4. An inventor agreed with an associate to give him an interest in a patent
for the invention when issued, and the associate agreed to procure its
issue. The patent was issued after the inventor's death to the inven-
tor by name, "his heirs or assigns." His administratrix conveyed to
the associate the promised interest, and subsequently the remaining
interest, and all persons interested in the estate acquiesced in the
conveyances. Held, that the patent should be construed as a grant to
the associate as assignee, and should be held to have been obtained
by the authority of the administratrix as well as of the associate. Ib.
5. Failure, in such case, to record title papers in the Patent Office, it
appearing that the administratrix and the in-part equitable owner had
obtained the patent, cannot make the patent void. lb.

6. When an inventor makes oath to an application for a patent, filed in
his lifetime, an amendment to it within the scope of the original oath
and of the invention described in the original specification, made after
his death without filing a new oath or a new power of attorney, is
valid, and does not render the patent void. Ib.

7. Claims 1 and 3 of letters patent No. 213,323 granted to William Coupe,
March 18, 1879, for an improvement in hide-stretching machines, con-
strued. Weatherhead v. Coupe, 322.

8. The principal feature of the Coupe machine, covered by claim 1, and of
his method of stretching hides, covered by claim 3, is, that the hide
is stretched longitudinally and transversely at the same time; and a
single passage of the hide through the machine is supposed to give it
sufficient stretching transversely as well as longitudinally. 1b.

9. The defendant's machine has no stretcher bar, substantially such as
that of the patent, giving a transverse stretch to the hide simultane-
ously with the giving of the longitudinal stretch; and, therefore, does
not infringe the patent. lb.

10. Letters patent No. 116,266, granted to Alanson Cary, as inventor,
June 27, 1871, for an improvement in modes of tempering springs, are
invalid, in view of the state of the art, for want of patentable inven-
tion. Lovell Manufacturing Co. v. Cary, 623.

11. The invention appears, from the specification, to be a method of restor-
ing steel wire which has been mechanically strained, by subjecting it
to a temperature of 600°, more or less, and the claim limits the method
to its application to "furniture or other coiled springs;" but the pro-
cess, as applied to those springs, was not different, in method or effect,
from the same process when applied to any mechanically strained wire,
or to steel made in straight pieces or strips, or otherwise. Ib.
12. The invention was anticipated by the prior use of New England wire
clock-bells and of blued hair springs, used in marine clocks. The treat-
ment to which those articles were subjected was in all respects the
same in the prior use, as in the patented process. Ib.

13. It does not amount to invention to discover that an old process is
better in its results, when applied to a new working, than would have

been expected, the difference between its prior working and the new
working being only one of degree and not one of kind. Ib.

14. There was nothing more than mechanical skill in arriving at the
alleged invention, in view of the state of the art. Ib.

15. The point considered that no one had used the former processes for the
manufacture of furniture springs, and that as soon as Cary's process

was made known, the art of making furniture springs was revolution-
ized. lb.

16. The cases in this court on the subject of double use, considered as to
whether it is a patentable invention to apply old and well-known de-
vices and processes to new uses, in other and analogous arts. Ib.

PLEADING.

It is bad pleading to describe a party by the initials only of his Christian
name, but, when no advantage is taken of the defect in the court below,
it will not be considered here. Monroe Cattle Co. v. Becker, 47.

PRACTICE.

In this case the only error being in an allowance of interest, the court
orders the judgment to be affirmed if the interest be remitted; other-
wise to be reversed for that error. Washington & Georgetown Railroad

Co. v. Harmon, 571.

See ADMIRALTY, 1 (11);

EXCEPTION, 1;

JURISDICTION, C, 5;

LOCAL LAW, 7, 8;

PLEADING;

PRESUMPTION;

PUBLICATION;

UNITED STATES, 2.

PRECIOUS METALS.

See ROCK CREEK PARK, 1.

PRESUMPTION.

Where an act is done which can be done legally only after the performance
of some prior act, proof of the later carries with it a presumption of
the due performance of the prior act. Knox County v. Ninth National
Bank, 91.

See EXCEPTION.

PROHIBITION, WRIT OF.

See ADMIRALTY, 1.

PROMISSORY NOTE.

See JURISDICTION, C, 1.

PUBLICATION.

An order of court, directing a notice of an election which was to take place
in thirty-four days to be given by publication in a designated news-
paper for five weeks, must be construed to mean a publication in each
of the five weeks. Knox County v. Ninth National Bank, 91.

PUBLIC LAND.

1. The issue of a patent of public land to a person who is not equitably
entitled to it does not preclude the owner of the equitable title from
enforcing it in a court of equity against claimants under the patent.
Monroe Cattle Co. v. Becker, 47.

2. When a person makes a homestead entry of a tract of public land,
and enters into occupation of it with his family, and dies a widower,
and without acquiring a patent, the right to complete the proofs and
acquire the patent passes, under Rev. Stat. § 2291, to all his children
equally as well those who are adults as those who are infants; and
not, under Rev. Stat. § 2292, to such children only as are minors at
the time of his death, to the exclusion of those who had then attained
their majority. Bernier v. Bernier, 242.

3. Section 2292 of the Revised Statutes was only intended to give to
infant children the benefit of the homestead entry and to relieve them,
because of their infancy, from the necessity of proving the conditions
required when there are only adults, or adults and minors, mentioned
in § 2291, and to allow a sale of the land within a prescribed period
for their benefit. Ib.

4. While the location of the boundary lines of a land grant is pending
before the Land Department, and the proper officers are bringing to
bear upon it their own judgment and discretion, the courts have no
right to interfere with their action by injunction. New Orleans v.
Paine, 261.

5. When a line of a land grant railroad as located does not satisfy the
terms of the granting act, whether the Land Department may not
consider it as a temporary and provisional one, quære. Hamblin v.
Western Land Co., 531.

6. A valid homestead entry could not be made upon indemnity lands of
the Sioux City & St. Paul Railroad Company after the patent from
the United States to the State of Iowa, issued June 17, 1873, under
the act of May 12, 1864, 13 Stat. 72, c. 84. Ib.

7. A reservation of public land from entry, made by the Department of
the Interior, as coming within the limits of a railroad grant, operates
to withdraw the land from homestead entries, even if found afterwards
not to come within such limits. Ib.

See EXECUTIVE, 1;
INDIAN.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES.

See DAMAGES.

RAILROAD.

1. A servant of a railroad company, employed in coupling freight cars
together, who is well acquainted with the structure of the freight cars
of his employer, and also with those of other companies sending
freight cars over his employer's road differing from his employer's
cars in structure and in the risk run in coupling them, assumes, by
entering upon the service, all ordinary risks run from coupling all
such cars. Kohn v. McNulta, 238.

2. A bill was filed against a railroad company in Missouri by the owner
of a building on a public street in St. Louis, on which the company
was about, under competent municipal authority, to lay down tracks
at grade for use in running cars drawn by steam power. The bill
prayed to restrain and enjoin the company from commencing or carry-
ing out the proposed construction, or from taking possession of the
street for that purpose. The injuries to result to the complainant's
building from the proposed construction were set forth, but without
any demand for compensation other than that contained in the prayer
for general relief. The statutes of Missouri provide for the assess-
ment of compensation for the taking of property for public use, but
not for such assessment where property is merely damaged. Held,
that the complainant had an adequate remedy at law for the injuries
complained of, and was not entitled to the relief prayed for. Osborne
v. Missouri Pacific Railway, 249.

In Kansas, in an action of replevin to enforce a chattel mortgage of a
machine sold to the defendant by the plaintiff, and mortgaged back to
secure the purchase money, the defendant may set up, as a defence,
failure of the machine to do the work guaranteed and damage to him
from delay in the delivery; and if the jury pass upon these issues, the
judgment on their verdict is a bar to a subsequent action by the pur-
chaser of the machine against the vendor, to recover damages for such
failure and such delay. Clement v. Field, 467.

See EXECUTIVE, 1.

ROCK CREEK PARK.

1. If there were any deposits of gold in the land condemned for the Rock
Creek Park in Washington, those deposits were the property of the
United States. Shoemaker v. United States, 282.

2. The filing of a map of the land proposed to be taken for the Rock
Creek Park, made under § 3 of the act of September 27, 1890, 26 Stat.
492, c. 1001, was not a finalty, and did not commit the commissioners
to taking all the tracts included in it. Ib.

3. The owners of the tracts condemned for that park are not entitled to
interest upon
the respective sums assessed as damages for the taking.

lb.

SERVICE OF PROCESS.

See ADMIRALTY, 1 (7) ;

COMMON CARRIER, 4, 2.

SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

See EXECUTIVE.

SET OFF.

See RES JUDICATA.

STREET.

See RAILROAD, 2.

STATUTE.

A. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.

The construction given to an act by the Department charged with the duty
of enforcing is material only in case of doubt. United States v.
Tanner, 661.