...probability. Finally we have a thoroughgoing subjective view in Mr. Keynes' definition as follows: "A definition of probability is not possible unless it contents us to define degrees of probability-relation by reference to degrees of rational belief." We would probably all agree with...

...improbable in these circumstances has been fixed objectively, and is independent of our opinion.30 A definition of probability is not possible, unless...reference to degrees of rational belief. We cannot analyze the probability-relation in terms of simpler ideas.31 What is more, in the peculiar sense of...

...lies in his view of knowledge, and its objects. In a curious passage (I, § 8) he speaks of passing from the logic of implication and the categories of...categories of knowledge, ignorance, and rational belief." Knowledge is on the same scale with belief; it is not different in kind; and its object is of the same...

...deductive relations, which are certain or true if logically correct. This general logic implied the passage 'from the logic of implication and the categories...categories of knowledge, ignorance and rational belief (TP: 62). In this theory of rational belief, uncertainty can arise from three different sources: from...

...at the time Russell was writing. 101: 6-7 Mr. Keynes holds ... probability ... not further definable "A definition of probability is not possible, unless...the probability-relation in terms of simpler ideas" (Keynes 7927, 8). For a fuller Russellian discussion of this point, see his review of Keynes's book,...

...probability. Finally we have a thoroughgoing subjective view in Mr. Keynes' definition as follows : " A definition of probability is not possible unless it contents us to define degrees of probability-relation by reference to degrees of rational belief." We would probably all agree with...