MARTIN CH. J.:

LESTER v. SUTTON.

Whether the letter of the 9th of June, from Silliman & Haswell to Lester, was competent evidence for the plaintiff when the case was his, or not, it is unnecessary to determine, as it became clearly competent, and should, in fact, have been introduced by the defendant in connection with that of the 13th of June, written by the plaintiff to them. What would, or might be, its effect upon the issue or trial, it is immaterial to inquire. But it was a part of the correspondence relative to the subject matter in issue. It was written in reply to that of the 3d of June, and was the subject of that of the 13th.

It was determined in Watson v. Moore, 1 C. & K. 626, that when a party produces the letter of another, purporting to be in reply to a previous one written by himself, he is bound to call for and put in the letter to which it was an answer, as part of his own evidence. This wholesome rule applies to the case at bar.

The defendant seeks to conclude Lester by the letters written by him to Silliman & Haswell. But these letters being written in the course of a correspondence between them in a matter of business, and the letter of the 9th being a part of that correspondence, drawn out by the letter of the 3d, in part, and drawing out that of the 13th, they should be regarded as a whole, to which, upon the introduction of a part, either party was entitled. If, therefore, the defendant neglected the duty of calling for and putting in this letter, or if this was not insisted upon by the plaintiff by way of objection to the reading of the letter of the 13th, still the plaintiff was entitled to introduce it, for the same reason, and upon the same principle, that the defendant should have produced it.

When a part of a correspondence is given in evidence, the whole may be, relative to the subject matter of the litigation, upon precisely the same principle that allows the whole of a conversation to be given in evidence under like

LESTER v. SUTTON.

circumstances. This rule exists from necessity: a reply can not be understood without a knowledge of the proposition or question which called it forth; an acceptance, without a knowledge of the offer; nor a remark made in the course of conversation, without a knowledge of the whole conversation, Words have not an arbitrary and inflexible meaning, but they are to be interpreted by the context, if in writing, and by the accompanying conversation, if oral. This is the experience of every practical man, and the rules of evidence are based upon principles derived from such experience. We think, therefore, that as objection to the introduction of the letter of June 13th was made, unless that of the 9th was also introduced, the same was improperly admitted. As to that of June 3d, it was properly admitted. It was clearly competent for Sutton to show, if he could, that Lester had conducted the business upon his own account, and not as agent, and this letter tended to show such to be the fact. It was a link in the chain of his testimony, and whether it would alone, or with other evidence, establish such to be the fact, was a question for the jury. That being introduced, the plaintiff was entitled to introduce their reply; while as already shown, the letter of the 13th purporting to be in reply to the one of the 9th, should have been accompanied with it.

Whether the plaintiff should have been admitted to be sworn as witness, or not, was a question addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and error can not be assigned upon its action. The judgment must be reversed, and a

new trial ordered.

The other Justices concurred.

An order was thereupon entered "that the judgment of said Circuit Court for the county of Wayne be, and the same is hereby vacated and held for naught, and that the said plaintiff in error do recover of and from the said defendant in error his costs to be taxed, and that the cause be remanded to the court below for a new trial."

LESTER v. SUTTON.

On taxation of costs under this order, the clerk refused to allow the costs which had accrued in the trials (of which there had been three) in the court below, and plaintiff in error appealed, claiming that he was entitled to be allowed all the said costs, as well as those which accrued in this court.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE:

The plaintiff in error is entitled to tax only the costs which accrued in this court. The costs in the court below, in such case, unless otherwise specially directed, abide the event of the new trial.

William S. Maynard v. Ebenezer J. Penniman.

No agent for the service of papers can be recognized under the rules, unless residing at Detroit or Lansing.

When notices are served upon the agent of an attorney, the distance of the attor ney's residence from the place of holding the court will determine the time for which notice must be given, and not the distance of the agent's residence from the court. Heard November 1st. Decided November 2d.

Error to Washtenaw Circuit.

D. C. Holbrook moved to dismiss the writ of error for want of prosecution. The affidavit of service of notice of motion stated that Mr. Hawkins, the attorney for plaintiff in error, had removed from the state to Chicago, and that the notice was served upon Mr. Barry at Ann Arbor "who is and was duly appointed as the agent of said Hawkins to receive said notice." Only a four days notice was given.

T. S. Blackmar, contra.

BY THE COURT:

We can recognize no agent for the purpose of the service of papers, unless residing at Detroit or Lansing.

Besides, the time for which notice was given in this case was insufficient. It is the residence of the attorney,

MAYNARD V. PENNIMAN.

and not that of the agent, which determines the time for which notice must be given. Rule twenty-six requires a ten days notice where the attorney resides over a hundred miles from the place of hearing, and that should have been given in this case, whether served on an agent or personally. Motion denied.

Henry Hopson v. Caroline Payne and Others.

Where a creditor seeks in chancery to reach property alleged to have been purchased with the money of his debtor and conveyed to the debtor's wife to keep the same beyond the reach of creditors, his bill will be demurable unless it shows, by clear and sufficient allegations, either: That his debt existed at the time of the conveyance: or that the debtor was embarrassed at the time, or, at least, indebted to others, and that the purchase money was paid by him and the deed taken to the wife for the actual fraudulent purpose to hinder, delay or defraud the then existing creditors: or that the purchase money was paid by the debtor, and the conveyance taken to the wife, for the purpose of defrauding future creditors.

Where a bill alleged in one place, that the purchase price of the property

was

paid in cash," by the said wife, and, in another, that the husband "paid the purchase money for said premises, or that he furnished the money wherewith the same was purchased, to the said" wife, -Held, that as the law presumes honesty rather than fraud, it was to be inferred from these allegations, that the wife paid for the land with her own money, rather than the contrary.

Heard October 26th and 27th. Decided November 2d.

Appeal in chancery from Wayne Circuit, where the demurrer of Caroline Payne to the bill of complaint was sustained, and the bill, as to her, dismissed. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Whittemore & Crosby, for complainant.

S. D. Miller, for defendant Caroline Payne.

CHRISTIANCY J.:

The bill in this case, as to defendants Joseph Payne and Warren Cronk, is an ordinary judgment creditor's bill, So far as it relates to Caroline Payne, the wife of the de

HOPSON . PAYNE.

fendant Joseph Payne, the bill seeks to make her a trustee, for complainant and other creditors of her husband, of a certain lot or parcel of land conveyed to her by Duncan McKenzie and wife, by deed dated the 11th day of February, 1856, on the ground, as was claimed upon the argument and was probably intended to be alleged in the bill, that the same had been purchased with the money of her husband, and the deed taken in her name for the purpose of defrauding creditors of the husband; and it prays that she may be decreed to hold said land so conveyed, in trust for complainant and the other creditors of the husband, to the extent that may be necessary to satisfy their just demands; and that the same may be sold under the direction of the court, and the proceeds, as far as necessary, applied in satisfaction of complainant's judgment.

To this bill the defendant, Caroline, put in general demurrer for want of equity. The court below sustained the demurrer, and dismissed the bill as to her, with costs. The complainant has appealed to this court, and the only questions presented to us arise upon the demurrer.

Admitting that defendant, Caroline, may be properly joined with the judgment debtors, and that the lands conveyed to her by McKenzie, or the purchase money, could be thus reached by a creditor's bill, in the same manner as if the land had been owned and fraudulently conveyed by the husband, to which I can see no objection, but upon which the court express no opinion; we will first inquire whether the case made by the bill is sufficient (all facts well pleaded being admitted by the demurrer) to entitle the complainant to relief as against Caroline Payne.

Without attempting to enumerate all the facts which must be shown by complainant in such a case, to entitle him to relief against her, it is sufficient to say here, that no ground can be laid for reaching such a trust in her hands as this is claimed to be, without showing by clear and suf ficient allegations in the bill, either: