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sagacity. The Majestic, 17 Sup. Ct. 597, 602, | CATHOLIC. 166 U. S. 375, 41 L. Ed. 1039.

CAT.

A cat which is kept as a household pet

may properly be considered a thing of value.

It ministers to the pleasure of its owner, and serves ob vitæ solatium. Ford v. Glennon, 49 Atl. 189, 74 Conn. 6.

CAT-HOLE.

A "cat-hole" is a wet, low place in a farm, covered with grass, weeds, and underbrush, known as "waste land." Bolton v. Calkins, 60 N. W. 297, 102 Mich. 69.

CATALOGUE.

An expired lease according to the cove nants of which, by an agreement of demise, the land was to be farmed, was not a "catalogue" containing conditions for the manage ment of a farm, within a statute requiring such an instrument to be stamped. Strut v. Robinson, 3 Barn, & Adol. 395.

CATCH.

The word "catch" "is not aptly employed to express the idea of obtaining possession of inanimate or motionless things, but of taking captive live and moving ones." As used in Pub. Laws, c. 292, providing that it is unlawful to catch or possess for any purpose any lobster less than 101⁄2 inches in length, "catch" is equivalent to the expression "catch and have possession," since catching necessarily involves at least a momentary possession, and so an indictment charging defendant with catching and having in possession certain short lobsters is not bad for duplicity as alleging distinct transactions. State v. Dunning, 22 Atl. 109, 83 Me. 178.

CATCHING BARGAIN.

"Catching bargains" are dealings with an expectant heir for the purchase of his expectancy. Whelen v. Phillips, 25 Atl. 44, 46, 151 Pa. 312.

CATCHINGS.

"Catchings," as used in a policy of insurance on a whaler, stipulating that the "catchings" shipped from a certain point should be at the risk of the insured, was employed in the ordinary sense, meaning the "things caught," and when the blubber or pieces of whale flesh are cut from the whale and are on the deck, or at least, when they are stowed under deck, they are, in the sense of the trade, "catchings." Rogers v. Mechanics' Ins. Co. (U. S.) 20 Fed. Cas. 1118, 1119.

The term "Catholic" is a designation which, if not common to every branch of the Christian church, is certainly not exclusively applicable to a Roman Catholic church

in a city. Dolan v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore (Md.) 4 Gill, 394, 405.

"Catholic chapel," as used in a will bequeathing certain property to be used for the erection of a Catholic chapel, does not necessarily mean a place devoted to worship according to the terms of the Roman Catholic Church. The term "Catholic chapel" has no necessary, precise, and definite signification. The courtesy of private society, and all political and religious controversies, require us to concede to persons of any communion or party such appellations, by way of distinction, as they choose to assume for themselves. Large bodies of Christians not in communion with the Church of Rome assert in their creeds and daily worship a right to the name of "Catholic," and reject as heretical and schismatical any assumption that the terms "Catholic" and "Roman Catholic" are equivalent, or even allied in signification. Such term, when occurring in a will, therefore, must be explained by extrinsic evidence. O'Hear v. De Goesbriand, 33 Vt. 593, 608, 80 Am. Dec. 653.

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"Cattle" means live stock; domestic quadrupeds which serve for tillage or other labor, or as food for man. Mathews v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 553, 554, 47 S. W. 647.

In the construction of statutes, "cattle" includes horse, mule, ass, sheep, hog, or goat, of any age or sex, bull, cow, calf, and ox. Ky. St. 1903, § 456.

The word "cattle" may be either singular or plural in number, so that the use of the term "cattle" may mean one cattle. In its sense of "live stock," domestic quadrupeds which serve for tillage or other labor, or as food for man, it includes a number of different kinds of live stock. An indictment

charging defendant with the theft of cattle is supported by proof of the theft of one animal. Mathews v. State, 47 S. W. 647, 648, 48 S. W. 189, 190, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 553.

"Cattle," as used in a will by which testator gave to legatees all of his cattle except oxen, cannot be construed to include fattening cattle bought to be fattened for the market by testator, subsequent to the making of his will, in order to convert and utilize the corn raised, but means the stock

of cattle proper belonging to the testator, though the term "cattle," as it is ordinarily understood, embraces all classes of animals of the cattle kind. Hawes v. Foote, 64 Tex. 22, 26.

Code, 2901, making it grand larceny to steal any "cattle, swine, sheep or goats," means live animals, such as enumerated, and does not apply to a theft of the dead body of such animal. Golden v. State, 63 Miss. 466, 468.

"Cattle," in law, includes all of the domestic animals, so that an information charging the theft of "cattle" is too indefinite to support a charge for theft of steers. State v. Brookhouse, 38 Pac. 862, 10 Wash.

87.

As bovine species only.

The word "cattle," as used in the chapter relating to diseased cattle, means bovine cattle only, and does not relate to or include any other kind of domestic animals. Comp. Laws N. M. 1897, § 181.

"Cattle," as used in Code, § 1068, making it criminal to pursue, kill, or wound any horse, mule, jenny, cattle, hog, sheep, or goat of the property of another, is not used in its broad sense as embracing all such ani

mals, but in the narrower and restricted but well-understood sense to "designate only that class of animals belonging to the bovine species as the bull, ox, cow, or heifer." State v. Credle, 91 N. C. 640, 645.

In common parlance "cattle" means bulls, cows, steers, yearlings, and calves of the bovine genus, which from time out of mind has been domesticated, and, while it may be true that an animal of the cattle species may be such as does not come within the meaning of domesticated animals of the bovine genus, still an allegation that the animal stolen was one of the cattle species sufficiently charges the theft of cattle. McIntosh v. State, 18 Tex. App. 284, 285.

The word "cattle" is defined by Webster to be a collected name for domestic quadrupeds, including the bovine tribe, also horses, mules, sheep, cattle, and goats, but is especially applicable to oxen, cows, and their young. The use of the word in an indictment charging the theft of "two cattle" does not render the indictment bad as being too indefinite, although it does not specify the kind of cattle. People v. Barnes, 2 Pac. 493, 494, 65 Cal. 16.

Buffalo.

"Cattle," as used in Rev. Code 1845, p. 364, 2, making it criminal to willfully and maliciously kill, maim, or wound any cattle of another, is used in a general sense, and includes horses, but does not include a domesticated buffalo. State v. Crenshaw, 22 Mo. 457, 458.

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Bulls and oxen.

"Cattle" is defined by Webster as meaning quadrupeds of the bovine tribe, and, used as a generic term, as including all domestic quadrupeds, as sheep, goats, horses, mules, asses, and swine, and, within a statute providing for damages for killing cattle, oxen are included. Randall v. Richmond & R. R. Co., 107 N. C. 748, 749, 12 S. E. 605, 11 L. R. A. 460; Id., 104 N. C. 410, 10 S. E. 691.

"Cattle," as used in St. 3 Geo. IV, c. 71, for preventing cruelty to cattle, does not include bulls, and bull-baiting is not punishable thereunder. Ex parte Hill, 3 Car. & P. 225.

"Cattle," as used in Pen. Code, art. 155, providing that any citizen taking up any estray cattle other than work oxen shall proceed in a certain manner, should be construed to include oxen which are not work oxen. State v. Moreland, 27 Tex. 726, 727.

Goats.

In Code, § 1003, making it a misdemeanor to willfully and unlawfully kill or abuse any horse, mule, hog, sheep, or other cattle, and embraces all domestic quadrupeds, in"cattle" is employed in its general sense, cluding goats. State v. Groves, 25 S. E. 819, 820, 119 N. C. 822.

Hogs.

"Cattle," as used in a letter of credit, guarantying the drafts of a person against his shipments of cattle to a certain extent, included "hogs." Though the word "cattle" is often confined to cattle of the bovine genus, it is, according to Worcester, "also a collective name for domestic quadrupeds generally, including not only the bovine tribe, but horses, asses, mules, sheep, goats, and swine." In its limited sense it is used to designate the different varieties of horned animals, but it is also frequently used with a broader signification, as embracing animals in general which serve as food for man. In England, even in a criminal case (Rex v. Chapple, Russ. & R. 77), where there is a greater strictness of construction than in a civil controversy, pigs were held to be included within the words "any cattle." And in other cases in that country involving life and liberty, the word has been construed to embrace animals not used for food. First Nat. Bank of Decatur v. Home Sav. Bank of St. Louis, 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 294, 299, 22 L. Ed. 560.

"Cattle" is a collective name for domestic quadrupeds generally, including not only the bovine tribe, but horses, mules, sheep, goats, and swine. As used in Rev. St. § 4848, which requires that a lawful partition fence should be such as could inclose and restrain sheep, unless the parties agreed to build a fence to restrain or inclose only horses, mules, or cattle, it is used, as it is commonly used in the United States, to signify only beasts of the bovine genus; that is, oxen,

bulls, cows, and their young, and it does not, | etc., as well as oxen, cows, etc. It has been

as there used, include hogs. Enders v. McDonald, 31 N. E. 1056, 1057, 5 Ind. App. 297. The word "cattle," as used in Rev. St. 1889, § 3621, making it a misdemeanor for any one to maim, wound, beat, or torture any horse, ox, or other cattle, designates all domestic quadrupeds, including horses, sheep, and hogs, and hence pigs are within the stat ute. State v. Lawn, 80 Mo. 241; State v. Pruett, 61 Mo. App. 156, 157.

The term "cattle," in a statute in relation to uelty to animals, includes hogs; hence pigs are within the statute. State v. Lawn, 80 Mo. 241; State v. Pruett, 61 Mo. App. 156, 157.

Hogs may be included under the term "cattle," which is a collective name for domestic quadrupeds generally, as used in a letter accrediting a certain person whose drafts on shipments of cattle were guarantied by the writer. First Nat. Bank of Decatur v. Home Sav. Bank of St. Louis, 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 294, 299, 22 L. Ed. 560.

Under Rev. St. § 4848, requiring that a lawful fence should be such as would restrain sheep, unless the parties agreed to build a fence to restrain and inclose only horses, mules, or cattle, hogs are not included under the term "cattle." Enders v. McDonald, 31 N. E. 1056, 1057, 5 Ind. App. 297.

Horses.

Horses are included in the term "cattle" in the primary sense of the latter term, but in popular use in the United States the word is not so understood. United States v. Mattock (U. S.) 26 Fed. Cas. 1208, 1209.

In the Revised Statutes of Missouri, making it a crime to willfully and maliciously kill cattle of another, "cattle" includes most domestic animals, and, for the purpose of the statute, horses are regarded as cattle. State v. Hambleton, 22 Mo. 452, 454; State v. Clifton, 24 Mo. 376.

In a statute requiring a railroad company to erect and maintain fences sufficient to prevent cattle, horses, sheep, and hogs from getting on such railroad, "cattle" includes horses and asses, as well as domesticated horned animals. Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Brubaker, 47 Ill. 462, 463.

The word "cattle" is a collective name for domestic quadrupeds, including the bovine tribe, and also horses, asses, mules, sheep, goats, and swine, but especially bulls, oxen, cows, and their young, and in a statute rendering a railroad company liable for killing stock it includes horses and sheep. Henderson v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 81 Mo. 605, 606; Louisville & F. R. Co. v. Ballard, 59 Ky. (2 Metc.) 177, 183.

held to bear a legal significance which includes horses. Where the Legislature expressly gives power in respect to infectious diseases among animals, there is no reason to limit the intention within narrower bounds than will be set by the acceptance of the words giving power in their natural meaning. Newark & S. O. H. C. Ry. Co. v. Hunt, 12 Atl. 697, 699, 50 N. J. Law (21 Vroom) 308.

Lexicographers give the word "cattle" two meanings-one restricted to domestic, bovine animals, the other covering any stock The first is ordikept for use or profit. narily given as its common meaning, the second as a special signification, less frequent now than formerly, and, when used in an insurance policy where the occupation was stated to be "cattle shipper," the term did not include horses in shipment. Brock v. Brotherhood Acc. Co., 54 Atl. 176, 75 Vt. 249.

Mules.

A declaration for an injury to cattle is not supported by evidence of injury to mules. "Whatever may be the meaning given to the term 'cattle' elsewhere, it is certain that with us it never is construed in a common parlance to include either horses or mules." Brown v. Bailey, 4 Ala. 413.

"Cattle," as used in Act 1855, requiring railroad companies to make and maintain fences sufficient to prevent "cattle, horses," from getting on the road, and making them liable for injuries caused by such failure. should be construed to include a mule, for, though the term "cattle" in common parlance does not include horses or mules, yet the term "horses" embraces a mule. Toledo, W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Cole, 50 Ill. 184, 186.

Mules are included in the term "cattle," in the primary sense of the latter term, but in popular use in the United States the word is not so understood. United States v. Mattock (U. S.) 26 Fed. Cas. 1208, 1209.

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The term "cattle" includes sheep. Davis "Cattle" is defined as including all do- v. Collier, 13 Ga. 485, 491; Henderson v. mestic quadrupeds, such as horses, mules, | Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 81 Mo. 605, 606.

Steers and yearlings.

"Cattle," as used in Pen. Code, art. 766, making the theft of cattle an offense, should be construed to include a steer and yearlings, though they are described as "neat cattle," for all cattle are neat cattle. Arrington v. State, 13 Tex. App. 551, 553.

The term "cattle" designates domestic quadrupeds collectively, and charging the theft of a steer is sufficient under a statute making the stealing of cattle or neat cattle grand larceny. State v. Bowers (Mo.) 1 S. W. 288; State v. Lawn, 80 Mo. 241, 242; State v. Abbott, 20 Vt. 537, 538; State v. Lange, 22 Tex. 591.

CATTLE BEAST.

The expression "cattle beast," as used in an indictment charging the injury of a cattle beast in violation of Code, § 1068, making it criminal to pursue, kill, or wound any horse, mule, jenny, cattle, hog, sheep, or goat, is employed to "designate the singular number of the plural noun 'cattle,' as used in the statute, which only includes that class of animals belonging to the bovine species, as the bull, ox, cow, heifer, etc. It is a sufficient description of the animal killed." State v. Credle, 91 N. C. 640, 645.

CATTLE DROVER.

Any person who shall drive or bring neat cattle into or through the state shall be deemed a cattle drover. Cobbey's Ann. St. Neb. 1903, § 3119.

CATTLE GUARD.

As fence, see "Fence."

it was necessary to construct it that it would not be so efficient for turning stock as it Ford v. Chicago, R. I. otherwise would be.

& P. Ry. Co., 59 N. W. 5, 8, 91 Iowa, 179, 24 L. R. A. 657. No particular form of appliance is prescribed by statute, but it cannot be contended that cattle guards should be so constructed that cattle could pass over them in safety, since this would defeat the very purpose of their requirement. Louisville, H. & St. L. R. Co. v. Beauchamp, 55 S. W. 716, 718, 108 Ky. 47. A pit under the track does not meet the requirement of the law. Kansas City, M. & B. R. Co. v. Spen. cer, 17 South. 168, 169, 72 Miss. 491.

A railroad is not bound to guard against unruly horses or other animals, and, if its cattle guards are reasonably sufficient to turn back such beasts as cattle guards are generally designed to restrain, it is sufficient, and the railroad will not be liable for not maintaining a better one. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Gabbert, 8 Pac. 218, 223, note 3, 34 Kan. 132.

"Cattle guards," as used in Laws 1869, c. 81, § 1, providing that any railroad running through any improved or fenced land shall make proper cattle guards on the railroad when it enters and leaves such improved or fenced lands, means such appliances as will prevent animals from going on the land adjoining the right of way, and is not limited to the track or roadbed merely, but extends the whole width of the right of way. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Manson, 2 Pac. 800, 803, 31 Kan. 337.

"Cattle guards," as used in How. Ann. St. § 3337, requiring railroad companies to construct and maintain cattle guards at highways and street crossings, does not mean such guards as will keep animals from getting over it in a great degree of excitement or in exceptional cases, but such as would turn back such beasts as are generally restrained under such ordinary circumstances as may occur at such places, or may be reaSmead v. sonably expected to occur there. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 24 N. W. 761, 762, 58 Mich. 200.

CATTLE RANGE.

"Cattle guards," as used in statutes requiring railroads to erect cattle guards at certain places along their lines, "mean such an appliance as will prevent animals from going upon the land adjoining the right of way." Heskett v. Railway Co., 16 N. W. 525, 526, 61 Iowa, 467; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Morrow, 4 Pac. 87, 89, 32 Kan. 217; Ford v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 59 N. W. 5, 8, 91 Iowa, 179, 24 L. R. A. 657; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Gabbert, 8 Pac. 218, 223, 34 Kan. 132; Hurd v. Rutland & B. R. Co., A cattle range is a large stretch of coun25 Vt. 116; Pittsburg & L. E. R. Co. v. Cuntry, consisting generally of many square nington, 13 Am. & Eng. Ry. Cas. 529; miles, which is usually uninclosed, and has Clarke v. Ohio River R. Co., 20 S. E. 696, no definite or fixed boundaries, on which cat700, 39 W. Va. 732. The company, however, tle are permitted to run at large during the Holcomb v. Keliher, 59 N. W. does not perform its duty when it constructs cattle guards which will be safe to turn back cattle, but which will be unsafe for the use of employés when required to use them, but CAUCUS. must be constructed conformably to the safety of the traveling public and its employés, as well as to facilitate the turning back of the stock, though, in order to make it safe for the use of the public or employés,

entire year.
227, 5 S. D. 438.

The word "caucus," as employed in the act relating to elections, shall mean a meeting of the legal voters of any political party assembled for the purpose of choosing dele

gates, or for the nomination of candidates for office. Pub. St. N. H. 1901, p. 140, c. 78, § 1.

In statutes relative to elections, the term "caucus" shall apply to any public meeting of the voters of a ward or a city, or of a town, or of a representative district, held under the provisions of the chapter relating to elections for the nomination of a candidate for election, for the election of a political committee, or of delegates to a political convention. Rev. Laws Mass. 1902, P. 104, c. 11, § 1.

CAUCUS OFFICER.

In statutes relative to elections, the term "caucus officers" shall apply to chairmen, wardens, secretaries, clerks, and inspectors, and, when on duty, to additional officers specially elected, or elected to fill a vacancy, and taking part in the conduct of caucuses. Rev. Laws Mass. 1902, p. 104, c. 11, § 1.

CAUGHT.

A statement that a certain person's moral character was not good, and that there was proof of his being "caught" with his house girl, will be construed to import that he was discovered in such a position that adultery would be inferred. Lovejoy v. Whitcomb, 55 N. E. 322, 174 Mass. 586.

CAUSA SINE QUA NON.

"Causa sine qua non," as used with reference to personal injury cases, means a cause, which, if it had not existed, the injury would not have taken place. Hayes v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 4 Sup. Ct. 369, 374, 111 U. S. 228, 28 L. Ed. 410.

CAUSE.

See "Adequate Cause"; "Challenge for Cause"; "Concurrent or Concurring Cause"; "Contributing Cause"; "Controlling Cause"; "Direct Cause"; "Due Cause"; "Efficient Cause"; "Good Cause"; "Immediate Cause of Injury"; "Independent Cause"; "Irresistible Superhuman Cause"; "Just Cause"; "Justifiable Cause"; "Natural Causes"; "Probable Cause"; "Procuring Cause"; "Proper Cause"; "Proximate Cause"; "Reasonable Cause"; "Remote Cause"; "Sole Cause of Death"; "Sufficient Cause."

Any cause, see "Any."

Webster defines an "occasion," as distinguished from a "cause" to be that which incidentally brings to pass an event without being itself efficient cause or sufficient reason. Pennsylvania Co. v. Congdon, 33 N. E. 795, 796, 134 Ind. 226, 39 Am. St. Rep. 251.

"Cause," as used in statutes relating to contested elections, and requiring the person wishing to contest to give notice in writing, stating the "cause" of such contest briefly, means the fact or combination of facts which give rise to the right of contest or of action, as the case may be. Whitney v. Blackburn, 21 Pac. 874, 876, 17 Or. 564, 11 Am. St. Rep. 857.

As the phrase "cause to believe a trader insolvent" is used in the bankrupt and insolvent laws, it means knowledge of such a state of facts in respect to the affairs and pecuniary condition of the debtor as would lead a prudent business man to the conclusion that the debtor cannot meet his obligations as they mature in the ordinary course of business. Goldsworthy v. Roger Williams Nat. Bank, 10 Atl. 632, 633, 15 R. I. 586.

In contracts of mutual interest, the cause

of the engagement is the thing given, or done, or engaged to be given or done, or the risk incurred by one of the parties; and in contracts of beneficence, the liberality which one of the parties wishes to extend to the other, is a sufficient consideration. The civilians used the term "cause" in relation to obligations, in the same sense as the word "consideration" is used in the jurisprudence of England and the United States. It means the motive, the inducement to the agreement Mouton v. Noble, 1 La. Ann. 192, 193.

For removal from office.

A cause which is sufficient to authorize a removal from office of a city officer means legal cause, and not any cause which the council may think sufficient. The cause must be one which specially relates to and affects the administration of the office, and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public. A cause must be one attaching to the qualifications of the officer or his performance of its duties, showing that he is not a fit or proper person to hold the office. State v. Common Council of City of Duluth, 55 N. W. 118, 120, 53 Minn. 238, 39 Am. St. Rep. 595.

In State v. Common Council of City of Duluth, 55 N. W. 118, 53 Minn. 238, 39 Am. St. Rep. 595, involving the construction of the provisions of the charter of the city of Duluth, under which any member of the board of fire commissioners might be removed by a vote of two-thirds of all of the "Unforeseeh members elected to the common council of said city for a sufficient cause, the Supreme

Any cause whatever, see "Any."
Any other cause, see "Any Other."
Artificial cause, see "Artificial."
Irresistible cause, see "Irresistible."
Other cause, see "Other."
Unforeseen

Cause."

cause, see

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