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formance of the services is an offer. Acquiescence on A's part constitutes an acceptance. A is bound to pay B what his serv

B ices are reasonably worth.

22. A sues B for damages resulting from a breach of contract and obtains a judgment against him for $100 which is entered of record. The judgment so entered constitutes a contract of record.

23. A enters into a recognizance to keep the peace for six months. This is a contract of record.




54. Requisites of a contract.-A contract to be enforcible at law must have the following requisites:

1. Competent parties.
2. Agreement, or offer and acceptance.
3. Sufficient consideration and sometimes a seal.
4. In some cases a particular form.
5. Legality of object.

6. Absence of fraud, mistake, undue influence or duress.

55. Competent parties. The parties to a contract must have legal capacity to make a contract. That is, they must be of sufficient age, sound mind, etc. The following classes of persons are, in a greater or less degree, incompetent:

1. Infants.
2. Insane persons.
3. Drunken persons.
4. Alien enemies.
5. Married women.
6. Corporations.

56. Infants.—Legally speaking, an infant is a person who has not reached his majority. At common law all persons, both male and female, under the age of twenty-one years are infants. By statute, however, in

many of the states girls reach their majority at the age of eighteen years; and in some states at this age or even younger, if married.

At common law, a person reaches his majority on the last day of his twenty-first year; or, in other words, on the day preceding the twenty-first anniversary of his birth.

As a rule, an infant's contracts are voidable at his option. The effect of infancy, therefore, is to confer a privilege rather than to impose a disability. The object of the rule is the protection of the infant. It is owing to this fact that there is an important exception to the rule stated above. An infant is liable for necessaries; he is not liable, however, for the agreed price, but for the reasonable value only.

57. An infant's liability for necessaries.What constitutes necessaries depends upon the infant's means and station in life. They include not only food, clothing, medical attendance, etc., but also at least a common school education. Under particular circumstances they may include a horse, bicycle, watch and jewelry. It is to be observed, however, that they never include articles of mere ornament and luxury, while on the other hand they may include luxurious articles of utility. Moreover, they must concern the person of the infant and not his estate. Thus, a horse purchased by an infant for use in some business enterprise is never a necessary; while on the other hand if purchased under medical advice for exercise, with the view of restoring the infant's health, it is considered a necessary. Any article, however, purchased by an infant for pleasure alone is not a necessary, nor does the mere fact that an article is useful bring it into the category. A college education is not considered a necessary, nor is money borrowed by an infant, even to buy food, unless it is used by the infant for this purpose.

The value of food or clothing purchased by an infant when he is already reasonably supplied cannot be recovered. Thus, an infant under the care of his father or a guardian, who reasonably supports him, is not liable for food and clothing purchased by him on credit. It follows, therefore, that persons furnishing an infant with such articles on credit do so at their peril. The burden is upon them to show that the infant was really in need.

Since the law imposes upon a man the duty of caring for and supporting his family, an infant husband is liable for necessaries furnished to his wife. And it seems that he also should be held liable for necessaries furnished to his children. Upon this point, however, the decisions are in conflict. He is not liable for materials furnished for the erection of a dwelling house upon his land, nor for the expense of repairing such building, even when the repairs are necessary to prevent serious injury to the house.

58. Legal obligations of infants.-At common law a husband is liable for the ante-nuptial debts of his wife, and the infancy of the husband is no defense.

Contracts made by infants under authority or direction of the law are also binding upon them. Thus, a contract of enlistment in the army by an infant may be enforced. And a bond by an infant pursuant to a statute for the support of his bastard child is not voidable. So also is a conveyance by an infant in performance of a legal obligation. Thus, an infant mortgagee who reconveys property mortgaged to him upon payment of the debt is bound by the reconveyance.

The general rule, however, has already been stated:


An infant's contracts are voidable at his option. Thus, an infant's contracts for the purchase or sale of property, whether real or personal, contracts for services, his promissory notes, partnership agreements, etc., are voidable at his option. 59. Disaffirmance by an infant.-An infant may

disaffirm his voidable contracts at any time before he reaches his majority or within a reasonable time thereafter, except that he can not avoid a deed of lands made to him until he becomes of age. In the latter case some courts hold that after coming of age he may disaffirm at any time before the period of the statute of limitations has run.

Disaffirmance may be by express words or by conduct. Where the contract is wholly executory the infant may remain passive until sued and then plead infancy. He may disaffirm by expressly stating that he does so, or by some act which clearly shows it. Thus, an infant who has conveyed land to one party may disaffirm his act by conveying the land to another after he has reached his majority. In such case, however, the infant must return the consideration received from the former vendee.

60. Return of consideration by an infant.Many courts hold that an infant may disaffirm his executed contract growing out of which he has received a beneficial consideration and recover what he has parted with even when he is unable to return what he has received. To hold otherwise, they say, would be to frustrate the law, inasmuch as the privilege of disaffirmance is for the protection of the infant against improvidence during the period of his immaturity.

1 MacGreal v. Taylor, 167 U. S. 688; Reynolds v. McCurry, 100 Ill. 356; Craig v. Van Bebber, 100 Mo. 584, 13 S. W. R. 906, 18 Am. St. Rep. 569;

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