any combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.

"Section 4. The several circuit courts of the United States are hereby vested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this act; and it shall be the duty of the several district attorneys of the United States in their respective districts, under the direction of the attorney-general, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations. Such proceedings may be by way of petition setting forth the case and praying that such violation shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the parties complained of shall have been duly notified of such petition, the court shall proceed, as soon as may be, to the hearing and determination of the case; and pending such petition and before final decree, the court may at any time make such temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises.

"Section 5. Whenever it shall appear to the court before which any proceeding under section four of this act may be pending, that the ends of justice require that other parties should be brought before the court, the court may cause them to be summoned, whether they reside in the district in which the court is held or not; and subpoenas to that end may be served in any district by the marshal thereof.

"Section 6. Any property owned under any contract or by any combination, or pursuant to any conspiracy (and being the subject thereof) mentioned in section one of this act, and being in the course of transportation from one state to another, or to a foreign country, shall be forfeited to the United States, and may be seized and condemned by like proceedings as those provided by law for the forfeiture, seizure, and condemnation of property imported into the United States contrary to law.

"Section 7. Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden, or declared to be unlawful by this act,

may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.

"Section 8. That the word 'person' or 'persons,' wherever used in this act, shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the territories, the laws of any state, or the laws of any foreign country."

Mr. Victor Morawetz, an authority on the Anti-Trust Act, in an article in the Columbia Law Review, December, 1910, divided the cases arising under the Sherman Act into four classes:

(1) Cases involving contracts, combinations or conspiracies restraining the trade or commerce of other persons or of the public generally. These contracts, combinations and conspiracies include boycotts, strikes, etc., and have been held in the United States Supreme Court to come within the meaning of the Act. See In re Debs (1895), 158 U. S. 564; Loewe v. Lawlor, known as the Danbury Hatters case (1907), 208 U. S. 274.

(2.) Cases involving contracts or combinations of public carriers to increase the rates or tolls payable by the public in respect to Interstate Commerce. Such contracts or combinations have been held to be violations of the Sherman Act. See U. S. Trans-Missouri Freight Association (1897), 166 U. S. 290; U. S. v. Joint Traffic Association (1898), 171 U. S. 505, 565, 569; Northern Securities Company v. U. S. (1904), 193 U. S. 197.

(3) Cases involving contracts or combinations that, without restraining the trade or commerce of others and without monopolizing, or attempting to monopolize trade or commerce, simply diminish competition among those contracting or combining. Contracts or combinations of this character, Mr.

Morawetz says, have never been held by the United States Supreme Court to be prohibited by the Anti-Trust Act. "Although dicta may be found in the opinions of the court which, taken without regard to the context, may seem to indicate that the court considered that all contracts and combinations restraining competition in any degree were prohibited by the AntiTrust Act, no such conclusion can fairly be deduced from these opinions when considered in their entirety." The point Mr. Morawetz makes is this, that the court has decided in railway cases that any combination tending to restrain the means of commerce constitutes a violation of the act, but that contracts or combinations among merchants or manufacturers which, without monopolizing commerce, simply restrict competition among those contracting or combining, are not in violation of the Anti-Trust Act. In the railroad cases, the contracts or combinations restrained the trade or commerce of the public by increasing the tolls upon the highways of Interstate Commerce. Contracts or combinations amongst manufacturers or merchants, however, have been held violations of the act only when they constituted monopolizing within the meaning of the second section of the Anti-Trust Act. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. U. S. (1899) 175 U. S. 211. The position taken by Mr. Morawetz seems to be justified by the subsequent Supreme Court decisions in the Standard Oil and American Tobacco Company cases.

1

(4.) Cases involving attempts to monopolize, or combinations or conspiracies to monopolize any part of interstate or international trade or commerce. Such cases have been held violations of the act, but the difficulty in determining cases of this kind is to construe the meaning of the term "to monopolize." It is not necessary for the government to prove in any case that a monopoly has actually been accomplished if it can prove that there has been an attempt to monopolize or a combination or conspiracy to monopolize.

'The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, et al., vs. U. S., 221 U. S. 1; U. S. vs. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106

APPENDIX II

ARTICLES OF CO-PARTNERSHIP

Articles of Co-partnership, made this first day of June in the year One Thousand, nine hundred and ten, by and between William H. Hull and Edward T. Moran, both of the Borough ! of Brooklyn, City of New York.

Witnesseth:

That the said parties have mutually agreed and hereby do mutually agree to continue a co-partnership heretofore entered into by and between them and carried on at Nos. 712-724 Bedford Avenue, in the City of New York, Borough of Brooklyn, for the manufacture of carriages, under the firm name and style of Hull & Moran, upon the following terms and conditions:

First:

Said Co-partnership shall continue until the same shall be dissolved by the mutual consent of the parties hereto, or ended in pursuance of some of the provisions hereinafter contained.

Second:

Each partner may terminate the Co-partnership by giving thirty (30) days written notice to the other partner of his intention so to do.

Third:

The Co-partnership shall be dissolved by the death of one of the partners; and in that case the surviving partner shall liquidate the business and pay over to the legal representatives of the deceased partner within six months or sooner, the interest of such deceased partner in said business.

Fourth:

All losses and profits shall be shared equally.

Fifth:

The business shall be carried on under the firm name and style of Hull & Moran.

Sixth:

In case the Co-partnership be dissolved during the lifetime of both partners, then and in that case, both partners shall act as liquidating partners for the purpose of winding up the busi

ness.

Seventh:

In case of the death of one of the partners, the legal representatives of that partner shall have the right during business hours, to inspect the books of the firm, and to make an inventory, at their own proper expense, and the surviving partner shall assist them in every way possible by giving them all necessary information for the purpose of ascertaining the exact standing of the firm at the time of the death of such deceased partner.

Eighth:

The assets, which are to constitute the working capital of the firm, shall be contributed equally by the partners and said assets shall be the present business assets of said Firm, which shall be taken over and be subject to this agreement.

Ninth:

Each partner shall be entitled to draw a salary of sixty dollars ($60.00) per week.

Tenth:

It is further agreed that a certain note bearing even date with these presents and made by said Edward T. Moran to the order of said William H. Hull, amounting to One Thousand Dollars, shall be paid out of the surplus earnings of said Moran in said business, over and above the said salary of $60.00 per week to be paid to him; and all such surplus earnings shall be applied in payment or in part payment of said