Applying this construction to a state statute the court further said: "Section 2792, Rev. 1918, provides that a licensed dealer who had filed his application for a renewal shall not be convicted pending the decision upon his application. If this section be in force in its entirety, then sales of intoxicating liquor could be made, although prohibited by the amendment. And this shows clearly that so far forth as this statute would permit the licensed dealer to sell contrary to the prohibitions of the amendment and of the National Act it is invalidated. As to sales of less than one-half of 1 per cent. of alcohol it is valid, since such sales are not contrary to the National Act. The sales for which the accused was tried and found guilty were of intoxicating liquor whose alcoholic contents were in excess of one-half of 1 per cent. The trial court properly charged that section 2790, which the accused was charged with having violated, was at that time in force, and that the fact that the accused had made application for a renewal of his license which was pending for decision before the county commissioners did not give him a right to make such sale." "We have found nothing in the meaning of the term concurrent,' as defined in the reported cases or the dictionaries, which leads us to conclude that, as used in the amendment to the Constitution, it was intended that the right of the states to pass appropriate legislation to enforce the prohibition should be more restrictive than the power conferred upon Congress to affect the same result, save that the laws of Congress should affect all the people in the United States, while the laws of the state should affect only those within its boundaries." Ex p. Gilmore, (1921) 88 Tex. Crim. 529, 228 S. W. 199. 5. "Appropriate Legislation" The term "appropriate legislation," as used in this section, necessarily means such legislation as will tend to make this constitutional provision completely operative and effective. Rose v. U. S., (C. C. A. 6th Cir. 1921) 274 Fed. 245. "In the exercise of its police power the state may legislate for the enforcement of the amendment by different means and methods which do tend to this end. Undoubtedly the power conferred upon the states of enforcing this amendment by appropriate legislation contemplated the passage of new legislation by the states to provide such enforcement. But this does not attempt to compel it or to control the manner in which the state may effect this. It impairs no right theretofore existing in the state except that of acting in repugnance to the amendment. It does not expressly require the passage of enforcing legislation, nor limit the power of the state to the newly enacted legislation. It does not invalidate state legislation which is not inconsistent with the amendment or the National Prohibition Act. Such state legislation, in existence when the amendment became effective, if it may serve in the enforcement of the amendment, is appropriate legislation.' This term in the Eighteenth Amendment was used in the same sense in which it was used in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, and means such legislation as may make the amendment fully effective and adapted to its fundamental purpose. Ex p. Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 344, 25 L. Ed. 676; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 218, 23 L. Ed. 563. The state may thus enforce this amendment by appropriate legislation, newly enacted, or by existing legislation." State v. Ceriani, (Conn. 1921) 113 Atl. 316. 6 "The term appropriate legislation,' as used in other amendments to the Constitution, has been construed by the Supreme Court of the United States to mean legislation contemplated to make the amendment fully effective; that is, legislation adapted to carry out the objects the legislators had in view. . . . The framers of the amendment, having selected language specifically conferring upon the states concurrent power to enforce the prohibition by appropriate legislation,' in our opinion did not intend that the state's legislation should be identical with that of Congress, nor that it should be confined to the enforcement of the laws of Congress. A general law adapted to all parts of the country, it is conceived, might be inadequate to meet the conditions requisite in the enforcement of the prohibition in a given state. Legislation by the state supplementing that of Congress would seem more consistent with the intent of the framers of the amendment. Should an irreconcilable conflict develop, no doubt the provision of the federal Constitution, making that document and the laws of Congress paramount would prevail. But neither Congress nor the state being able to thwart the prohibition, but being empowered only to enforce it, the development of such a conflict would appear remote, if not impossible. The difference in the penalty prescribed by Congress and the state would not condemn the state law as unconstitutional." Ex p. Gilmore, (1921) 88 Tex. Crim. 529, 228 S. W. 199. 1920 Supp., p. 821, amend. 19. Amendment as within amending power of Constitution.- This amendment is within the amending power of the Constitution as set forth in Article 5 thereof. Leser v. Garnett. (Md. 1921) 114 Atl. 840. --- Effect of Amendment on state constitution. - In Opinion of Justices, (Me. 1921) 113 Atl. 614, it was held that, in view of the enactment of this amendment, which in effect amended art. 2, § 1 of the Maine Constitution regarding the qualifications of voters, the Governor of that state could appoint women as justices of the peace under art. 5, pt. 7, § 8, and art. 6, § 5 of the constitution of the state. Effect on state election laws generally. This amendment automatically strikes from the state laws, organic and statutory, all discriminatory features authorizing one sex to vote and excluding the other, or placing conditions or burdens upon one not placed upon the other as a condition precedent to the right to vote, but in no wise interferes with, changes, or alters state laws with reference to elections that cannot and do not amount to a discrimination in favor of one sex against the other. It protects the man and woman alike, and a burden cannot be placed upon one sex that is not put upon the other, nor can a privilege, benefit, or exemption be given one to the exclusion of the other. The said amendment, by its own force and effect, strikes from section 177 of our state Constitution the word "male," as used in defining who are or may become electors, as well as where used in other parts of our organic or statutory laws when used in connection with the right and qualification to vote, and also strikes therefrom the use of the masculine pronoun wherever it appears, so as to make the same include and applicable to both sexes. And as the said amendment prohibits a discrimination against women by section 177, and perhaps other provisions of our state law, it likewise prohibits a discrimination against men by sections 178 and 194 of our Constitution, and has the same effect upon these provisions as to the elimination of the male sex as when used in section 177 and other provisions. The result is that upon the final ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment it had the effect of making our organic as well as statutory laws applicable to men and women alike, and placed all women in the state upon the same footing with men. Graves v. Eubank, (Ala. 1921) 87 So. 587, wherein the court said further as to the liability of a woman to a poll tax: "The result is that, the Nineteenth Amendment becoming operative prior to the 1st day of October, 1920, all women who were over 21 years of age and under 45 on said date became liable to the payment of the poll tax due on said date and which would become delinquent the 1st of the following February as a condition to vote in succeeding elections. and this appellant, having tendered the tax collector the amount of her tax, is entitled to the writ of mandamus compelling the acceptance of same and the issuance to her of a receipt therefor, and which said writ was erroneously denied by the trial court. It must not be understood from this holding that the court means to intimate that any vote heretofore cast in the November election or any other election held prior to the 1st day of February, 1921, is invalid when cast by those who acquired the right to vote by virtue of the Nineteenth Amendment, but we do hold that, in order to vote in future elections occurring after the 1st of February. they must have paid the poll tax which becomes delinquent on said 1st day of Febru ary." Amendment as qualifying women for jury service. This amendment does not operate in terms or by implication to qualify women as jurors. It requires legislation to do that. State v. James, (N. J. 1921) 114 Atl. 553, wherein it was held that a male defendant could not raise the objection that women were not drawn for jury service. Where under the statutes of a state persons are selected for jury service from the qualified voters of the state, the legislature, in view of this amendment, is authorized to enact legislation so that women may be made liable to jury duty. In re Opinion of Justices, (Mass. 1921) 130 N. E. 685. Validity of state statute requiring registrants to state age. State statutes requiring applicants for registration as voters to state their exact ages in years and months, do not impose in any way an injurious, unreasonable, or unnecessary restraint, impairment, or impediment on the exercise of the elective franchise. On the contrary, we think that it is a reasonable, uniform, and impartial regulation, calculated to facilitate and secure the exercise of this right and to prevent its abuse, and as such does not violate this amendment. State v. Hillenbrand, (Ohio 1920) 130 N. E. 29, 14 A. L. R. 255. MENTS ADMIRALTY See SHIPPING AND NAVIGATION Affirmative relief in favor of claimant or respondent. 577 note Affreightment and charter-parties, 579 note Appeal, case not subject to remand, 642 note Assault and battery, 580 note 578 note, 579 note Death by wrongful act, 580 note Discontinuance of libel in personam, 628 note Exclusive jurisdiction of district court, 612 note ADMIRALTY - (Cont'd) Jurisdiction of proceeding against state, 848 note Maritime contracts. 578 note, 579 note Personal injury suits, 577 note Procedure, power of courts to regulate, 439 note Prohibition. power of supreme court to Saving of common-law remedy. 578 note ADMISSION TAX See TAX ON ADMISSIONS AND DUES AEROPLANES See POSTAL SERVICE AFFREIGHTMENT CONTRACTS Admiralty jurisdiction, 579 note AGRICULTURE Findings of fact and law, 633 note Foreign persons or vessels, 579 note [881] Seo FEDERAL FARM LOAN ACT Advances for agricultural purposes, authority of War Finance Corporation, 28-30 Agricultural societies, exemption from income tax. 149 Bankruptev. farmers exempt from involuntary proceedings. see BANKRUPTCY Bollworm. reimbursement of states for expenses in eradicating, 4-5 Bureau of markets and crop estimates. powers and duties. 3 Contracts for sale of grain for future delivery, see FUTURE TRADING ACT Cornering grain, prevention, 7 Cotton, reimbursement of states for expenses in eradicating pink bollworm, 4-5 Crop estimates, powers and duties as to. 3 Depression in agricultural sections. joint resolution for relief not affected by termination of war, 315 Evidential effect of certificates, 3 Official grades, contracts adding terms to Sale for future delivery, see FUTURE State inspection act held invalid, 339 Inspection of grain, state act held invalid, Land banks, see FEDERAL FARM LOAN ACT Markets and crop estimates, powers and Perishable farm products received in inter- Pink bollworm, reimbursement of states for Produce of farms received in interstate com- Relief of depression in agricultural sec- tions. authority of War Finance Cor- Sales of grain for future delivery, see Fu- ALASKA Bone dry law of Alaska, 536 note Courts, see District courts, infra District courts Attorney general authorized to designate Fairbanks, annual term of court held at, Juneau, annual term of court held at, 12 - ALASKA (Cont'd) (Cont'd) Valdez, annual term of court held at, 12 Government railroad, disposal of proceeds Hospitals, admission of patients, 13 Bone dry law, 536 note Territorial prohibition act not repealed Judges of district court, see District Judicial district, divisions, 12 Legislative power, limitation, 341 note Mining claims, session law as to forfeiture |