by the debtor at the time of the assignment, in lands in this state.—Graydon v. Church, 36. 2. The receiver, in such a case, sues not strictly in his official character as receiver, by virtue of his appointment by the court of New York, but as an assignee, holding the legal interest in the property by virtue of the assignment of the debtor.Ibid.

3. It is not necessary, in such case, for the receiver to go behind the recitals in the assignment, and prove the prior proceedings of the court. The recital of these proceedings in the assignment are to be taken as true, so far as they become material; and the courts of this state will notice and act upon them so far as to recognize the complainant substantially as trustee for the creditors, in whose behalf the assignment was made, and will assist the receiver to collect and render the property available for the purposes of the trust, but will not concern themselves with any question relating to the disposition of the proceeds, as between him and the creditors, nor interfere between him and the court by whose appointment he acts. It is for that court to hold him to his accountability

7 MICH.-20