to the relator, who had, under the Oklahoma law, recorded the deed assigning the certificates and was in actual possession of the premises. The certificates had issued on or before April 7, 1906. The notation removing Alberson's name from the rolls was made January 11, 1908. The relator purchased the certificates before January 11, 1908, for value in good faith without knowledge of the fraud or notice of the proceedings for cancellation herein before referred to. The Supreme Court entered judgment for the relator, commanding issue and record of the patent, but making no order in respect to restoring Alberson's name to the rolls. The relator acquiesced in the judgment; but on writ of error sued out by respondent the judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals (44 App. D. C. 63); and the relator brings the case here on writ of error.

The nature of the Choctaw-Chickasaw Agreement1 and the rights incident to enrollment and allotment have been frequently considered by this court. Enrollment confers rights which cannot be taken away without notice and opportunity to be heard. Garfield v. Goldsby, 211 U. S. 249. Certificates of allotment, like receiver's receipts under the general land laws, entitle the holder to exclusive possession of the premises; Act of July 1, 1902, § 23, 32 Stat. 641-644; United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337-8. But enrollment and certificates may be cancelled by the Secretary of the Interior for fraud or mistake, Lowe v. Fisher, 223 U. S. 95; because although the equitable title had passed, Michigan Land and Lumber Co. v. Rust, 168 U. S. 589, 593, the land remains subject to the supervisory power of the Land Department, Knight v. Lane, 228 U. S. 6, until issue of the patent, United States v. Wildcat, 244 U. S. 111, unless under the statute the power expires earlier by lapse of time. Bal

1

1 See, e. g., Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445; Woodward v. de Graffenried, 238 U. S. 284.

linger v. Frost, 216 U. S. 240. Under § 5 of the Act of April 26, 1906, c. 1876, 34 Stat. 137, the legal title can be conveyed only by a patent duly recorded. Brown v. Hitchcock, 173 U. S. 473, 478. The provision in § 23 of the Act of July 1, 1902, that "allotment certificates issued by the Commission to the Five Civilized tribes shall be conclusive evidence of the right of any allottee to the tract of land described therein" has relation to rights between the holder and third parties. The title conferred by the allotment is an equitable one, so that supervisory power remained in the Secretary of the Interior.

We are not required to decide whether (as suggested in Lowe v. Fisher, 223 U. S. 95, 107) the power to remove Alberson's name from the rolls had, because of § 2 of the Act of April 26, 1906, expired before the Secretary acted. For the Supreme Court of the District did not order the name restored, and its judgment was acquiesced in by the relator. The claim which the relator makes in this court rests wholly upon the fact that the relator was a bona fide purchaser for value. But the doctrine of bona fide purchaser for value applies only to purchasers of the legal estate. Hawley v. Diller, 178 U. S. 476, 484. It "is in no respect a rule of property, but a rule of inaction." Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, § 743. It is a shield by which the purchaser of a legal title may protect himself against the holder of an equity, not a sword by which the owner of an equity may overcome the holder of both the legal title and an equity. Boone v. Chiles, 10 Pet. 177, 210.

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedial process which is awarded, not as a matter of right, but in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion. It issues to remedy a wrong, not to promote one; to compel the performance of a duty which ought to be performed, not to direct an act which will work a public or private mischief or will be within the

strict letter of the law but in disregard of its spirit. Although classed as a legal remedy, its issuance is largely controlled by equitable principles. The relator having itself only an equity seeks the aid of the court to clothe it with the legal title as against the United States, which now holds both the legal title and the equity to have set aside an allotment certificate secured by fraud. A writ of mandamus will not be granted for such a purpose. See Turner v. Fisher, 222 U. S. 204. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

HULL, TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY OF PALMER, v. FARMERS' LOAN & TRUST COMPANY ET AL.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

No. 66. Argued November 19, 1917.-Decided December 10, 1917. A New York testator bequeathed a fund in trust to pay the income to his son during life, with remainder over to others, subject to the condition that the principal also be paid to the son whenever he became able to pay his just debts and liabilities from other resources-a condition recognized as valid by the law of New York. The son secured his discharge in bankruptcy, whereupon the principal was paid over to him by order of the Surrogate Court. Held, that no right to the principal passed to his trustee in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act, § 70a (5).

155 App. Div. 636; 213 N. Y. 315, affirmed.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

1 People ex rel. Wood v. Assessors, 137 N. Y. 201; People ex rel. Durant Land Co. v. Jeroloman, 139 N. Y. 14; Commonwealth ex rel. Van Dyke v. Henry, 49 Pa. St. 530; Indiana Road Machine Co. v. Keeney, 147 Mich. 184; United States ex rel. McManus v. Fisher, 39 App. D. C. 176, 181.

312.

Opinion of the Court.

Mr. Walter S. Heilborn, with whom Mr. David J. Gallert was on the brief, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Frederick Geller, with whom Mr. Edward H. Blanc was on the brief, for Farmers' Loan & Trust Company.

Mr. Henry B. Twombly, with whom Mr. Gerrit Smith was on the brief, for Palmer.

MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the

court.

that

Charles Palmer, of New York City, by will executed shortly before his death, bequeathed to the Farmers' Loan & Trust Company the sum of $50,000, in trust, to pay the income to his son Francis, during his life, with a remainder over to others, subject to the "wish my said son shall have the principal of said trust fund whenever he shall become financially solvent and able to pay all his just debts and liabilities from resources other than the principal of this trust fund."

Promptly after probate of the will, Francis filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, and in due time received his discharge. Then the Trust Company instituted proceedings in the Surrogate Court for a judicial settlement of the estate; and, the court adjudging that Francis had become entitled to the principal of the trust fund (65 Misc. N. Y. 418), it was paid over to him. Later, the trustee in bankruptcy who had not been a party to proceedings in the Surrogate Court, brought suit in the Supreme Court of New York against the Trust Company and Francis to recover the principal. He claimed that the right to it had passed to him under § 70a (5) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544, and that the whole fund was required to satisfy the balance due on debts proved against the bankrupt estate and the expenses of

administration. No claim was asserted against the income of the trust fund. A complaint setting forth these facts was dismissed on demurrer; and the judgment entered by the trial court was affirmed both by the Appellate Division (155 App. Div. 636) and by the Court of Appeals (213 N. Y. 315). The case comes here on writ of error.

Plaintiff asserts that the case presents this federal question: Does a contingent interest in the principal of personal property assignable by the bankrupt prior to the filing of the petition necessarily pass to his trustee in bankruptcy? And, to sustain his claim to recovery, he contends, that under the law of New York (1) the words used by the testator create a trust; (2) vesting in the beneficiary a contingent interest in personal property; (3) which is an expectant estate; (4) assignable by him; and (5) that, in view of the Surrogate's decision and the action thereon, the defendants are estopped from denying that the contingency requiring payment of the principal had arisen. Plaintiff contends also that, under the federal law, (6) this assignable estate in expectancy passed to the trustee when Francis was adjudged bankrupt, and (7) the trustee, as holder of the estate, became entitled to the principal when the discharge rendered Francis solvent.

We need not enquire whether the several propositions of state and federal law which underlie this contention are correct. This is not a case where a testator seeks to bequeath property which shall be free from liability for the beneficiary's debts. Ullman v. Cameron, 186 N. Y. 339, 345. Here the testator has merely prescribed the condition on which he will make a gift of the principal. Under the law of New York he had the right to provide, in terms, that such payment of the principal should be made, only if and when Francis should have received in bankruptcy a discharge from his debts and that no part of the fund should go to his trustee in bankruptcy. The lan