In addition, FSIS disputed Baur's claim that all downed livestock should be classified as diseased pursuant to 9 C.F.R. § 301.2, pointing out that the regulation refers to both "diseased" as well as "disabled" livestock and noting that a disabled animal, suffering from a broken leg, would not require condemnation as a potential health threat.

Finally, FSIS defended the adequacy of current federal inspection policies, stating that: "It is not difficult to distinguish a recumbent cow... affected with a cental nervous system (CNS) condition. If proper clinical observations are combined with an adequate history and appropriate laboratory test evaluations, a differential diagnosis is possible in the vast majority of cases." FSIS also disagreed with Baur's assessment of the potential risk of disease transmission from downed livestock, noting that:

[T]he consensus of the scientific literature is that BSE does not exist in the U.S. BSE has not been detected in this country, despite active surveillance efforts for several years. Since 1990, nearly 6,500 specimens, from animals in 43 states, have been laboratory tested by an ongoing BSE surveillance system in the U.S. No evidence of BSE (in the form of characteristic lesions) or related transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) has been seen. In addition, to prevent BSE-contaminated animals or animal products from entering the U.S., severe restrictions exist on the importation of live ruminants and ruminant products from countries where BSE is known to exist.

Following the denial of his petitions and the failure of subsequent discussions with the USDA, Baur filed suit in the District Court seeking judicial review of the USDA's decision under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. The complaint briefly summarizes the allegations made in Baur's prior petitions, specifically alleging that downed livestock are more likely to be affected with diseases such as TSES, and that given the inherent limitations in current BSE testing capabilities, "it is simply impossible to determine with certainty whether a downed animal is infected with BSE" by relying on a slaughterhouse inspection scheme. Baur claims standing to pursue his APA claims as "a regular consumer of meat products

*(...continued)

certain diseases, it is condemned and disposed of according to specified procedures. See 9 C.F.R. §§ 309.4-309.15 (2003). However, if the downed animal passes postmortem inspection by a veterinary officer, it may be passed in whole or in part for human food. See generally 9 C.F.R. § 311.1 (2003).

62 Agric. Dec. 524

who is concerned about eating adulterated meat." He alleges that "each time he eats meat he is at risk of contracting a food-borne illness such as vCJD," and is consequently "injured by the risk that he may consume meat that is the product of a downed animal, and by his apprehension and concern arising from this risk."

Defendants subsequently moved to dismiss Baur's complaint, arguing, inter alia, that Baur lacked standing to bring suit because he did not allege that BSE had ever been detected in the United States. In the absence of any allegation that BSE has spread to the United States, defendants claimed that Baur's asserted injury was simply speculative and "based on a series of hypothetical events"--that BSE will enter the country, that existing surveillance and inspection procedures will fail to detect downed animals infected with BSE, and finally that Baur will consume the meat from an infected animal. See Farm Sanctuary, 212 F.Supp.2d at 282-83.

The District Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss by written memorandum and order on July 30, 2002, rejecting Baur's contention that "the increased risk to the food supply created by the threat of BSE contamination" constituted an adequate injury-in-fact for Article III standing purposes. Id. at 283. Noting that "[t]he record provides no evidence of BSE in the United States," the District Court classified Baur's alleged harm as too "remote" and "hypothetical" to support standing. Id. at 283-84. In dismissing Baur's complaint, the District Court also expressed concern over the potential breadth of Baur's standing claim, noting that if it "were to find that Baur's fear of contracting vCJD constituted a direct injury, then any citizen would have standing to sue to direct the federal government to take an action to improve health, occupational, or environmental safety"--impermissibly blurring the proper distinctions between legislative and judicial oversight of agency action. Id. at 284.

'Farm Sanctuary, Inc., ("Farm Sanctuary"), a non-profit organization dedicated to the promotion of humane food production practices, joined in the administrative petitions below and served as coplaintiff in the eventual suit before the District Court. The District Court dismissed Farm Sanctuary's claims for failure to meet the zone of interests test for prudential standing. See Farm Sanctuary, 212 F.Supp.2d at 284-85 (noting that "Farm Sanctuary's [asserted] injury, that its members are harmed when they observe the treatment of animals at slaughterhouses, is beyond the scope of the FMIA"). Because Farm Sanctuary does not appeal this judgment, we focus solely on the allegations raised by

Baur.

Judgment was entered on August 5, 2002, and this timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

We review the District Court's dismissal of Baur's complaint for lack of standing de novo, accepting as true all of the complaint's material allegations and construing the complaint in Baur's favor. See Excimer Assocs. v. LCA Vision, Inc., 292 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir.2002) (per curiam) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). Although standing is a fundamental jurisdictional requirement, it is still subject to the same degree of proof that governs other contested factual issues. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Thus, at the pleading stage, standing allegations need not be crafted with precise detail, nor must the plaintiff prove his allegations of injury. See id. (recognizing that "[a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury ... may suffice [to establish standing], for on a motion to dismiss we 'presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim' ") (quoting Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990)) (alteration in original). It bears emphasis that under federal pleading rules, "[c]omplaints need not be elaborate, and in this respect injury (and thus standing) is no different from any other matter that may be alleged generally." See South Austin Coalition Comm. v. SBC Communications, 274 F.3d 1168, 1171 (7th Cir.2001).

A. Article III Standing and Injury-In-Fact

On appeal, the parties frame a narrow question for us to consider: whether Baur's allegation that he faces an increased risk of contracting a food-borne illness from the consumption of downed livestock constitutes a cognizable injury-in-fact for Article III standing purposes. The underlying law that governs this inquiry is well-established. Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution restricts federal courts to deciding "Cases" and "Controversies" and thus imposes what the Supreme Court has described as the "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,"--injury-in-fact, causation, and redressibility. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must therefore allege, and ultimately prove, that he has suffered an injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and which is likely to be redressed by the requested relief. See

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Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997). These core requirements are designed to ensure that the exercise of federal jurisdiction is consistent with separation of powers, limiting federal jurisdiction to those suits "traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process." Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968)).

In this case, only the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III standing is at issue. To qualify as a constitutionally sufficient injury-in-fact, the asserted injury must be "concrete and particularized" as well as "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Because "[t]he standing inquiry focuses on whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring ... suit," the injury analysis "often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted." Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). Moreover, the assessment of injury is functionally tied to the separation of powers and judicial competence concerns underlying the standing doctrine. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471-72, 102 S.Ct. 752. Thus, in evaluating whether the alleged injury is concrete and particularized, we assess whether the injury "affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way," see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2130, to confirm that the plaintiff has a personal stake in the controversy and avoid having the federal courts serve as "merely publicly funded forums for the ventilation of public grievances or the refinement of jurisprudential understanding," Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 473, 102 S.Ct. 752. Likewise, the requirement of concrete injury recognizes that if an injury is too abstract, the plaintiff's claim may not be capable of, or otherwise suitable for, judicial resolution. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 819, 117 S.Ct. 2312. Similarly, to support standing, the plaintiff's injury must be actual or imminent to ensure that the court avoids deciding a purely hypothetical case in which the projected harm may ultimately fail to occur. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564-65 n. 2, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (noting that "[a]lthough imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic

"The government does not contest causation and redressibility, and it seems clear that if the alleged risk of disease transmission from downed livestock qualifies as a cognizable injury-in-fact then Baur's injury is fairly traceable to the USDA's decision to permit the use of such livestock for human consumption and could be redressed if the court granted Baur's request for equitable relief.

concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes--that the injury is certainly impending") (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Enhanced Risk as Injury in Food and Drug Safety Suits

Here, the government largely concedes, at least for the purposes of this type of administrative action, that relevant injury-in-fact may be the increased risk of disease transmission caused by exposure to a potentially dangerous food product. Thus, the heart of the standing dispute in this case lies not in the notion that risk may qualify as injury-in- fact, but instead in whether Baur has succeeded in alleging more than a merely speculative risk of disease transmission from downed livestock. Nonetheless, because we have an independent obligation to address standing issues, see Thompson v. County of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 248-49 (2d Cir. 1994), we explain the reasons why an enhanced risk of disease transmission may constitute injury-in-fact.

Although the Supreme Court has yet to speak directly on this issue', the courts of appeals have generally recognized that threatened harm in the form of an increased risk of future injury may serve as injury-in-fact for Article III standing purposes. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling, Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir.2000) (en banc) (concluding that "[t]hreats or increased risk constitutes cognizable harm" sufficient to meet the

7

Without questioning standing, the Supreme Court has decided cases in which it appeared to assume that enhanced risk may cause real injury. See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993) (concluding that a prisoner could bring an Eighth Amendment claim for injunctive relief based on allegations that prison officials had exposed him "to levels of [second-hand smoke] that pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health"); Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 434-36, 117 S.Ct. 2113, 138 L.Ed.2d 560 (1997) (noting that exposure to known carcinogens may reasonably cause distress but holding for various policy reasons that a plaintiff cannot recover emotional distress damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act until the manifestation of disease symptoms).

Because these cases did not specifically address the issue of standing, they do not provide direct precedential authority for finding standing in this case. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 91, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352 n. 2, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). However, the Supreme Court's analysis in both Helling and Metro-North displays a willingness, at least under some circumstances, to conceptualize exposure to enhanced risk as a type of cognizable injury. See Helling, 509 U.S. at 33, 113 S.Ct. 2475 (reasoning that a prisoner can seek injunctive relief from exposure to an unreasonable risk of future harm, such as exposure to an infectious disease, without alleging "that the likely harm [will] occur immediately and ... [al]though the possible infection might not affect all of those exposed").