Lapas attēli
PDF
ePub
[graphic][subsumed][merged small][subsumed][merged small][subsumed][merged small][merged small][subsumed][merged small][merged small][merged small][subsumed]

IN

JO

FOOE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

October Term, 1900.

JOHN H. GOETZE, APPELLANT, v. THE UNITED STATES.
No. 340. On appeal, etc.

FOURTEEN DIAMOND RINGS, MANUEL PEPKE, CLAIMANT,
PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. THE UNITED STATES.

No. 419. On writ of error.

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES.

STATEMENT OF THE CASES.

On June 6, 1899, Goetze imported from Porto Rico into the port of New York a quantity of leaf or filler tobacco, upon which duty was assessed at 35 cents per pound as filler tobacco not specially provided for, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 213 of the tariff act of 1897, commonly known as the "Dingley Act."

The importer protested, claiming that the merchandise was not subject to duty, because Porto Rico at the time of the importation was not a foreign country, and because, therefore, the imposition of duties on goods brought from a place within the territory of the United States into a port of the United States is not lawful and valid under the Constitution.

The Board of General Appraisers sustained the assessment of duty imposed by the collector upon the merchandise in question, and thereupon the importer appealed to the United States circuit court for the southern district of New York, by which court the decision of the Board of General Appraisers was affirmed in an opinion rendered by District Judge Townsend. From the judgment of the circuit court this appeal

was taken.

Porto Rico was partially occupied by the war forces of the United States during the months of July and August, 1898. By the protocol of August 12, 1898, between the United States and Spain, Spain agreed to cede Porto Rico to the United States and immediately evacuate. The evacuation was effected and full possession of the island assumed by the United States prior to January 1, 1899. From that date until the 1st of May, 1900, Porto Rico was occupied and governed by the military forces of the United States, under the command of the President, as conquered territory, under the law of belligerent right.

The treaty of Paris, made in pursuance of the protocol, was signed December 10, 1898, ratified by the Senate February 6, 1899, and ratifications exchanged April 11, 1899. So that the importation in this case was subsequent to the ratification of the treaty, but prior to the establishment of a civil government in the island under act of Congress. It does not appear that the importers are citizens of the United States or of Porto Rico, nor whether or not the imported tobacco was the product of Porto Rico.

In the case of Fourteen Diamond Rings, it appears that the claimant, Pepke, is a citizen of the United States and served as a United States soldier in the Island of Luzon; that while there he purchased or acquired the rings in question and brought them into the United States without paying duty thereon some time in the year 1899, between July 31 and September 25. The rings were seized, on May 18, 1900, at Chicago by a United States customs officer as merchandise liable to duty which should have been invoiced, and was fraudulently imported and brought into the United States contrary to law. An information for the forfeiture of the rings was filed on behalf of the Government June 1, 1900, to which the claimant pleaded, setting up that at the time he acquired said property Luzon was a part of the territory of the United States and that the seizure of said goods was contrary to the claimant's right as a citizen of the United States under the Constitution, and particularly under section 2, Article IV, thereof, and he insisted that under Article I, section 8, Congress is required in laying and collecting taxes to see to it that all taxes and duties shall be uniform throughout the United States. To this plea the United States demurred, and upon hearing of the demurrer, the district court gave judgment of forfeiture for the Government. This judgment the claimant has removed into this court by a writ of error.

ARGUMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES.

THE GOVERNMENT'S CONTENTION.

The tariff act of 1897 declares that "there shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all articles imported from foreign countries and mentioned in the schedules herein contained, the rates of duty which are by the schedules and paragraphs respectively prescribed." (30 Stat., 151.)

The Government contends, and the circuit court so held, that this act applied to merchandise imported from Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands after their cession to the United States exactly as it did before; that within the meaning of the act these countries are to be regarded as foreign, belonging to but not forming in a domestic sense a part of the United States.

That it is within the constitutional province of the treaty-making power to accept the cession of foreign territory upon such terms, conditions, and limitations as to its internal status as may best subserve the interests of the United States, and it is not necessary to invest such territory with the full status of an integral part of the Union.

That this is one of the ordinary and necessary sovereign powers of an independent nation, and nothing in the Federal Constitution or in the fundamental principles that underlie our Republic denies to the nation a right to the full exercise of this usual and common sovereign right.

That the treaty-making power-the President and the Senate-as evidenced by the language of the treaty of Paris, did not intend to make Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands integral parts of the United States, but intended, in several particulars, to reserve their final status for adjustment by Congress, at the same time making peculiar and special differential provisions for variations and exceptions in customs and port regulations as to Spain and Spanish goods and subjects, which are inconsistent with the intention that the ceded countries became upon the ratification of the treaty a part of the United States in all respects and in the fullest sense.

The Government contends that the term "foreign countries" in the act of 1897 is to be regarded as having been understood by Congress to be subject to the rule of interpretation of the phrase given by the Supreme Court in the case of Fleming v. Page, where it was held that under our revenue laws every port is regarded as a foreign one until expressly established as domestic under the authority and control of the statutes of the United States.

That the clause of the Constitution which declares that duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States does not apply to nor govern these cases, because the term "United States," as there used, means only the territory comprised within the several States of the Union, and was intended only for their benefit and protection, and not for the benefit and protection of outside territory belonging to the nation; that in the latter sense duties on imports from these islands are uniform throughout the United States, because they are uniformly imposed at every port in the United States, so that there is no preference given to the ports of one State over those of another, nor is any inequality between the several States created.

That the right to bring merchandise into the United States is a right entirely within the regulation of Congress; such right in no wise differs as to either citizens or aliens. Citizenship carries with it no special or peculiar privileges at the custom-house. The American, the Spaniard, the Porto Rican, are treated alike. The basis of the customs laws is not ownership, but (1) the geographical origin of the shipment, and (2) the nature of the goods. The duty is imposed against merchandise, not upon the importer.

The Government contends, therefore, that in view of the fact that tariff laws are in rem, there is no principle of justice, much less of constitutional restriction, which forbids Congress from taxing in this way the merchandise of outlying possessions of the United States when brought into the ports of the Union. That the limitations of the Constitution as to customs, etc., were intended to secure equality between the States in the geographical sense, and not to forbid Congress from exercising the ordinary sovereign power of taxation as to the products of other sections of country not included within the geographical boundaries of the States; for which we rely upon the opinion of this court in Knowlton v. Moore as decisive and conclusive.

If the foregoing propositions are sound, then it is established (1) that the tariff act of 1897 was intended by Congress to classify as foreign all countries not a part or belonging to the United States at the time of its passage, and the subsequent cession of the Spanish islands to the United States did not operate to admit imports from those islands free of duty, under that law; (2) that the tariff act so construed and enforced violates no constitutional rule of uniformity.

« iepriekšējāTurpināt »