CARNE v. HALL.

showing of good excuse for the delay, the circumstances do not call for indulgence on other grounds.

Motion granted.

The People v. William Tyler,

Upon the high seas every vessel, public and private, is, for jurisdictional purposes, a part of the territory of the nation where it belongs; and an offence committed on board of it is an offence against the sovereignty of that nation. But, where a private ship enters a foreign jurisdiction, it becomes, with all on board, in the absence of treaty stipulations to the contrary, subject to the municipal laws and control of the coun. try it visits.

When a Legislature, out of abundant caution, enumerates a great number of possible places, and punishes crimes committed in any of them, there is no rule of construction which requires the law to be regarded as an assertion that there are such places within the jurisdiction. It does not, therefore, necessarily follow, because Congress in the Crimes Act of 1857 provided for the punishment of offences upon bays, ereeks, havens and rivers, not within states nor forming a part of the high seas that the existence of such within the admiralty jurisdiction must be assumed. The said act of 1557 being amendatory and supplementary to other acts of identical extent, commencing in 1790, it is not to be supposed that it was intended to use these terms in different senses at the different periods. And, as there were at the date of the first act navigable waters open from the ocean, not admitted to have been within the exclusive jurisdiction of any particular state, and as, npon the Pacific coast, we have still some waters of this description, there is no necessity to go beyond our own territory to satisfy the terms of the act. And the jurisdiction referred to by the language used being a local one, referring to a fixed natural locality, and not satisfied by a vessel, the claim of jurisdiction should not be extended into foreign parts, unless such an intention is clearly expressed in the act.

As the states lying upon the lakes and their connecting waters extend to the national boundary, and their jurisdiction is co-extensive with their territory and legislative power, the said Crimes Act of 1857, if it applies at all to these waters, can only take effect without the United States, and within British waters. As a general principle, the criminal laws of no nation can operate beyond its territorial limits, and to give any government or its judicial tribunals the right to punish any act or transaction as a crime, it must have occurred within those limits. The exceptions to this rule relate to crimes which are peculiarly injurious to the rights or interests of the nation or of its subjects, and which, if committed by its citizens or subjects, may be punished wherever committed. As in the case of treason committed abroad, or criminal acts on the part of the crews or passengers of its ships in a foreign port, whereby its commerce or its pacific relations with other powers would be endangered. But these exceptions to the general rule of the locality of crimes are never understood to be included in the general provisions of criminal statutes, but require to be specifically mentioned and defined.

THE PEOPLE v. TYLER.

The territory of a state or nation includes, as a part of its domain, the lakes and rivers which lie within its limits. And these waters being thus susceptible of appropriation as territory in the same way as the land, are in like manner capable of division, by which a part may be appropriated by one adjoining nation and a part by another; and when so divided, the part belonging to each nation is as completely a part of its territory as the whole lake or river if wholly within its limits.

The United States and Great Britain having in this manner, by the treaty of 1788, divided and appropriated the lakes and their connecting waters, the courts of neither, while this treaty remains in force, can for jurisdictional purposes, and especially for criminal jurisdiction, consider that portion of these waters within the limits of the other, as differing in any respect from the lands. The treaty of 1842, conceding to the vessels, &c., of both nations a right of passage through the channels and passages thus appropriated, does not deprive either of that complete and exclusive jurisdiction over that part of the lakes and rivers on its side the line which any nation may exercise upon land within its acknowledged limits.

The said Crimes Act of 1857 was not understood or intended by Congress to extend to any waters not essentially maritime; much less to a river in the interior of the continent, not navigable from the ocean; and least of all to a portion of that river within the territory and exclusive jurisdiction of a foreign sovereignty. Nor was the said Crimes Act of 1857 intended to go beyond the class of assaults made manslaughter under the former statutes to which it was amendatory and supplementary; or, to do more than provide for the case of death on land, resulting from assaults which were already made punishable when death resulted at the place where the fatal blow was given.

And, therefore, manslaughter committed by a mortal blow given on the River St. Clair, beyond the boundary line between the United States and the Province of Canada, and within a county in said province, from which blow death ensued on land, is not within the intent and meaning of the said act, though the blow was given on an American vessel.

The subject of admiralty jurisdiction over the lakes and navigable waters connecting them considered, and the case of the Genesee Chief (12 How. 443) commented on, per Christiancy J.

The admiralty jurisdiction over the said lakes and navigable waters connecting them, and the constitutional validity of the act of Congress of February 25th, 1845, relating to the same, considered and denied, per Manning J.*

Heard June 1st, 2d, 3d & 4th. Decided October 14th.

Case reserved from St. Clair Circuit.

On the fourth day of February, 1859, defendant was indicted in the Circuit Court for the county of St. Clair for murder. The indictment charged that Tyler, on the twen

* On the cause being announced as ready for decision, MARTIN CH. J., made an oral statement of the case, and then proceeded to say, that he had not written out his opinion, but that he held the following views:

Jurisdiction is co-extensive with the territorial limits of the government exercising it. Admiralty jurisdiction is that which a nation exercises beyond its territorial limits, and upon the high seas. This is exercised because these seas are the

THE PEOPLE . TYLER.

ty-ninth day of November, 1858, "with force and arms, on navigable waters without the limits of the state, in and on board the brig Concord then and there being in the river St. Clair, without the limits of the state of Michigan, in and upon one Henry Jones in the peace of God then and there being, feloniously, willfully, and of his malice aforethought, did make an assault, and that the said William Tyler a certain pistol of the value of two dollars then and there charged with gunpowder and one leaden bullet, which said pistol he, the said William Tyler, in his right hand then and there had and held, then and there feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did

peculiar property of no nation, but a common highway for all; and is properly exclusively confined to cases of civil jurisprudence. The United States has never conferred upon its admiralty courts criminal jurisdiction. It is true that criminal jurisdiction over certain specified offenses is conferred by Congress upon the courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction, but such jurisdiction is never administered under the admiralty code, but after the course of the common law.

In England, at the time of our revolution, and for a long time prior, no power existed in the courts of admiralty to try and punish for crime. This power was conferred upon a commission which proceeded under the common law. Thus the right of trial by jury, and of being confronted by witnesses, was secured to persons charged with the commission of offenses upon the high seas, as well as to those charged with their commission upon land. This common law was brought to this country by our ancestors, and at the time of the revolution, and the formation of our federal government, was the law of every colony. The objections which had prevailed in England to the trial of those charged with crime, under the admiralty code-whereby the right of trial by jury was refused-and which ultimately led to the withdrawal of this jurisdiction from the admiralty courts, equally prevailed here; and, when the framers of the constitution inserted in it the clause conferring admiralty and maritime jurisdiction upon

the Federal judiciary, they conferred such only as existed in the mother country at the time of the separation. This is manifest from the fact that provision is made in a separate clause of the constitution for the power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations, and in also providing that the trial of all crimes shall be by jury. Had crimes been considered as embraced within the admiralty jurisdicton, this power would be unnecessary, if not inconsistent with the provision conferring judicial pow er; and certainly the provision for trial by jury would be wholly inconsistent with the power and practice of admiralty courts.

If the admiralty courts had no jurisdiction over crimes committed on the high seas, what court has, and what is the extent of that jurisdiction? Congress, by various acts from 1789 to the present day, has conferred that jurisdiction upon the Circuit and District Courts of the United States.

Such jurisdiction is confined to the high seas, or other waters out of the jurisdiction of any particular state.

When, therefore, Congress provides for the punishment of felonies, if committed within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, such jurisdiction must be regarded as confined to the high seas, or, probably, tide - waters in certain instances-as such only are within the dominion of Congress for such purpose. The constitutional limitation

THE PEOPLE V. TYLER.

discharge and shoot off, to, against, and upon the said Henry Jones, and that the said William Tyler, with the leaden bullet aforesaid, out of the pistol aforesaid, then and there, by force of the gunpowder aforesaid, by the said William Tyler discharged and shot off as aforesaid, then and there feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did strike, penetrate and wound him, the said Henry Jones, in and upon the left side of the head of him, the said Henry Jones, giving to him, the said Henry Jones, then and there, with the leaden bullet aforesaid so as aforesaid discharged and shot out of the pistol aforesaid, by the said William Tyler, in and upon the left

must be considered as incorporated into and as controlling the act. And Congress, in every or nearly every instance, has accordingly respected this limitation of power by enacting that the offences shall have been committed on waters out of the jurisdiction of any state.

The words "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," as used in the criminal code, must then be interpreted by the grant of power to Congress in the Constitution, and construed as signifying the high seas. Whether there be a civil admiralty jurisdiction extending elsewhere, and on other waters, it is immaterial to inquire.

This leads us to the inquiry, are the waters of the St. Clair River which are without the boundaries of the United States and within those of Canada, within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and without the jurisdiction of any particular state, within the meaning of the Crimes act? When the Constitution was framed, it cannot-except by the most violent presumption-be presumed that the lakes and their connecting waters were intended to be embraced within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States. The term was employed in the sense it had been for centuries used in the mother country, and, from their first settlement, in the colonies, to designate jurisdiction upon the ocean-that space without the territorial limits of any government-the common highway of all nations. The lakes, and rivers or straits connecting them, were not presumed to be of such a character.

They were, before the revolution, within the exclusive dominion of Great Britain, and, by the treaty of peace, dominion over them was divided. No waste of waters beyond any territorial jurisdiction - no common highway of nations, ever existed upon them. By the treaty of 1783, the boundary line between Great Britain and the United States ran through the centre. They can, thererefore, in no sense, be denominated "high seas" within the meaning of the constitution.

Nor are their waters which are within the boundaries of the United States without the jurisdiction of any particular state. Each state lying upon their borders is bounded by the national boundary line. Beyond such line, the waters are within an acknowledged foreign jurisdiction, and, so far as I can ascertain, (at least in this case, as admitted by the pleadings,) within the body of foreign counties. Under no known rule of admiralty law, then, can they be regarded as within admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.

Nor were they ever regarded as being within such by Congress, nor by the courts of the United States, until the decision of the case of the Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh (12 Howard, 448).-If they had been within this jurisdiction, there was no occasion for the passage of the act of 1845, extending what Judge Conklin very properly calls a quasi adiniralty jurisdiction over them.

This act does not extend full admiralty jurisdiction over them, nor include them within such jurisdiction. It only extends

THE PEOPLE. TYLER.

side of the head of him, the said Henry Jones, one mortal wound, of the depth of four inches, and of the breadth of half an inch, of which said mortal wound the said Henry Jones, from the said twenth- ninth day of November, in the year aforesaid, until the thirtieth day of November, as well on the navigable waters aforesaid, as in the city of Port Huron, in the county of St. Clair, in the state of Michigan, did languish, and languishing did live, on which said thirtieth day of November, in the year aforesaid, the said Henry Jones, in the said city of Port Huron, in the said county of St. Clair, in the state of Michigan aforesaid, of the said mortal wound died: and

the jurisdiction of the District Court over cases of contract and tort arising in, upon, or concerning certain classes of boats and vessels navigating them, to be exercised in the same manner as jurisdiction was exercised over contracts and torts upon like vessels navigating the high seas or tidewaters, within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and secures to parties a concurrent remedy at common law, and by the state laws, when competent.

As I understand it, this act distinctly recognizes the distinction between these waters and the high seas, and regards them as being without the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States. Its language will not admit of a construction which will embrace them within such jurisdiction. The jurisdiction conferred is likened to the admiralty, but it is not the full and exclusive admiralty jurisdiction which it extended over them. As it did not exist over the lakes before the act, Congress had no power to extend it over them. I am aware that the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of the Genesee Chief, regard this as being an extension of the admiralty jurisdiction; or rather, as I understand the opinion of Chief Justice Taney, as a recognition of the existence of such jurisdiction under the constitution. To my mind it is certain that it exists as admiralty jurisdiction by virtue of the Constitution, or not at all. Congress cannot extend such jurisdiction over waters not recognized by the law of nations

as the proper subjects of it. That law was in the eye of the framers of the Constitution when the provision conferring admiralty and maritime jurisdiction upon the Federal courts was incorporated into it, and this includes only the high seas or tide

waters.

If Congress had the power to pass the act at all, it was under the power to regulate commerce between the several states. This seems to have been the aim of Congress, for the act confers jurisdiction only in cases of contract or tort arising upon vessels "employed in business of commerce and navigation between ports and places in different States and Territories." And this appears to be the later view of that court. (See Allen v. The Fashion, 21 How.) It was said, in the argument of the prisoner's counsel, that this court in Amer. Trasportation Co. v. Moore had recognized these waters as within the original grant of admiralty jurisdiction, and of like character with the sea in respect to maritime legislation and jurisdiction. In this the counsel is mistaken. No such question was before us, nor did we undertake to determine under what grant such jurisdiction was exercised. As an exercise of the power to regulate commerce between the different states, I am still of the opinion that the civil jurisdiction of the District Court might have been extended in the manner and with the limitation that it was. If these views are correct, the Crimes acts of of 1825 and 1857 do not embrace the offense for which Tyler stands charged, as the of