AGENT.

See BONA FIDE PURCHASERS, 1.

AGENT OF ATTORNEY.

See PRACTICE IN SUPREME COURT, 12, 13.

ALLEYS.

See WAYS.

AMENDMENT.

See PRACTICE IN SUPREME COURT, 8, 15, 16.

APPEAL.

See GARNISHEES; POLICE COURT OF DETROIT.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS.

See PRACTICE IN SUPREME COURT, 14.

ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGE.
See MORTGAGE, 2 to 8.

ASSUMPSIT.

1. Where an article was ordered of a manufacturer at a specified price, and work was done and materials used towards its construction, but before it was completed the order was countermanded, and the materials remained in the manufacturer's hands, - Held, That the manufacturer could not recover on the common counts the value of such labor and materials, but should sue on the special contract, and claim his damages for the breach, or for being wrongfully prevented from performing it.Hosmer v. Wilson, 294.

2.

In such a case the defendant has no interest in the materials, and no concern with the amount of the labor; but the plain

tiff's labor is upon his own materials, to increase their value,
for the purpose of effecting a sale to defendant of the article
ordered, when completed. - Ibid.

3. But the law will not compel the plaintiff, after such counter-
mand, to go on and complete the article ordered before he can
recover pay for what he has done, but he may treat the coun-
termand and refusal to take the article ordered as a prevention
of performance on his part, and sue upon the contract on that
ground. - Ibid.

4. The value of the labor expended on the materials in such case
is not the proper criterion of the damages for which plaintiff is
entitled to recover. Such labor may have enhanced the value
of the materials, in which case the plaintiff, still owning them,
is compensated to the extent of such enhanced value; or it may
have diminished such value, and then payment for the labor
will not be adequate compensation. Whether the labor has en-
hanced or diminished the value of the materials, is necessarily
a question of fact for the jury in estimating the damages sus-
tained. - Ibid.

See MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED.

ATTACHMENTS.

1. An affidavit stating that both defendants in attachment reside in
New York, and have not resided in Michigan for three months,
will be construed to refer to the defendants, and each of them,
and is sufficient. - Dorr v. Clark, 310.

-

2. Since the amendatory act of 1850 (Comp. L. §404), the deputy
county clerk has general authority to perform the duties of
his principal. And, therefore, an affidavit for attachment sworn
to before him is good, though it does not appear that the clerk
was absent at the time. - Ibid.

See CIRCUIT COURT COMMISSIONERS, 2, 3; JUSTICES COURTS, 3; WIT-

NESS, 4.

ATTACHMENT BOND.

1. An assignment by the sheriff to the plaintiff of an attachment
bond is a thing which the plaintiff may require as a matter of
right, and is valid if signed by the sheriff, though not in his
name of office. - Dorr v. Clark, 310.

2. It is no defense to an attachment bond, on which property has

been delivered by the sheriff to the bondsmen, that the property did not belong to the defendants in the attachment, or was en cumbered. Parties bonding property under the statute, must take it on the statutory conditions. -- Ibid.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

1. It is the policy of the law to scrutinize gifts, conveyances and securities by a client to his attorney pending the relation, especially when connected with the subject matter of litigation; and it will not permit the relation and the confidence it implies, to be turned to the profit of the attorney at the expense of the client. - Gray v. Emmons, 536.

2. Where the attorneys of complainants who were assignees of a portion of a chattel mortgage on a stock of goods, with priority of payment, took possession of the mortgaged property, and without authority from complainants, sold more than was sufficient to satisfy their portion of the mortgage, and were sued by the owner of the balance, and recovery had against them; Held, that the attorneys had no equity against complainants to require to be indemnified for their act in selling the excess. Ibid.

3. Nor does it make any difference in this respect, that the attor neys appear to have acted in making such sales on a supposed authority from the owner of the balance of the mortgage; as the law in such case, complainants not being in fault, will leave the misfortune to rest where it has fallen. — Ibid.

4. Accordingly where, in such case, after suit brought against the attorneys for the value of the goods sold beyond what was sufficient to pay complainants' debt, they obtained from their clients a bond of indemnity against the suit- the clients supposing the suit to be brought for the whole value of the goods sold under the mortgage, Held, that the bond was wrongfully obtained, and should be given up to be cancelled. — Ibid.

5. Nor is the right of complainants to this relief affected by their employing counsel to defend the suit against the attorneys they having already given the bond, and, there being no evidence they knew at the time what their rights were. - Ibid. 6. Such bond of indemnity, where the only liability of the attor neys was for making sale of the excess after satisfying the claim of their clients, is without consideration. Ibid.

See PRACTICE IN SUPREME COURT, 6, 12, 13.

AUTHORITY.

See PRACTICE IN SUPREME COURT, 6.

BAILEES.

See RAILROAD CORPORATIONS, 6, 7.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES.

1. Where a party receives negotiable paper from his debtor, with the debtor's indorsement, as collateral security for his demand, and not as agent merely, it is his duty to present the same for payment when due, and take the proper steps to charge the debtor as indorser; and failing to do this, he makes the paper his own. --Jennison v. Parker, 355.

See JUSTICES' COURTS, 7; PLEADINGS, 2.

BONA FIDE PURCHASERS.

1. Where a debtor, owning lands encumbered by mortgages, gave his creditor a deed of the lands, on a parol understanding that the creditor was to dispose of them for the payment of the the mortgages, and his debt, and account to the debtor for the balance, and the creditor, instead of paying off the mortgages, bought them, as agent for and in the name of a third person who claimed not to be aware of this understanding: - Held, That the latter could not claim to be a bona fide purchaser without notice of the debtor's equities, but must be held in law chargeable with knowledge of the facts of which his agent was cognizant. - Emerson v. Atwater, 12.

2. Such purchaser of the mortgages, holding them subject to the debtor's equities, can not cut off those equities by selling the land mortgaged, under the power of sale, and bidding it in himself. - Ibid.

3. A plea that defendant is bona fide purchaser and owner of the absolute title to lands, is not sustained by proof showing that he is owner of a mortgage interest only. — Ibid.

CASES IN MICHIGAN REPORTS, CITED AS AUTHORITY, COMMENTED ON, OR OVERRULED.

American Transportation Co. v. Moore, 5 Mich. 368; commented on, 240.

Bagg v. Jerome, 7 Mich. 145; cited, 530.
Draper v. Williams, 2 Mich. 469; cited, 505.
Eggleston v. Mundy, 4 Mich. 295; cited, 531.
Fuller v. Parish, 3 Mich. 211; cited, 23, 25.
Gaines v. Betts, 2 Doug. Mich. 98; approved, 317.
Gardner v. Gorham, 1 Doug. Mich. 507; cited, 365.
Graydon v. Church, 4 Mich.; overruled in part, 36.
Howard v. People, 3 Mich. 209; commented on, 317.
Jackson v. Dean, 1 Doug. Mich. 515; cited, 114, 158.
Maynard v. Cornwell, 3 Mich. 309; cited, 106.
Moore v. Sanborn, 2 Mich. 528; cited, 422.

Nye v. Van Husan, 6 Mich. 329; cited, 523.
Oliver v. Eaton, 7 Mich. 108; cited, 158, 524.

People v. Foote, 1 Doug. Mich. 102; commented on, 317.
People v. Plumstead, 2 Mich. 469; cited, 505.

Pierson v. Manning, 2 Mich. 445; cited, 530.

Rood v. School District, 1 Doug. Mich. 502; commented on, 317. Stevens v. Brown, Wal. Ch. 41; cited, 62.

Swetland v. Swetland, 3 Mich. 211; cited, 23, 25.

Tannahill v. Tuttle, 3 Mich. 110; cited, 531.

Wadsworth v. Loranger, Har. Ch. 113; cited, 22.
Weed v. Snow, 1 Mich. 131; cited, 61.

1.

CASES MADE.

See PRACTICE IN SUPREME COURT, 17.

CERTIORARI.

See JUSTICES' COURTS 2.

CHATTEL MORTGAGE.

See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, 1, 2, 10, 11, 12.

CIRCUIT COURT COMMISSIONERS.

The statute empowering circuit court commissioners to entertain