Aviation Competition: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, One Hundred Fifth Congress, Second Session, April 23, 1998U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000 - 108 lappuses |
Citi izdevumi - Skatīt visu
Bieži izmantoti vārdi un frāzes
Airline Deregulation Act airline industry airline's airport slots alliances Answer anti-competitive anti-competitive practices antitrust laws average fare aviation benefits British Airways Chairman compete competition guidelines competitive responses competitors conduct Congress consumers Department of Justice Department of Transportation Detroit Detroit-Boston discount fares DOT's proposed economic effect entrant carriers entry Essential Air Service exited fact fare levels Federal flights going HIRST hub markets hub system increased incumbent airline incumbent carriers issue JOHN MCCAIN KAHAN Kahn low fare low-fare airlines lower fares major airlines major carriers marginal costs MCFADDEN methods of competition Morrison network carrier Northwest offer operating passenger mile percent predation predatory behavior predatory practices predatory pricing profitable prohibit unfair methods proposed policy question regulation result revenue riers route section 411 Senator BRYAN Senator FORD Senator GORTON Sherman Act SLADE GORTON Southwest Airlines Spirit Airlines testimony tion traffic travelers unfair exclusionary unrestricted fares yield
Populāri fragmenti
17. lappuse - The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political and social institutions.
23. lappuse - This statement is made in accordance with the Department's business review procedure, 28 CFR 50.6, a copy of which is enclosed. Pursuant to its terms, your business review request and this letter will be made publicly available immediately, and any supporting data will be publicly available within 30 days of the date of this letter, unless you request that any part of the material be withheld in accordance with paragraph lO(c) of the business review procedures.
17. lappuse - In such cases a strong argument can be made that, although, the result may expose the public to the evils of monopoly, the Act does not mean to condemn the resultant of those very forces which it is its prime object to foster: finis opus coronat. The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.
7. lappuse - As Alfred Kahn, the acknowledged father" of airline deregulation, has observed, deregulation can continue "only in the presence of effective competition as the protector of consumers." Both economic theory and practice within the air transportation industry support the conclusion that the availability of comparative information about air transportation services is beneficial to vigorous competition among the airlines and necessary to the maintenance of affordable fares and responsive...
83. lappuse - USC §41712 if, in response to new entry into one or more of its local hub markets, it pursues a strategy of price cuts or capacity increases, or both, that either ( 1 ) causes it to forego more revenue than all of the new entrant's capacity could have diverted from it or (2) results in substantially lower operating profits — or greater operating losses — in the short run than would a reasonable alternative strategy for competing with the new entrant.
39. lappuse - Levine, who trenchantly parsed the "puzzling persistence of apparently predatory behavior in deregulated airline markets," noting that "economists committed to a high degree of airline market contestability have historically maintained that predation is doomed to failure and is therefore unlikely because the capital assets involved in airline production are mobile.
22. lappuse - Moreover, it is questionable whether, except under the most extreme circumstances, the antitrust laws may appropriately be used to interfere with the unilateral business judgment of an air carrier that a proposed fare reduction will be profitable in the short-run. First, it is extremely difficult to allocate costs and revenues to particular routes, flights, or fare types. Thus, there are any number of valid accounting assumptions that might be made in concluding that a unilateral fare reduction was...
92. lappuse - With that, we are adjourned. [Whereupon, at 3:30 pm, the hearing was adjourned.] APPENDIX PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MCCAIN, US SENATOR FROM ARIZONA Thank you, Chairman Gorton.
21. lappuse - Division would challenge the activity under the antitrust laws. A file containing the business review request and the Department's response is available to the public and may be examined in the Legal Procedure Unit, Antitrust Division, Room 7416, Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530. After a 30day waiting period, the documents supporting the business review will be added to the file.
28. lappuse - A. petitive carriers more than doubled, from 8 percent to 17 percent. In addition to the number of competitors on a route, the identity of those competitors is also important. Deregulation allowed entry by existing airlines into new routes but it also allowed the entry of new, usually low-cost, low-fare airlines into the industry. The extent of competition provided by these new entrants is shown in Figure 6.4, which distinguishes between Southwest Airlines and other new entrants.