Stone et al. v. Moore et al. Said Circuit Court erred in not granting and decreeing said complainants, on the final hearing of said cause, the relief prayed for in said bill of complaint. Said court erred in not requiring said Moore, and Norton, Walter & Rogers, to disclose and set forth in their answers, the actual condition of accounts existing between said Moore, and the said Norton, Walter and Rogers, and in sustaining the demurrers contained in said answers to the portions of the bill containing the charges relating thereto. Said Circuit Court erred in making final decree of dismissal of complainants' bill at their cost, when by the law of the land, said court should have decreed in favor of complainants, and against said respondents, for the sum of two thousand four hundred dollars, and interest and costs. BRACKETT, LUMBARD & SMITH, for Complainants in Error. W. C. GOUDY, for Defendants in Error. BREESE, J. The principal question in this case comes up on Moore's supplemental answer of June 27, to the complainants' bill. In that answer, he states that complainants never authorized him to insure their corn on storage-that it was not the custom of warehousemen at Havanna to insure property held as warehousemen or on storage; that he did not intend to insure property held by him as a warehouseman-that he gave no representation to the companies that would cover the corn of the complainants, and paid no premium therefor-that he never reported to complainants that he had insured their corn, because he had not done so, and consequently, they could not have adopted or affirmed any act of his with reference thereto—that complainants paid no part of the premium for the insurance; and denies that their corn was covered by the policies. To this answer a demurrer was filed and overruled, and the injunction dissolved and bill dismissed. This practice of demurring to an answer we do not understand, and must reprobate it. It is in violation of all the rules of chancery practice and proceedings known to us. An answer in chancery has, in general, a two-fold property. First, meeting the allegations of the bill, and second, a statement to the court of the nature of the defense on which the defendant means to rely; and in this respect the answer fulfills the duty of a plea, or a series of pleas, either denying facts upon which the plaintiff's equity, as stated in the bill, arises, or by confessing such facts, and avoiding them by the introduction or some new matter, from which contrary inferences may be drawn. Stone et al. v. Moore et al. 2 Daniel's Ch. Prac. 814. He is not to state the conclusions in law which he intends to deduce, or has deduced, from the facts he has set out, that would be contrary to all the principles of good pleading, but he should merely state the facts intended to be proved, and leave the inference of law to be drawn from them by the court, after argument. He may set up any number of defenses in his answer, as the consequence of the same state of facts, which his case will allow, or ingenious counsel suggest; but the defenses must be consistent with each other. Ib. 815, 816. If, then, the complainant considers the defendant's answer does not meet the demands of the law, or finds that the answer contains scandalous or impertinent matter, or that it does not sufficiently answer the allegations and charges in the bill, or is otherwise defective, he must file exceptions to it, in which he must state such parts of the bill as he conceives are objectionable. Or if the answer be not obnoxious to exceptions, it may be set down for hearing, and its sufficiency as a defense tested; this is equivalent to a demurrer at law. If it sets up new matter, which the complainant deems irrelevant, and as forming no sufficient grounds of defense, he can except to the answer, for impertinence. If the exceptions are allowed, either by the master on reference, or by the court, without a reference, and the answer adjudged insufficient, the defendant must file a further answer within such time as the court shall direct, and on failure to do so, the bill will be taken for confessed. If such further answer is deemed insufficient, the defendant must file a supplemental answer, and pay all costs attendant thereon; if that shall be adjudged insufficient, he may be proceeded against for a contempt of court. Scates' Comp. 141, ch. 21, sec. 22; Kitchell v. Burgwin, 21 Ill. 43; Fulton Co. v. Miss. & Wabash R. R. Co., ib. 366. If no exceptions are filed, a replication is usually put in, which makes an issue between the parties. If there be no exceptions, on replication, the cause is set down for hearing on the bill and answer, and exhibits, if any, and the answer is taken to be true, and no evidence shall be received, unless it be matter of record to which the answer refers. Scates' Comp. 141, ch. 21, sec. 31. In this case no exceptions were taken to the answers, nor were any replications filed, nor was the answer set down for hearing. The answers, therefore, setting forth facts constituting a defense, are to be taken as true, by force of the statute, and the injunction was properly dissolved, and the bill dismissed. The judgment must be affirmed. Decree affirmed. Myers v. The People. 26 173 FREDERICK W. MYERS, Plaintiff in Error, v. THE PEOPLE, 3233 Defendants in Error. ERROR TO RECORDER'S COURT OF CHICAGO. The granting of a change of venue is a matter of discretion with the judge of the Recorder's Court, and error cannot be assigned on the refusal to grant the change, unless there has been a manifest abuse of its exercise. In this court, it is requisite the application should state the specific facts and circumstances which induce the apprehension that a fair and impartial trial will not be had. An approver is one who confesses himself guilty of felony, and accuses others of the same crime, to save himself from punishment. An exception to testimony, and the reasons for it, should appear in the bill of exceptions. If objection is made to the entire testimony of a witness, and a part of it is proper, the exception will fail. The Recorder's Court has jurisdiction to try a larceny where the stolen property is found within the city. THIS indictment at the October term, A. D. 1859, of the Recorder's Court of the city of Chicago, contains two counts for larceny. "That Frederick W. Myers, John Haslett, and John Smith, late of said city, on the 10th day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-nine, in said city of Chicago, in the county and State aforesaid, one sorrel mare, of the value of one hundred dollars, one other mare, of the value of one hundred dollars, the personal goods of John Mohr, then and there being found, did then and there feloniously steal, take and carry away, contrary to the statute, etc." To this indictment, plaintiff in error, in proper person, plead not guilty. On the 10th day of October, A. D. 1859, the plaintiff in error gave the State's attorney notice that he should make an application to said recorder of said court, for a change of venue in said cause. On the 14th day of October, A. D. 1859, he filed in said court his petition, accompanied by his affidavit, praying for a change of venue. Said petition showed that plaintiff in error feared and believed that said recorder was prejudiced against him, and also the inhabitants of said city of Chicago and Cook county, were prejudiced against him, and also that he feared, on account of said prejudice, that he could not have and receive a fair and impartial trial before said recorder, in said Recorder's Court of said city, in said Cook county. The recorder overruled the motion, and refused to grant a change of venue. A jury was called. After the examination of other witnesses, one David Carpenter was called, who said: I went to Myers' house on the 4th day of Myers v. The People. July, 1859; one night the heat troubled me, and I got up; I saw Myers and Haslett mount their horses and start to run down a cow. Myers borrowed my hat. I started out to see what they were doing; went after them half a mile, where they had dismounted; after they left, I found they had tied a cow to the fence. I lived with Myers three or four weeks. Haslett boarded with Myers. Smith lived at Bremen. Myers and his wife once started to visit Smith at Bremen. Smith stopped with Myers when he came to the city. I had no interview with any one but Myers in regard to stealing cows. Myers and myself stole a cow, and Haslett took her to Backus' stable. Myers and myself rode when we got to Backus' stable, Backus said he would not receive the cow from Myers; so I led her into the stable and delivered her to him myself. I saw a horse at Myers' place, in his stable, when I first went there. Myers spoke to me about paint; I furnished some hair dye. Myers said that he had received a letter from Bremen, and that he had to make way with the mare. Gray, a police officer, asked me where the mare was, about a week or ten days before Myers was arrested. I told him that she was in Myers' barn. Myers told me that there was a chattel mortgage on the mare, and that he wanted to disguise her. I brought an ox to Myers' place one night. I awoke him and told him that I had stole it; he came out and considered it all right. Haslett and Smith had the mare before Myers had her, and they all told me that Myers bought the mare of Haslett. Myers and myself stole cows together, killed them, and brought them into the city and sold them; the ox I got of Sherman, and the money was furnished by Bradley; this ox was killed at Myers' stable and sold; I tied the ox in the woods, and told Myers that I had stole it. To the introduction of said Carpenter, as a witness, the defendant below objected; objection overruled, and the defendant excepted. To the testimony of said Carpenter, the said defendant objected; objection overruled, and the defendant excepted. The jury found the defendant guilty, and fixed the term of his imprisonment at seven years in the penitentiary. Defendant's counsel moved in arrest of judgment, for a new trial, and for the prisoner's discharge, all of which were overruled. The errors assigned are, that Court erred in not changing the venue. Court erred in overruling the defendant's objections made in the progress of the trial. Court erred in allowing David Carpenter to testify in said cause. Myers v. The People. Court erred in allowing the prosecutor, Carlos Haven, to introduce evidence of particular acts of the defendant, tending to prove a general bad character. Court erred in allowing the prosecution to give evidence of another distinct offense, other than charged in the indictment. Court erred in not arresting the judgment. Court erred in overruling motion for new trial. Court erred in overruling defendant's motion to be discharged. S. M. AND W. S. FELKER, and A. GARRISON, for Plaintiff in Error. W. BUSHNELL, State's Attorney, for the People. WALKER, J. It is first urged that the court below erred in refusing to grant a change of venue. The petition presented for that purpose fails to state the specific facts and circumstances which induced the applicant to fear that he should be unable to procure a fair and impartial trial before the court, or by the people of the county. This is expressly required by the act regulating the practice in the court below. It is not governed by the general act then in force on that subject. The act also requires that the judge shall be satisfied of the truth of the affidavit. This vests him with the right to exercise a sound discretion in such applications; and hence error cannot be assigned for refusing or granting the application, unless there has been manifest abuse in its exercise. The court below is not governed by the general law regulating changes of venue, as was held in Martin v. The People, 15 Ill. 536. It is likewise urged, that Carpenter was an approver, and for that reason was incompetent to give evidence, and that the court erred in admitting him as a witness. The statute has expressly provided that an approver shall not give evidence, and if this objection is well taken, the judgment of the court below must be reversed. Who then is an approver? He is one who confesses himself guilty of felony, and accuses others of the same crime to save himself from punishment. We are at a loss to perceive that this witness in any way confessed himself guilty of the larceny of the property, for which plaintiff in error was then being tried, or that he in any way accused him, for the purpose of saving himself of a conviction for that crime. The fact that witness confessed that he had been guilty of other felonies, although it went to his credibility, did not constitute him an |