place the claimant in any other position than that he assumed in filing his claim, and that is as the payee of the notes secured by the fraudulent mortgage. In that position the claimant is not entitled to the relief prayed for. It is possible that there is due some amount, as wages, from the bankrupt; but as the claimant has rested his claim upon the notes and mortgage he must abide the conclusion thereon, and, they being invalid, he is not entitled to other relief against the creditors.

The bankrupt asks to be allowed the value of a cream separator and of a calf, which he claims were exempt to him under the laws of Iowa, and which were taken possession of by the trustee, and by him sold and disposed of. I see no good reason for holding that a cream separator may not be a tool or instrument of a farmer within the meaning of section 4008 of the Code of Iowa. The selling of cream from milk given by the cows owned by farmers has become one of the recognized methods of carrying on ordinary farming in this state, and the tools or instruments used in connection therewith are therefore exempt under the section just cited. Under the terms of section 4017 of the Code, as construed by the state Supreme Court in Grover v. Younie, 110 Iowa, 446, 81 N. W. 684, the failure to insist upon the exemption at the time the separator was taken by the trustee does not defeat his right thereto. The trustee testifies that he realized $65 from sale of the separator, and this sum he must pay out of the proceeds of the estate to the bankrupt. Under section 4008 of the Code the bankrupt was entitled to hold as exempt two cows and two calves. As I understand the evidence, the cows were set apart to the bankrupt, but the trustee took away a calf, over the protest of the wife of the bankrupt, he being absent at the time, without leaving two calves to meet the exemption. The bankrupt is entitled to $8 as the value of this calf, and this sum will also be paid him by the trustee out of the estate in his hands. A claim is also made for $50 for crops alleged to have been taken by the trustee from the 40 acres of the farm which the bankrupt claims was his homestead. The creditors show that their debts were incurred before the homestead right, if any, accrued, and it is also claimed by the trustee that the bankrupt used more of the grain, hay, and products of the farm than he was justly entitled to. Under these circumstances it is not made to appear that this claim is a just one, and the same cannot be allowed.

UNITED STATES v. NINETY-NINE DIAMONDS et al.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. August 19, 1905.)

No. 2,139.

1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-RULES.

All the words of a statute should have effect. The intention of the enacting body is not expressed by a part, but by all the statute; and, as the purpose of construction is to ascertain that intention, "all the words of a law must have effect rather than that part should perish by construction." [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 44, Cent. Dig. Statutes, §§ 282, 283.]

2. SAME-PLAIN TERMS OF STATUTE MAY NOT BE CONSTRUED AWAY.

Construction and interpretation have no place or office where the language of a statute is unambiguous and its meaning is evident.

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see vol. 44, Cent. Dig. Statutes, § 266.] 3. SAME-CONSTRUCTION MUST BE SENSIBLE-OBJECT SOUGHT MAY BE CON

SIDERED.

Statutes should have a rational, sensible interpretation. The object which the legislative body sought to attain and the evil which it endeavored to remedy may always be considered to ascertain its intention and to interpret its act.

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see vol. 44, Cent. Dig. Statutes, § 262.] 4. CUSTOMS DUTIES-FALSE STATEMENT-LOSS OF DUTIES ESSENTIAL ΤΟ

OFFENSE.

None of the acts denounced by Act June 10, 1890, c. 407, § 9, 26 Stat. 135 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1895], constitute an offense thereunder, unless they deprive the United States of some of its lawful duties.

5. SAME.

The word "false" in this section, which prescribes punishment by forfeiture, fine, and imprisonment for the use of a false statement in making an entry of imported goods, means more than incorrect or erroneous. It implies wrong or culpable negligence, and signifies knowingly or negligently untrue.

6. PENALTIES-FORFEITURES-"FALSE" AND "FALSELY" MEAN KNOWINGLY OR NEGLIGENTLY UNTRUE.

The words "false" and "falsely," in statutes and contracts which impose forfeitures or penalties for false acts or acts falsely done, generally imply culpable negligence or wrong. They signify more than incorrect or incorrectly, and mean knowingly or intentionally or negligently false or falsely, in the absence of express provisions in the statutes or contracts or reasonable implications from them, their subject, and the circumstances to the contrary.

7. CUSTOMS DUTIES-FALSE STATEMENTS-Evidence.

One who had the right of possession of and a lien upon imported merchandise for the duties and for transportation expenses which he had paid, together with the option to purchase any of it at fixed prices, or to return it to the tentative vendors, declared in good faith in making an entry of the goods, which were invoiced to him, that he was the owner. His statement did not deprive the government of any lawful duties. Held, the use of this statement to make the entry did not constitute an offense, under Act June 10, 1890, c. 407, § 9, 26 Stat. 135 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1895]. (Syllabus by the Court.)

In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota.

For opinion below, see 132 Fed. 579.

139 F.-61

Charles C. Houpt, for the United States.

W. Wickham Smith (Edward C. Stringer and McNeil V. Seymour, on the brief), for defendants in error.

Before SANBORN and HOOK, Circuit Judges, and ADAMS, District Judge.

SANBORN, Circuit Judge. This is an action by the United States to confiscate 99 diamonds, under Act June 10, 1890, c. 407, § 9, 26 Stat. 135 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1895], for the administration of the customs, upon the ground that the claimant, Henry Bockstruck, in making his entry, declared that he was the owner and that Simon Fink was the seller of the merchandise, when the truth was that he was the consignee and Fink was the consignor. These were the facts: The diamonds had been sent and invoiced to Bockstruck from Antwerp by Simon Fink, under an agreement that he should pay the duties and the expenses of the transportation from New York and should have the option to keep and pay for, at the invoice price, or to return to Fink, Bodenheimer & Co. in New York, any or all of the diamonds. He paid the duties and the transportation charges from New York, and had a lien on the diamonds for those amounts. He had the right to the possession of the merchandise. The invoice billed the goods to him at the prices. specified as the purchaser, and the deputy collector told him to use the declaration of an owner prescribed by Act June 10, 1890, c. 407, § 5, 26 Stat. 132 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1889]. There was no claim or evidence in the court below that Bockstruck intended to make any statement that was not true, or to deceive the officers of the government, or that the statement he made in any way deprived or was intended to deprive the United States of any of the lawful duties upon the merchandise referred to therein. The court below held that Bockstruck was the owner of the diamonds and dismissed the action.

In the briefs and arguments of counsel these three questions have been discussed: Was the claimant the owner of the merchandise? Is one, who in making an entry of imported merchandise innocently makes an untrue statement by mistake, accident, or honestly, after the exercise of reasonable care, subject to the forfeiture and penalties imposed by section 9? Is one who makes an entry of imported merchandise by means of a false statement, which does not deprive the United States of any lawful duties, liable to this forfeiture and these penalties? These questions will be considered in their reverse order.

Section 9 reads in this way:

"That if any owner, importer, consignee, agent, or other person shall make or attempt to make any entry of imported merchandise by means of any fraudulent or false invoice, affidavit, letter, paper, or by means of any false statement, written or verbal, or by means of any false or fraudulent practice or appliance whatsoever, or shall be guilty of any willful act or omission by means whereof the United States shall be deprived of the lawful duties, or any portion thereof, accruing upon the merchandise, or any portion thereof, embraced or referred to in such invoice, affidavit, letter, paper, or statement, or affected by such act or omission, such merchandise or the value thereof, to be recovered from the person making the entry, shall be forfeited, which forfeiture shall only apply to the whole of the merchandise or the value thereof in the case or package containing the particular article or articles of merchan

dise to which such fraud or false paper or statement relates; and such person shall, upon conviction, be fined for each offense a sum not exceeding five thousand dollars, or be imprisoned for a time not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court."

The contention of counsel for the government is that the clause "by means whereof the United States shall be deprived of the lawful duties or any portion thereof" is limited in its effect to the crime of using any "willful act or omission," and that all the other offenses denounced by this section are complete, although they have no effect upon the collection of the duties and are not intended to, and do not deprive the government of any portion of them. In this position he is. sustained by two decisions of the Circuit Court of the Southern District of New York. U. S. v. Cutajar (C. C.) 60 Fed. 744; U. S. v. Rosenthal (C. C.) 126 Fed. 766, 776. The respect and deference which the opinions of the learned judges who rendered these decisions always command have invoked a careful and deliberate consideration of the reasons they suggest for their views and of the argument of counsel; but they have not proved convincing. If we eliminate from section 9 the words that are not material to the question under discussion, it reads:

"If any owner shall make any entry by means of any false invoice, affidavit, letter, paper or statement, or shall be guilty of any willful act or omission by means whereof the United States shall be deprived of the lawful duties accruing upon the merchandise embraced or referred to in such invoice, affidavit, letter, paper or statement, or affected by such act or omission, such merchandise shall be forfeited."

If the deprivation clause is limited in its effect to the willful act or omission, the words "embraced or referred to in such invoice, affidavit, letter, paper or statement" have neither function nor effect. If these words were omitted and the section read:

"If any owner shall make any entry by means of any fraudulent or false invoice, affidavit, letter, paper, or by means of any false statement the merchandise shall be forfeited, and if in making any entry any owner shall be guilty of any willful act or omission by means whereof the United States shall be deprived of the lawful duties accruing upon the merchandise affected by such act or omission such merchandise shall be forfeited."

it would have the exact effect which the construction of counsel for the government gives it. This fact is a demonstration of the proposition that the Congress intended, and by the words it used expressly declared, that the deprivation clause should have broader scope, and that it should qualify the entry by means of any fraudulent or false affidavit, letter, paper, or statement, as well as the guilt of any willful act or omission. Cardinal rules for the interpretation of the law are that the intention of the legislative body should be ascertained and given effect, and that this intention must be deduced, not from a part, but from the entire statute which expresses it, because the Legislature did not express its intention by a portion, but by all of the law upon the subject. An interpretation which restricts this deprivation clause. to the guilt of "any willful act or omission" flies in the teeth of the maxim that "all the words of a law must have effect, rather than that part should perish by construction." City of St. Louis v. Lane, 110 Mo. 254, 258, 19 S. W. 533; Knox Co. v. Morton, 15 C. C. A. 671, 675,

68 Fed. 787, 790; Wrightman v. Boone Co., 31 C. C. A. 570, 572, 88 Fed. 435, 437; Paving Co. v. Ward, 28 C. C. A. 667, 674, 85 Fed. 27, 34.

The section expresses the intention to create and punish several offenses. If all its language is carefully analyzed and separated into its component parts applicable to the various offenses, it clearly reads that, if any owner makes an entry (1) "by means of any fraudulent or false invoice" whereby the government is deprived of the lawful duties "accruing upon the merchandise embraced or referred to in such voice," or (2) "by means of any fraudulent or false affidavit" whereby the government is deprived of the lawful duties "accruing upon the merchandise embraced or referred to in such affidavit," or (3) "by means of any fraudulent or false report" whereby the government is deprived of the lawful duties "accruing upon the merchandise embraced or referred to in such report," or (4) "by means of any fraudulent or false letter" whereby the government is deprived of the lawful duties "accruing upon the merchandise embraced or referred to in such letter," or (5) "by means of any fraudulent or false paper" whereby the government is deprived of the lawful duties "accruing upon the merchandise embraced or referred to in such paper," or (6) "by means of any false statement" whereby the government is deprived of the lawful duties "accruing upon the merchandise embraced or referred to in such statement," or (7) if any owner shall be guilty of "any willful act or omission" whereby the government shall be deprived of the lawful duties "accruing upon the merchandise affected by such act or omission," such merchandise shall be forfeited. The section is the consolidation of these component parts and their expression in a single sentence. Its language is plain and its meaning evident. It is only by expunging or disregarding a portion of the section that an act which does not deprive the government of lawful duties can be made an offense under it. But a penal statute which creates and denounces a new offense should be strictly construed. A man ought not to be punished unless he falls plainly within the class of persons specified by such a statute. An act, which is not clearly an offense by the express will of the legislative department of the government, must not be made so after its commission by the interpolation of expressions or by the expunging of some of its terms by the judiciary. The definition of offenses and the classification of the offenders are legislative, and not judicial, functions; and where, as in the case at bar, a penal statute is plain and unambiguous in its terms, the courts may not lawfully extend it to a class of persons who are excluded from its effect by its words, because, in their opinion, the acts of the latter are as mischievous as those of the class whose deeds the statute denounces. It is the intention expressed in the statute, and that alone, to which the courts may give effect. They may not assume or presume purposes and intentions that the terms of the statute do not indicate, and then enact or expunge provisions to accomplish these supposed intentions. Construction and interpretation have no place or office where the language of a statute is unambiguous and its meaning evident. It must be held to mean what it plainly expresses, and no room is left for construction. In U. S. v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 96, 5 L. Ed. 37, 42, Chief Justice Marshall said: