spirators plotting against the liberties of the people, were the results of free consultation and comparison of views, is to speak without knowledge. I for one mistrusted them from the beginning, and, if I may be excused the ego'tism again, it was under the inspiration of the conviction that they could not have held together so long under an imperious, self-willed man like the present Executive, without a thorough submission to all his views, that I was moved to introduce and urge, as I did, through great discouragements, but, thank God, successfully, the amendment to the tenure-of-office bill, that brings about this conflict. It has come sooner than I expected, but not too soon to vindicate, by its timely rescue of the most important of the departments of the government from the grasp of the President, the wisdom of a measure which, if it had been the law at the time of Mr. Johnson's accession, would, in my humble judgment, have set his policy aside and made his resistance to the will of the loyal people, and his project of governing the nation without a Congress, impossible. The veil has been lifted since the passage of this law, and those who wish may now read in letters of living light the great fact that during the progress of all this usurpation that has convulsed the nation, and kept the south in anarchy for three long years, there was scarce a ripple of dissent to ruffle the stagnant surface of those law-making and law-breaking cabals, those mere beds of justice, where, in accordance with the theory of the President himself, there was but one will that reigned undisputed and supreme.

To insist, then, that any apology is to be found for the delinquencies of the President, in the advice of a cabinet, where a difference of opinion was considered treason to the head, and loyalty to the law, instead of .to the will of the President, punished by dismissal, is, as it seems to me, on his part, the very climax of effrontery. What adequate cause does the President now assign for the removal of Mr. Stanton? His counsel promised us in their opening that they would exhibit reasons to show that it was impossible to allow him to continue to hold the office. They have failed to do it. They have not even attempted it. Was it because he had failed to perform his duties, or had in any way offended against the law? The President alleges nothing of the kind. Was it even a personal quarrel? Nothing of this sort is pretended either. All that we can hear of is that there was a "want of mutual confidence;" that "his relations to Mr. Stanton were such as to preclude him from resorting to him for advice,” (Heaven save the mark !) and that he did not think he could be any longer safely responsible for him. His counsel say that Mr. Stanton is a thorn in his side. Well, a thorn in the flesh is sometimes good for the spirit. But so are Grant, and Sherman, and Sheridan, and so is Congress, and so is every loyal man in the country who questions or resists his will. The trouble is, as everybody knows, that Mr. Stanton does not indorse his policy, and cannot be relied on to assist him in obstructing the laws of Congress; and that is just the reason why you want this thorn to "stick," and, if need be, prick and fester a little there, and must maintain it there, if you would be faithful to the nation and to yourselves. You cannot let Mr. Stanton go, by an acquittal of the President, without surrendering into his hands the very last fortress that you still hold, and are now holding only at the point of the bayonet.

But there is a point just here that seems to have been entirely overlooked by the counsel for the President, to which I desire especially to invite your attention. It seems to have been assumed by them throughout-if it is not, indeed, distinctly asserted in the defendant's plea-that if they shall be able to succeed in establishing a power of removal in the President, either under the Constitution or the act of 1789, erecting the department now in question, he may exercise that power at his mere will and pleasure, without reason and without responsibility; and having failed to show any adequate cause, or indeed any cause whatever for the act done here, he stands, of course, on this hypothesis. But is this the law? Is there no such thing as an abuse of power, and a just

responsibility as its attendant? Was it intended in either case-whether the power flowed from one source or from the other-that it should be exercisable without restraint? That doctrine would be proper in a monarchy, perhaps, but it is ill suited to the genius of institutions like our own. Nor was it the opinion. of Mr. Madison, or those who voted and acted with him in the Congress of 1789. No man there who asserted the power of removal to be in the President, or concurred in bestowing it on him for the occasion, ever supposed that its exercise was to be a question of mere caprice, or whim, or will. To the objection that this would be the effect of the doctrine of removal, it was answered by Mr. Madison himself in these words:

The danger consists merely in this, that the President can displace from office a man whose merits require that he should be continued in it. What will be the motive which the President can feel for such abuse of his power, and the restraints that operate to prevent it? In the first place, he will be impeached by the House before the Senate for such an act of maladministration; for I contend that the wanton removal of meritorious officers would subject him to impeachment and removal from his own high trust.

And it was no doubt mainly on this argument that the power of removal was embodied in the law.

What, then, have the President and his counsel to say in answer to this? Is the President impeachable on his own case, or does he expect to realize the fruits of the argument, and then repudiate the very grounds on which the alleged construction rests? Was Mr. Stanton a meritorious officer? Did his merits require that he should be continued in the place? No loyal man, I think, disputes that they did, and this Senate has already solemnly adjudged it, in their decision that, upon the reasons stated by the President, there was no sufficient cause for his removal, while none other have been since shown by the accused himself. What, then, was the motive for this act of maladministration, as Mr. Madison denominates it? Nothing that we are aware of, except the fact that the President cannot control the War Office in the interests of his policy, so long as he is there. Was this, then, a wanton removal? It was something more-it was a wicked one. And are we to be told now that he is bound to show no reasons, and cannot be compelled to answer for it to the nation, by those who claim the power of removal for him on the very footing that its abuse would be impeachable?

But it is further strenuously argued, that although the law may be constitutional, and the case of Mr. Stanton within it, as it has been already held to be by this Senate, the case was not so clear a one as to authorize a charge of crime against the President, unless it can be shown that he has wilfully misconstrued it; and that although wherever a law is passed, through the forms of legislation, it is his duty to see that it is faithfully executed so long as it requires no more than ministerial action on his part, yet, where it is a question of cutting off a power confided to him by the Constitution, and he alone can bring about a judicial decision for its settlement, if, on due deliberation and advice, he should be of the opinion that the law was unconstitutional, it would be no violation of duty to take the needful steps to raise that question, so as to have it peacefully decided.

Allow me to say in answer, that if even ignorance of the law, which excuses nobody else, can be held to excuse the very last man in the nation who ought to be allowed to plead it, the testimony shows, I think, that he did not misunderstand its meaning. His suspension of Mr. Stanton, which was an entirely new procedure, followed, as it was, by his report of the case to the Senate within twenty days after its next meeting, is evidence that he did understand the law as comprehending that case, and did not intend to violate it, if he could get rid of the obnoxious officer without resorting to so extreme and hazardous a remedy. But the question here is not so much whether he ignorantly and innocently mistook the law, as whether in the case referred to of an interference with the

power claimed by him under the Constitution, he may suspend the operation of a law by assuming it to be unconstitutional, and setting it aside until the courts shall have decided that it is a constitutional and valid one. In the case at issue, it was not necessary to violate the law, either by contriving to prevent the incumbent from resuming his place under it, or turning him out by violence after he had been duly reinstated by the Senate, if he honestly desired to test its validity in the judicial forum. All that it was necessary for him to do was to issue his order of removal and give the officer a notice of that order and its object. If he refused to obey, the next and obvious step would have been to direct the Attorney General to sue out a writ of quo warranto, on his own relation. This was not his course. The remedy was not summary enough for his uses, as his special counsel, employed only after the arrest of his pseudo Secretary Thomas, testifies, because it would have allowed the law to reign in the meanwhile, instead of creating an interregnum of mere will by which he hoped to supersede it. His project was to seize the place; by craft, if possible; by force, if necessary. For this purpose he claims to have made an arrangement with General Grant for its surrender to himself, in case the judgment of the Senate should restore the officer, and now taxes that distinguished officer with bad faith to him individually for his obedience to the law.

It stands, therefore, upon his own confession, that he intended to prevent Mr. Stanton from resuming his position, in which case, as he well knew, and as his Attorney General knew, and must have informed him, there was no remedy at law for the ejected officer. Foiled and baffled by the integrity of Grant, after full deliberation he issues his order of removal on the 21st of February, and sends it by his lieutenant, Thomas, with a commission to himself to act as Secretary ad interim, and enter upon the duties of the office. He does not fail to suggest to him at the same time that Stanton is a coward, and may be easily frightened out of the place with a proper show of energy on his part. He tells him also that he expects him to support the Constitution and the lawsas he understands them, of course. Thomas is a martinet. He knows no law, as he confesses, but the order of his Commander-in-chief. He has been taught no argument but arms; no logic but the dialectics of hard knocks. Instructed by the President, he hopes to frighten Stanton by his big looks and horrent arms. He proceeds upon his warlike errand in all the panoply of a brigadier, and loftily demands the keys of the fortress from the stern warder, who only stipulates for twenty-four hours to remove his camp equipage and baggage. The conquest is apparently an easy one. He reports forthwith to his chief with the brevity of a Cæsar: "Veni, vidi, vici." They rejoice, no doubt, together over the pusillanimity of the Secretary; and the puissant Adjutant then unbends, and flies for relaxation, after his heroic and successful feat, to the delights and mysteries of the masquerade; not, however, until he has "fought his battle o'er again," and invited his friends to be present at the surrender on the following morning, which he advises them that he intends to compel by force, if neces

sary.

The masquerade opens.

Fair women and brave men" are there, and-
Music ascends with its voluptuous swell,
And eyes look love to eyes that speak again;
And all goes merry as a marriage bell.

The Adjutant himself is there. The epaulette has modestly retired behind the domino. The gentleman from Tennessee at least will excuse me, if, after his own example, I borrow from the celestial armory, on which he draws so copiously, a little of that light artillery with which he blazes along his track, like a November midnight sky with all its flaming asteroids. The Adjutant, I repeat, is there.

Grim-visaged war hath smoothed his wrinkled frout,
And now, instead of mounting barbed steeds

To fright the souls of fearful adversaries,
He capers nimbly in a lady's chamber
To the lascivious pleasing of a lute.

But lo! a hand is laid upon his shoulder, which startles him in the midst of the festivities, like the summons to "Brunswick's fated chieftain" at the ball in Brussels, on the night before the battle in which he fell. It is the messenger of the Senate, who comes to warn him that his enterprise is an unlawful one. On the following morning he is waited upon again by another officer, with a warrant for his arrest for threats which looked to a disturbance of the peace. This double warning chills his martial ardor. Visions of impending trouble pass before his eyes. He sees, or thinks he sees, the return of civil strife, the floors of the department dabbled, perhaps, like those of the royal palace at Holyrood, with red spots of blood. But, above all, he feels that the hand of the law-maker and of the law itself, which is stronger than the sword, is on him, and he puts up his weapon and repairs, in peaceful guise, to take possession of his conquest. I do not propose, however, to describe the interview which followed. That will be the task of the dramatist. It will be sufficient for us to accompany him back to the White House, where he receives the order to "Go on and take possession," which he was so unhappily called back to contradict, and which it was then well understood, of course, that he could not obtain except by force; and he continues to be recognized as Secretary of War, without a portfolio or a cure, while he waits under the direction of the President, not upon the law, but only to see, like Micawber, what may turn up here, and to be inducted and installed in proper form, as soon as your previous decision sball have been reversed, and his title affirmed, by your votes in favor of an acquittal. The idea of a suit, in which direction no single step was ever taken, is now abandoned, if it was ever seriously entertained.

The conversation, however, with General Sherman, who was called as a witness by the President himself, settles the fact conclusively, if not already demonstrated by all the attendant circumstances, that it was not his purpose at any time to bring the case into the courts for adjudication. He preferred the dexterous finesse, or the strong hand, to a reference which every sensible lawyer would have told him could be attended with only one result, and that a judgment in favor of the law.

But in this great strait, instead of a resort to the Attorney General himself, his special counsel Cox, employed only after the arrest of Thomas, is called to prove that he advised against the writ of quo warranto, because of "the law's delay," and endeavored to seek a remedy more summary through a habeas corpus, in the event of the commitment of the Secretary ad interim. Supposing it all true, however, the movement came too late to help his employer's case, by showing a desire to put the issue in the way of a judicial decision upon the law. Nor is it clear by any means that such a process could have achieved the desired results. With a warrant good upon its face, and charging a threatened disturbance of the peace, or an offence against a statute of the United States, I doubt whether any court would venture to declare the warrant void, or to discharge upon such a hearing, on the footing of the unconstitutionality of the law, which had received nearly three-fourths of the votes of both houses, or, indeed, of any law whatever; while I do not see how even a decision against it could have had either the effect of ousting Stanton or putting Thomas in his place. It is enough, however, for the present purpose that the prisoner was discharged on the motion of his own attorney.

The counsel for the President admits that he cannot in ordinary cases erect himself into a judicial tribunal, and decide that a law is unconstitutional, because the effect would be that there could never be any judicial decision upon it; but insists, as already stated, that where a particular law has cut off a power confided to him by the Constitution, he alone has the power to raise the question for

the courts, and there is no objection to his doing it; and instances the cases of a law to prevent the making of a treaty, or to declare that he shall not exercise the functions of Commander-in-chief.

It has been already very fully answered that there is no evidence here to show that there was any honest purpose whatever to bring this case into the courts, but that, on the contrary, there is very conclusive testimony to prove that he intended to keep it out of them. But had he a right to hold this law a nullity until it was affirmed by another tribunal, whether it was constitutional or not? The Constitution gives to him the power of passing upon the acts of the two houses, by returning a bill with his objections thereto; but if it is afterwards enacted by two-thirds of both, it is provided that "it shall become a law." What is a law? It is a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power of a state. Is there any higher power than the legislature? Is it essential to the operation of a law that it should have the approval of the judiciary, as well as of the President? It is as obligatory on the President as upon the humblest citizen. Nay, it is, if possible, more so. He is its minister. The Constitution It is for others

requires that he shall take care that it be faithfully executed. to controvert it, if aggrieved, in a legal way, but not for him. If they do, however, it is at their peril, as it would be at his, even in the cases put, where it is asked, with great emphasis, whether he would be bound to obey. Those cases

are extreme ones. But if hard cases are said to make bad precedents, it may be equally remarked that extreme cases make bad illustrations. They are, moreover, of express powers, as this is not. But it will be time enough to answer them when they arise. It is not a supposable contingency that twothirds of both houses of Congress will flatly violate their oaths in a clear case. Thus far in their history, they have passed no law, I believe, that has been adjudged invalid. Whenever they shall be prepared to do what is now supposed, constitutions will be useless, faith will have perished among men, and limited representative government become impossible. When it comes to this, we shall have revolution, with bloody conflicts in our streets, with a Congress legislating behind bayonets, and that anarchy prevailing everywhere which is already foreshadowed by the aspect of a department of this great government beleaguered by the minions of despotism, with its head a prisoner, and armed sentinels pacing before its doors Who shall say that the President shall be permitted to disobey even a doubtful law, in the assertion of a power that is only implied? If he may, why not also set aside the obnoxious section of the appropriation bill, upon which he has endeavored unsuccessfully to debauch the officers of the army, by teaching them insubordination to the law? Why not openly disregard your reconstruction acts, as he will assuredly do, if you shall teach him by your verdict here that he can do it with impunity? The legal rule is that the presumption is in every case in favor of the law, and that is a violent one, where none has ever been reversed. The President claims that this presumption shall not stand as against him. If it may not here, it cannot elsewhere. To allow this revolutionary pretension, is to dethrone the law and substitute his will. To say that he may hold his office, and disregard the law, is to proclaim either anarchy or despotism. It is but a short step from one extreme to the other. To be without law, and to leave the law dependent on a single will, are in effect but one and the same thing. The man who can declare what is law, and what is not, is already the absolute master of the state.

But who is to try this case? The President insists that it belongs to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, where, as he untruly says, he endeavored to carry it. So it would, if the question involved were one of merely private right. But in his eccentric efforts to get into one court, by turning his back upon it, he has stumbled very unexpectedly into another.. It is not the one he sought, but it is the one the Constitution has provided for just such delinquencies as his, and he cannot decline its cognizance. I beg pardon. He did send you word, through