IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. No. 340. JOHN H. GOETZE AND COMPANY, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, VS. THE UNITED STATES, DEFENDANTS IN ERROR, AND SEVERAL SIMILAR CASES. 340, ETC. These suggestions are filed on behalf of individuals as deeply interested in the final determination of the questions involved as the Government itself. A decision in these cases adverse to the Government would make it possible not only to suddenly endanger our revenues upon a mere cession of acquired territory-no one can say to what extent-without the consent of Congress, but it would jeopard a very large amount of capital invested in the States in certain agricultural industries, the protection and development of which it has long been the policy of the Government to safeguard in our customs-revenue laws. These industries, embracing tobacco, sugar, rice, hemp, fruits, etc., can not compete on the unequal terms which would be forced upon them with like products grown in ceded (tropical) possessions. No one can now say to what extent the United States may go or feel required to go, through the fortunes of war, in taking over ceded possessions. No one would have been bold enough to assert, at the inception of our last war, that a cession of Porto Rico and of the Philippines would be one of the results. Eventually Cuba may be taken in to safeguard our interests, or her people may finally vote for annexation. This case is far-reaching in its possible consequences to our fiscal, industrial, and labor interests. Heretofore our cessions have been of contiguous territory having scanty products and comparatively few people, who could be readily assimilated, etc. We have now other and serious conditions to deal with. The Union was of States for their protection first, and not, as too many seem to suppose, for the exercise of charity toward inhabitants who might or might not come to us by war. Our treaty with Spain was ratified and promulgated April 11, 1899, embracing cessions of Porto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, on dis in some respects. There was no attempt by Confor Porto Rico until the passage of the acts approved and April 12, 1900. The contention is that upon the goods therefrom are at once entitled to entry free nd similar goods from foreign countries are subject our customs-revenue acts. us, the theory is that the mere cession and acceptance is a part of the United States for fiscal or revenue purmediately upon the ratification of the treaty and procla mation thereof (April 11, 1899) the Constitution extended over the islands ex proprio vigore, and that their inhabitants eo instanter became entitled to all the rights and privileges guaranteed by that instrument, among which is the provision (sec. 8, Article I) requiring that all duties, etc., shall be uniform throughout the United States," and that the words "United States" comprehend ceded territory for the purposes of domestic as well as foreign commerce. We thus stand upon the threshold of an investigation which will probably involve the consideration of several matters for its determination, among others 1. What is the legal or constitutional significance of the word "uniform" as used in sec. 8 of Article I, in its application to the cases pending? (a) What is the true interpretation of the words "United States "(Etats Unis) when applied? (b) As to the power of Congress to impose a tax on goods coming into the United States from ceded territory to which neither the Constitution nor our laws have been extended by Congress. (c) Whether the tax collected here on Porto Rican products since ratification falls under the taxing clause at all. Whether it is not governed by the clause to regulate commerce, and the limitations thereon; whether it does not fall within the sovereign power over and the conceded right to make rules for territory. 66 A part of the taxing clause in the Constitution has been given a construction by this court. 8 Wallace, 123, p. 132; 100 U. S. Rep., 434. This court there holds that the words imposts in sec. 8 and exports in sec. 9 refer only to foreign goods entering or going out of this country, while the question here is, whether goods from a province, district, dependency, island, or mere territory-not recognized as nor yet created a "territory"-to which neither the Constitution nor the body of our laws have been extended may, by mere act of cession, enter this country duty free. It is doubtless true that it was not the intention of the framers to give the people in such territory nor of any of the organized territories the benefit of "free trade" in nor lower rates on foreign goods than we in the States paid, nor to give foreign nations such an advantage, involving as it would a loss of revenue. The revenue law of March 2, 1799, sections 18 and 92, prohibits free entry of foreign goods, and the first provision in the tariff act of July 24, 1897, requires that duties shall be laid on "all (specified) articles imported from foreign countries," as does the act of April 12, 1900, section 2, especially applicable to Porto Rico, while the military law in the Philippines would prevent the free entry of such goods. The law of nations would also prevent it. No such commercial liberty is known. Cross vs. Harrison, 16 Howard, per Wayne, jus. In construing the Constitution the objects of grants-and of requirements therein as well-must be kept in view. The objects of the uniform clause were to secure equality of taxation among the States; to ensure revenue beyond the power of the States to prevent that result, and to do away with the jealousies and friction that had existed among the States. They surrendered taxing power and were accorded the benefits and protection of several tax provisions. Territory did not surrender the power to tax because it had none. It was not a party to the uniform agreement, and, in view of the absolute power to govern territory found in the Constitution and resulting from the right to acquire and from the power to regulate commerce, some clause should be found requiring Congress in taxing territory to observe the uniform clause or some prohibition found against taxing products coming in from ceded possessions. So far as foreign products coming into Porto Rico are concerned, the "uniform" provisiom has not been violated. A State may not tax the products coming into it from another State unless it equally taxes its own (8 Wallace, 123). Nor tax the right of citizens of the States to freely pass and repass between the States. (Crandell vs. Nevada, 6 Wallace, 35.) Nor may a State impose a license tax on an importer of foreign goods (Brown vs. Maryland, 12 Wheaton, 419). Nor may States impose taxes in the nature of regulations of commerce. The pending cases do not fall within either of these. Here we have an exercise of power by Congress taxing products for its own benefit from a ceded possession, and we insist that that right exists, either under the power to regulate commerce or in virtue of the sovereign power over or the right to make all needful rules, &c., for territory. These cases are original. The question is, May Congress, under any of its powers over territory, lay the tax complained of? The cases do no more than approach the real one to be decided. For instance, in Almy vs. California, 24 How., 169, the question was whether a tax laid by a State on bills of lading on gold and silver going from any point within to any point without the State was constitutional. Held not, because it was in effect a duty on exports, which, of course, is prohibited. This case is alluded to in Woodruff vs. Parham, 8 Wallace, 123, where Mr. Justice Miller says the mind of the court— in arriving at the ground for its conclusion in the Almy case-was evidently on foreign commerce; that the case, however, was well decided on the ground (however) that it was an attempt by a State "to regulate commerce," and that it was a tax by a State on goods going from one State to another in conflict with the freedom of transit of goods and persons between States and thus within the rule laid down in Crandall vs. Nevada, 6 Wallace, 35. We wish right here to call especial attention to the fact that in Crandall vs. Nevada Mr. Justice Miller placed the decision on special grounds relating to persons, which may very readily have no bearing on goods going from State to State. That ground was that citizens have the right to freely pass and repass. Again that was a case of a State imposing a tax. Mr. Justice Clifford agreed in the conclusion reached by Mr. Justice Miller in the Woodruff-Parham case, but said the ground should have been that Congress (i. e., not a State) had the exclusive power to regulate commerce" among the States, and he added that he had strong doubts whether even Congress possessed the power to levy any such tax, i. e., on products going from State to Siate. That is the nearest approach that we are aware of to any decision of the pending question, but this court is well aware of the latitude of the power decided to be possessed by Congress to regulate commerce. It is nearly absolute. Here the question is as to the power by Con H. Doc. 509-16 gress to regulate commerce between ceded possessions and the United States, where for many reasons there should be no limit on that power. In Woodruff vs. Parham, 8 Wallace, supra, the court, after citing the tax clause in the Constitution (sec. 8, Article I), says: "Is the word 'impost' here used intended to confer upon Congress a distinct power to levy a tax upon all goods and merchandise carried from one State to another? Or is the power limited to duties on foreign imports? If the former be intended, then the power conferred is rendered nugatory by the subsequent clause of the 9th section, which declares that no tax shall be levied on articles exported from any State, for no article can be imported from one State into another which is not at the same time exported from the former. But if we give the word 'imports' as used in the first clause the definition of Chief Justice Marshall, and to the word 'export' the corresponding idea, something carried out of the United States, we have in the power to lay duties on imports from abroad and the prohibition to lay such duties on exports to other countries, the power and the limitations concerning 'imposts."" What obligation or necessity; what principle requires that the "uniform" requirement should extend to our ceded territory? The conditions between it and those between the States are dissimilar, the burdens would be onerous, leading to discontent and possible revolu tion. It was the conditions that induced Congress to refrain from placing our burdensome internal revenue taxes over Porto Rico. Was it bound to extend those laws over that island? Either so or the whole burden must fall on the taxpayers of the States! General MacArthur, after speaking of the establishment of a republican form of government in the Philippines, says: "In the light of existing conditions it is difficult to realize that there is any possibility of such a future for the islands, especially as at present and for many years to come the necessity of a large American military and naval force is too apparent to admit of discussion." Somewhere the political or discretionary power of Congress commences. Neither Congress nor the Executive branch of the Government has yet recognized our recent cessions of territory as a part of the United States for fiscal or revenue purposes. Is not the court bound by that? Does it not fall within the principle stated in W77liams vs. Suffolk Co. Ins. Co., 13 Peters, 415? As the impost clause does not apply to these cases, which do not concern foreign goods, but goods entering the United States from (unorganized) territory but recently acquired, it will probably be said that the power to levy taxes requires that they also be uniform, but so far as foreign products coming into Porto Rico are concerned, they come in on the same basis as they do into the United States by sec. 2 of the Act of April 12, 1900. And such would be the result if it were not specially provided. (16 Howard, 164.) II. If we are right on our first proposition, that the "uniform" requirement applies-as to imposts and exports, only to foreign goods, then the contendents must resort to the other tax phrases in section 8 and |