GRAYDON . CHURCH. 2. If the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee once subsisted between Fetterman and Cruttenden, then an equity of redemption will continue to exist in Fetterman or his representatives, until released by deed or barred by foreclosure.-7 Johns. Ch. 43; 1 Paige, 80; 2 Johns. Ch. 101; 1 O. S. R. 107. Demand of payment and refusal will not bar this equity, nor will the declarations of the mortgagee. that he does not care for the property: 2 Cow. 231; 12 N. H. 382; 5 N. II. 452; 9 N. H. 178. What passed between Bishop and complainant, at their interview, did not amount to an estoppel: 4 Kent, 261 and notes; 2 Smith Lead. Cas. 561. That Bishop could claim no rights as a purchaser for value, see 13 Wend. 570; 4 Paige 215. C. I. Walker on same side : Although for many purposes a mortgage interest is esteemed personal property, yet that it is not esteemed a personal thing, or a chattel, is very fully shown by a series of decisions in relation to the construction of wills. It has been held that the interest of a mortgagee of real estate. may pass, by general description, as a real estate interest, but it does not pass by the terms "goods and chattels " or "moneys at interest," but may by the words "securi-. ties." 2 Powell on Mort. 404, 414; 3 Cruise Dig. 252, Title Devise, Ch. 10, § 132, 142; 1 Jarman on Wills, 645, 650; 5 Sim. 451; 6 Sim. 115; 10 Bing. 44; 29 E. L. & Eq. 391. - In one case held, that it did not pass even by the word "securities."-9 B. & C. 267. Yet all personal estate-i. e. personal things- does pass. by "goods and chattels."-1 Jarman, 692. It is undoubtedly true that the assignment of a mortgage as security, is simply a mortgage of a mortgage; but does it not follow, necessarily, that this second mortgage is of the same nature of the first? The original mortgage conveyed an estate in the land,, GRAYDON v. CHURCH. at law, the legal estate in equity; an estate in the nature of security, incident to a debt, but still an estate. An assignment of that mortgage assigns that estate; a conditional assignment of that mortgage is but a mortgage of that estate; so that the nature of the property in the hands of the assignee is precisely the same that it was in the hands of the mortgagee.-1 Hill. on Mort. 355, 179, 191; 6 Mass. 240. We submit that such an assignment is not a chattel or personal mortgage, and that to so hold it would be an unworthy quibbling about words, and would be doing violence to the common understanding of society. A personal or chattel mortgage, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, both among lawyers and among the peo ple, is a mortgage of a personal chattel, and not of an interest in land.-2 Hill. on Mort. 132; 2 Story's Eq. §§ 1030, 1032. It follows, therefore, that, as it does not come under the head of a personal mortgage, its true character is the apparent one,- a mortgage of an interest in land; and that it is to be governed, as to its foreclosure, by the rules regulating the foreclosure of mortgages of real estate. -1 Paige, 48; Ibid. 618; 6 Shepl. 191. We have been unable to find any authority or precedent, treating such a mortgage as the one in question as a personal mortgage, while it has been distinctly held that a mortgage of a building on land to which the mortgagor had no title, but had a contract for its purchase, was not a personal mortgage:-8 Metc. 19. The bill, therefore, is brought to redeem a mortgage in the nature of a real estate mortgage, and is in ample time -much less than twenty years having elapsed. It has also been held that under a mortgage of a term for years a mere chattel interest - that there was a clear equity of redemption after default; thus treating it, in this respect, as a mortgage of real estate.-2 Coll. 221. 2. But suppose it to be otherwise; suppose the mort GRAYDON . CHURCH. gage in question be considered as a personal or chattel mortgage-what then is the result? We submit that the plaintiffs would still be entitled to redeem. It is true that, at law, the title of a mortgagee of chattels becomes perfect and absolute on a breach of the condition of the mortgage, but we submit that it is equally clear that the mortgagor has an equity of redemption after such forfeiture: -4 Kent's Com. 139; Story on Bailm. 287, 308, 310; 2 Story's Eq. Juris. §1031; 2 Hill. on Mort. 314; 1 Pars. on Cont. 452, 597; Pow. on Mort. §1061; 1 Ves. Sr. 278; 1 Hare, 423; 3 Hare, 37; 9 Porter, 472; 7 Monroe, 384; 2 Johns. Ch. 100; 12 Wend. 62; 24 Wend. 143; 3 Mich. 110; 6 Shepl. 357; Ibid. 201; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 664; Coote on Mort. 607, 662. Bills to foreclose chattel mortgages have been brought in the following, among other cases: 9 How. 397; 4 Sm. & M. 210; 1 Strob. Eq. 334. And bills to redeem have been brought in the following cases, and the right to redeem fully recognized and sup ported: 3 Barb. Ch. 21; 1 Vern. 630; 4 Hen. & M. 101; 2 Hill. Ch. 171; 2 Ala. 555; 14 Ala. 114; 26 Ala. 312; 7 Humph. 431. And a form for a decree of redemption of chattels is given in Seaton on Decrees, 181. Nor has the complainant lost any rights by lapse of time. The right to redeem from a personal mortgage, after forfeiture, is a purely equitable right, and the statute of limitations is not applicable to it, as it is to claims which are both legal and equitable.-5 Paige, 631; 7 Johns Ch. 110; 1 Md. Ch. 128. The ordinary rule in Chancery is, that purely equitable claims become stale only after the lapse of twenty years. 6 T. B. Mon. 607; 1 Hoff. 417; 1 Dana, 278, 297. This rule has been applied to a right to redeem from a personal mortgage.-1 Dana, 278, 279; 1 Wash. 18. GRAYDON 0. CHURCH. S. T. Douglass, and Hughes & Wooley, for defendants: 1. As receiver of the Court of Chancery of New York, complainant would not be entitled to maintain the present suit in the courts of this state. The authority of a receiver is confined to the forum of his appointment. [The argument and authorities to this point, on both sides, are omitted]. 2. A bond and mortgage, though the mortgage be upon real estate, are personal property.- Will. on Real Pr. 349; 4 Kent, 159; 1 Hill. on Mort. 215; 2 Barb. Ch. R. 135; 3 Mich. 481; 1 Doug. 632; 1 Atk. 606; 3 Iowa 37; 17 N. Y. 295; 1 Seld. 557; 1 Kelly, 176; 11 Ohio, 341; 2 Stockt. 328. A mortgage of such mortgage is a mortgage of personalty, and the respective rights of mortgagor and mortgagee are such only as appertain to a mortgage of personalty. 3. A mortgage of chattels, unlike a pledge, is strictly a conveyance upon condition, and the title becomes absolute upon failure to perform the condition.-2 Spence Eq. Juris. 771; 4 Kent, 138; 2 Story Eq. Juris. §1030; Story on Bailm. 287; 2 Hill. on Mort. 478; 2 Cai. Cas. 200; 5 Johns. 258; 8 Johns. 90; 9 Wend. 80; 2 Comst. 443; 3 Cush. 322; 4 Barb. 491; 8 Vt. 445; 28 Vt. 240; 7 Cow. 290; 3 Mich. 110. As the law now stands, we think it is clear that an equity of redemption of personal property, as a distinct and well-defined title, subject to the various incidents of ownership and disposal which appertain to other acknowledged interests and estates, does not exist.-2 Hill. on Mort. 276, 478. The most that can be claimed is that courts of equity will interfere to allow a redemption, if asked within a reasonable time, in cases where it is necessary to prevent gross injustice.-3 Mich. 110; 2 Story Eq. Juris § 1031; 1 Pars. on Con. 452. And even this doctrine will be found to rest upon slender authority. No English, and scarcely GRAYDON v. CHURCH. an American, case can be found where a bill to redeem has been sustained. See 3 Atk. 303. Certainly there is no case which denies the capacity of the mortgagee of a chattel, after forfeiture, to sell the chattel as his own property, or which asserts the doctrine that the mortgagor can follow it into the hands of a purchaser from the mortgagee after forfeiture, and claim a right to redeem as against such purchaser. Clearly the mortgagee would have the right to make any sale to which the mortgagor assented. Without such assent, he would have a right to sell whenever the mortgagor, on reasonable notice given, had failed to redeem. And especially where the mortgagor, or person succeeding to his rights, had been appealed to for redemption, and expressly refused to redeem, abandoned all claim to the securities, and assented that the mortgagee might dispose of the property as he saw fit. Story on Bailm. §308 to 310; 1 Holt, 383; 8 Vt. 435; 22 Pick. 46; 2 Johns. Ch. 100; 1 P. Wms. 261; 2 Atk. 300; 12 Wend. 61. CHRISTIANCY J.: The first question presented in this case is the right of complainant to sue in this state. It is contended by the counsel for defendants that complainant, being a receiver appointed by the Court of Chancery of the state of New York, can not be recognized as such, nor be allowed to sue in his official capacity, beyond the limits of the state of New York, by whose court he was appointed. Where the rights of a receiver, appointed in another state, depend wholly upon the effect to be given to the judgments or decrees of the court making the appointment, the weight of American authority is, doubtless, opposed to his right to sue in another state; and this is certainly so, both on principle and authority, in reference to real property; and equally so as to personal property and rights. in action, where the rights of creditors in the latter state |