in the principle which would govern the case of goods imported from the United States into Porto Rico, and that of merchandise coming from Porto Rico into the United States. The political status of Porto Rico, its relations toward this country, and the necessity for congressional legislation to supersede the military government by a civil one, and to extend our tariff and other laws over the island, are subjects discussed in the recent mes sage of the President to the Fifty-sixth Congress, first session, on December 5, 1899, from which we make the following extract: The evacuation of Porto Rico having already been accomplished on the 18th of October, 1898, nothing remained necessary then but to continue the provisional military control of the island until Congress should enact a suitable government for the ceded territory. The President, in the same message, urges upon Congress the adoption of a temporary form of civil government for the island, including the establishment of Federal courts and Federal jurisdiction, and adds: Besides the administration of justice, there are the subjects of the public lands; the control and improvement of rivers and harbors; the control of the waters or streams not navigable, which under the Spanish law belonged to the Crown of Spain, and have by the treaty of cession passed to the United States; the immigration of people from foreign countries; the importation of contract labor; the imposition and collection of internal revenue; the application of the navigation laws; the regulation of the current money; the establishment of post-offices and post-roads; the regulation of tariff rates on merchandise imported from the island into the United States; the establishment of ports of entry and delivery; the regulation of patents and copyrights; these, with various other subjects which rest entirely within the power of Congress, call for careful consideration and immediate action. The attention of Congress is further called to the fact that our tariff's have been continued in force against products of the island as when it was under Spanish sovereignty; and the Executive recommends the abolition by Congress of all customs tariffs between the United States and Porto Rico, and that the existing government of the island, maintained by him under the law of belligerent right, be "superseded by an administration entirely civil in its nature.' If the present importations had been made from some foreign country other than the United States into Porto Rico, duties would unquestionably have been lawfully exacted under the provisions of the war tariff prescribed for that island by the President in his capacity of commander-in-chief. Whatever these duties may have been, the President, in the exercise of his military authority, it may be added, had just as much power to break down tariff walls in the conquered territory and admit every imported article free of duty as he had to prescribe duties levied by the war tariff. The power to fix the rates would necessarily involve that of fixing no duties at all. Had he done this, could it have been successfully contended that all of such goods carried to Porto Rico from foreign countries and admitted there free of duty could be brought thence into the United States without paying any duties at all, on the ground that they came from a part of the United States? This seems to us to be a strong argument in support of the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court in the two cases to which we have above referred, and of the interpretation we have placed on those decisions. Any other view of the law would authorize the President to admit goods into this country indirectly through Porto Rico, or other like conquered territory, exempt from any duty imposed by the provisions of existing tariff laws duly enacted by Congress. Whatever may be said as to international relations, in our judg ment Porto Rico had not, at the time of these importations, become for tariff purposes a part of the "United States," within the meaning of article II, section 8, of the Federal Constitution, which provides that all duties "shall be uniform throughout the United States." No question, we repeat, can arise as to the want of uniformity in the rates of duty levied by Congress, until that body shall undertake to extend the tariff laws to the newly acquired territory, and, by appropriate legislation, levy rates of duty on goods imported into such territory, different from those levied on merchandise coming from foreign countries into the United States, or shall levy duties on goods imported from that island into one of the established collection districts of the United States. The necessary inference from the foregoing decisions is that this provision of the Constitution does not extend ex proprio vigore to this island in its present political status. The protests are accordingly overruled and the collector's decision affirmed in each case. (S'd) H. M. SOMERVILLE, Board of Classification of U. S. General Appraisers. And for a certified statement of the facts involved in said matter, as ascertained by them, the said board states that said facts are fully set forth in the decision aforementioned, and that no other facts were ascertained by said board than such as are shown by said decision and other exhibits hereto attached. H. M. SOMERVILLE, Board of U. S. General Appraisers. (Endorsed:) No. 3076. U. S. circuit court, southern district of New York. In the matter of the application of J. H. Goetze & Co. for a review of the decision of the board of U. S. general appraisers as to the rate and amount of duty on certain imported merchandise. Return of the board of U. S. general appraisers. U. S. circuit court. Filed Mar. 15, 1900. John A. Shields, clerk. United States Circuit Court, Southern District of New York. Appeal by the importers from a decision of the board of general appraisers which sustained the assessment of duty by the collector upon the merchandise in question. TOWNSEND, District Judge: On June 6, 1899, John H. Goetze & Co. imported from Porto Rico into the port of New York one hundred bales of leaf or filler tobacco, upon which duty was assessed at thirty-five cents per pound as "filler tobacco not specially provided for," pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 213 of the tariff act of July 24, 1897, commonly known as the Dingley act. The importer protested, claiming that the merchandise was not subject to duty, because Porto Rico was not a foreign country, and because, therefore, the "imposition of duties on goods brought from a place within the territory of the United States into a port of the United States is not lawful and valid under the Constitution." There is no dispute as to the classification of the tobacco or as to the rate of duty, provided the imposition is lawful. A preliminary question of jurisdiction has been disposed of in the suit of Lascelles vs. Bradwell recently brought to enjoin the collector from collecting the duties. Judge Lacombe denied the motion of the complainants therein for an injunction on the ground that they "have an adequate, summary, and expeditious remedy at law under the customs administrative act.” The tariff act of July 24, 1897, provides "that on and after the passage of this act, unless otherwise specially provided for in this act, there shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all articles imported from foreign countries and mentioned in the schedules herein contained the rates of duty which are by the schedules and paragraphs respectively prescribed. (30 Stat. at Large, 151.) The Constitution provides that 'all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." (Art. I, sec. 8.) 66 Before the war with Spain Porto Rico was a foreign country. It did not cease to be a foreign country when it was occupied by the military forces of the United States. Its status at that time is settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Fleming vs. Page, 9 How., 603. The port of Tampico had been wrested from Mexico and was held by the United States until the final treaty of peace. During that time duties on goods imported from that port were protested on the ground that Tampico was part of the United States. Chief Justice Taney, in writing the decision to the effect that Tampico was a foreign country, says: * * * "The country was in the exclusive and firm possession of the United States and governed by its military authorities, acting under the orders of the President, but it does not follow that it was a part of the United States or that it had ceased to be a foreign country in the sense in which these words are used in the acts of Congress. By the laws and usages of nations conquest is a valid title, while the victor maintains the exclusive possession of the conquered country. The citizens of no other nation, therefore, had a right to enter it without the permission of the American authorities nor to hold intercourse with its inhabitants nor to trade with them. As regarded all other nations, it was a part of the United States and belonged to them as exclusively as the territory included in our established boundaries, but yet it was not a part of this Union." The conquest of Porto Rico under authority of the Executive made it ours by military title, but the President's "conquests do not enlarge the boundaries of this Union nor extend the operation of our institutions and laws beyond the limits before assigned to them by the legis lative power." Our boundaries could not be regulated by the 66 varying incidents of war and be enlarged or diminished as the armies. on either side advanced or retreated." (Fleming vs. Page, supra.) In this sense, therefore, our constitutional boundaries do not follow the flag." An extension of the boundaries of the United States can be made "only by the treaty-making power or the legislative authority and is not a part of the power conferred upon the President by the declaration of war" (ibid). The conquest of Porto Rico did not incorporate the island within the United States. Did the treaty of cession accomplish that result? What action on the part of the treaty-making power is essential in order to effect a complete incorporation of new territory and whether this result can be accomplished at all without supplementary legislation is by no means settled. In the treaty of cession of Louisiana it was provided that "the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States" (art III). Whether this provision brought the new territory within our boundaries is a question which has not arisen. Congress shortly after the ratification of the treaty passed acts providing for the extension of our customs and other laws over Louisiana (2 Stat. at Large, 245, 251, 283). The treaty which ceded Florida contained an almost identical provision for the incorporation of the inhabitants of that territory. Of this treaty Chief Justice Marshall said: "This treaty is the law of the land and admits the inhabitants of Florida to the enjoyment of the privileges, rights, and immunities of the citizens of the United States." (American Insurance Co. vs. Canter, 1 Pet., 542.) Whether they would be admitted independently of this stipulation he refuses to discuss. Congress, however, deemed it necessary to pass special enactments in order to extend our revenue and other general laws over the new territory. (3 Stat. at Large, 637, 657.) In the treaty of 1848 with Mexico providing for the cession of California it was stipulated that Mexicans remaining in the ceded territory who did not elect to retain their former citizenship "should be incorporated into the Union and be admitted at the proper time (to be judged of by the Congress of the United States) to the enjoyment of all the rights of citizens of the United States according to the principles of the Constitution." (Art. IX, treaties and conventions, 686.) Congress within a year from the treaty of cession extended our revenue laws to California. (9 S. L., 400.) All the laws of the United States not locally inapplicable were extended by special enactment to California a few weeks after she had been admitted as a State. (9 S. L., 521.) Of this treaty Mr. Justice Wayne said: "By the ratification of this treaty California became a part of the United States. (Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How., 197.) But, as will be shown, it is probable that Justice Wayne was referring to the relations of California and the United States as regards other nations and not as to its internal, organic connections with the sovereign nations, so that these words cannot be taken as determining that supplementary legislation is not necessary to complete incorporation. In the cession of Alaska it was provided that the inhabitants who remained three years, with the exception of uncivilized native tribes, "shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States." (Art. III.) About a year later Congress extended our customs and navigation laws to the new territory. (15 Stats. at Large, 240.) Thus we see that in all previous cession of territory there has been a special provision in the treaty for incorporating the inhabitants within the United States. Whether a treaty stipulation alone would be sufficient to incorporate the territory into the Union is not clearly established. The statement of Chief Justice Marshall, supra, would lead to the conclusion that such stipulation is sufficient to secure citizenship. Congress, however, has always deemed it necessary to put our customs laws in force by supplementary legislation. This uniform course of treaty and legislative provisions shows that the incorporation of new territory into our body politic is not to be readily inferred from a treaty, but results only from express stipulations in or necessary implication therefrom. Before the date of this importation the island had been ceded to this country by the treaty of Paris, which went into effect on April 11, 1899. Article 2 of that treaty provided that "Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico." Article 9 provided that the "civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded shall be determined by the Congress." (30 Stat. at Large, 1754.) * * * The treaty further provided that "Spanish subjects, natives of the peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty," may declare their intention to retain their allegiance; "in default of which declaration they · shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside." (Art. IX, 30 Stat. at Large, 1759.) There is no stipulation for the incorporation of the inhabitants within the Union as there has always been in prior treaties. On the contrary, their "civil rights and political status shall be determined by the Congress." Spaniards who renounce their allegiance have the same status as natives. In the determination of "civil rights and political status" must be comprehended the determination of the internal relationship of the Porto Ricans to our organic law. Before cession, under conquest, Porto Rico was a part of the United States as to foreign nations. The de facto title to the soil was in the United States, but its inhabitants were foreigners to the Constitution, and the provision for uniformity of duties had no application there. (Fleming vs. Page, supra.) By cession the title became de jure, but in the status of the islanders as foreigners, and so in the status of Porto Rico as a foreign country, no change was to be made until Congress should determine its character. The treaty vests the sovereignty over the island in the United States, but postpones changes in the relations of its people, and in its relations to the body politic, until Congress shall determine what relations shall be best suited to the conditions of its inhabitants and to the welfare of the United States. Since Congress at the time of this importation had not performed this condition of incorporation, the status of Porto Rico, except as to other nations, remains unchanged. Counsel for the appellants, however, interpret the treaty as having effected a complete incorporation of Porto Rico with the United |