acquiring an interest in the subject-matter against and superior to the
lien.
5. It does not appear to be necessary in Iowa to exhaust the remedy at
law before proceeding to enforce a vendor's lien. Ib.
6. Under the circumstances of this case, as detailed in the opinion; held,
(1) That a vendor's lien existed on the property for the complainants'
benefit which could be enforced by them for the balance due them
on the purchase money; (2) That George Lyle was not a necessary
party to the proceedings to enforce it; (3) That there was an error
in the master's computation, which made it necessary to remand the
1. The construction given by the Supreme Court of a State to a statute of
limitations of the State will be followed by this court, even in a case
decided the other way in the Circuit Court before the decision of the
state court. Bauserman v. Blunt, 647.
2. The statute of limitations of Kansas, as construed by the Supreme
Court of the State, does not run while the debtor is personally absent
from the State, although he retains a usual place of residence therein,
where a summons upon him might be served. Ib.
3. The statute of limitations of Kansas, as construed by the Supreme
Court of the State, stops running at the death of the debtor, but for
such a reasonable time only as will enable the creditor to have an
administrator appointed. Ib.
1. During the ninety days allowed by the statutes of Texas concerning the
purchase of school lands to a purchaser to make his first payment,
(Laws of 1879, special session, p. 23, Laws of 1881, p. 119,) it is not
competent for the surveyor to permit a person who had filed an appli-
cation for a designated tract to treat the application as withdrawn and
abandoned, and to make another application for the same tract in the
name of a different person. Monroe Cattle Co. v. Becker, 47.
2. During that period of ninety days the land is in the position of reserved
lands under railroad grant acts, to which it is well settled that the
grant does not attach if the land is in any way segregated from the
public lands. Ib.
3. Under the laws of Texas regulating the sale of the school lands, a pur-
chaser who makes the first payment called for, who executes the obliga-
tions for subsequent payments as called for, and complies with those
obligations as they mature, is protected against forfeiture. 1b.
4. The act of the legislature of Texas of April 14, 1883, concerning pur-
chases of school lands, had no effect upon the vested rights of the
plaintiff in this case. Ib.
5. An index to an abstract of judgments in Texas, made under its laws for
acquiring judgment liens, is sufficient, which gives the defendant's
name or names correctly, and the names of the plaintiffs by a partner-
ship title. Cooke v. Avery, 375.
6. In Texas, in trespass to try title, the defendant cannot question the
validity of his grantor's title at the time of the conveyance to him
when the plaintiff claims under the same grantor, unless he claims
under a paramount title. Ib.
7. If the defendant in such an action pleads his title specially, he waives
the general issue, and is confined to the defence specially pleaded. Ib.
8. The defendant in such an action, not having been in possession of the
land in dispute for twelve months next before the commencement of
the action under written evidence of title, offered to show that imme-
diately after concluding his bargain for the property he entered into
possession, and commenced making improvements, and erected im-
provements of great value on the property before he knew of the plain-
tiff's lien. This was done in order to enable him to get the benefit of
the provisions in the Texas statutes relating to improvements. Held,
that the offer was too vague. Ib.
9. A married woman was codefendant in an action of trespass to try title
in Texas. Her interest was a community interest in the property by
virtue of a conveyance to her husband. Held, that a personal judg-
ment in damages for use and occupation, and for costs, could not be
rendered against her. Ib.
Nebraska:
Ohio:
Oregon:
Texas:
See ASSIGNment for BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.
See LIEN.
See LIMITATION, STATUTES Of, 2, 3;
RES JUDICATA.
See JURISDICTION, A, 8;
MARRIED WOMAN, 3.
See COMMON CARRIER, 4 (1), (10);
MUNICIPAL BOND, 5, 9;
See JURISDICTION, A, 6.
See MARRIED WOMAN, 1, 2.
See EVIDENCE, 1.
See LOCAL LAW, 9;
1. Certain bonds issued by the government of Austra, held to represent a
"lottery or similar scheme," within the meaning of § 3894 of the
Revised Statutes, as enacted by the act of September 19, 1890, c. 908,
26 Stat. 465; and a given circular held to be a "circular concerning
any lottery, so-called gift, concert or other similar enterprise offering
prizes dependent upon lot or chance," within the meaning of said
§ 3894; and the said circular held to constitute a "list of the drawings
at any lottery or similar scheme," within the meaning of said § 3894.
Horner v. United States, 449.
2. What is a lottery, considered. Ib.
3. Cases in the United States and England, considered. Ib.
4. Although, by the bonds in question, Austria attempted to obtain a loan
of money, she also undertook to assist her credit by an appeal to the
cupidity of those who had money, and offered to each holder of a bond
a chance of obtaining a prize dependent upon lot or chance, the
element of certainty going hand in hand with the element of lot or
chance, but the former not destroying the existence or effect of the
latter. Ib.
Under § 7 of the act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826, 828, which pro-
vides for an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals from an interlocu-
tory order or decree granting or continuing an injunction on a hearing
in equity, the granting of a stay of the operation of the injunction
during the pendency of the appeal, by the court which granted or
continued it, is not a matter of right, but is a matter of discretion;
and such discretion of that court cannot be controlled by a writ of
mandamus from this court. In re Haberman Manufacturing Co., 525.
See ADMIRALTY, 1;
JURISDICTION, A, 5; C, 2.
1. In Ohio the separate property of a married woman is not charged, either
in law or in equity, by her contracts executed previous to its existence.
Ankeney v. Hannon, 118.
2. The cases in Ohio, in New York, and in England on this subject, ex-
amined. Ib.
3. The liability of a husband to his wife for her paraphernal property,
secured by legal mortgage of his estate, under the law of Louisiana,
is extinguished by his discharge in bankruptcy; her mortgage, there-
fore, cannot attach to land acquired by him after the discharge; and
a subsequent mortgagee from the husband may set up the discharge
in bankruptcy against the wife. Fleitas v. Richardson, (No. 2,) 550.
See LOCAL Law, 9.
See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 2;
Costs, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1;
RAILROAD, 1.
The question of priority between two mortgages on lines of telegraph, con-
sidered. United Lines Telegraph Co. v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust
Co., 431.
1. When negotiable bonds of a municipality, issued in aid of a railroad
company, are void as between the railroad company and the munici-
pality, the burden is upon the holder to show that he, or some one
through whom he obtained title to them, was a bona fide purchaser for
a valuable consideration. Lytle v. Lansing, 59.
2. The settled rule in equity that a purchaser without notice, to be
entitled to protection, must not only be so at the time of the contract
or conveyance, but also at the time of the payment of the purchase
money, applies to the purchase of negotiable municipal bonds. Ib.
3. It is the duty of one who purchases municipal bonds, knowing that the
municipality is contesting its liability on them, to make inquiries, and
the failure to do so will be held to be a wilful closing of his ears to
information. Ib.
4. The several holdings of the bonds which form the subject of this litiga-
tion since they passed out of the railroad company, examined, and
held to be either as collateral for a debt which has been paid, or as
fictitious, for a real owner who is affected with notice of their invalid-
ity. Ib.
5. The question under what statute of Missouri the bonds were issued
which form the subject of this controversy was properly determinable
in a suit on the bonds. Knox County v. Ninth National Bank, 91.
6. Decisions of state courts upon the requirements of state statutes for
validating issues of municipal bonds in the State, when made subse-
quent to an issue of such bonds, are not controlling in litigations in
Federal courts, involving the validity of such issue. Ib.
7. When the matter in dispute is whether a particular issue of municipal
bonds was made under one statute of the State in which the munici-
pality is situated or under another, the whole conduct of the munici-
pality, both before, at the time, and after the issue of the bonds, may
be shown to aid in determining the question. Ib.
8. In a subscription by a municipal corporation to aid in the construction
of a railroad, it is sufficient if the route is designated, leaving to the
municipal authorities to designate the particular corporation to be the
recipient of the subscription. Ib.
9. The bonds issued by Knox County, Missouri, to the Missouri and
Mississippi Railroad Company, were issued in pursuance of the gen-
eral laws of the State, and not under the act of the legislature of
Missouri, of February 20, 1865, to incorporate that company, and the
county powers of taxation are not limited by the provisions of section
13 of the act incorporating the company. Ib.
10. Where the constitution and a statute of a State forbid any county to
issue bonds to such an amount as will make its aggregate indebted-
ness exceed a certain proportion of the assessed valuation of taxable
property in the county; and the statute requires the county commis-
sioners to publish, and to enter on the public records of the county,
semi-annual statements showing the whole amount of the county debt;
a purchaser for value and before maturity, of a bond issued in excess
of the constitutional and statutory limit, is charged with the duty of
examining the record of indebtedness; and the county is not estopped,
by a recital in the bond that all the provisions of the statute have been
complied with, to prove, by the record of the assessment and the
indebtedness, that the bonds were issued in violation of the constitu-
tion. Sutliff v. Lake County Commissioners, 230.
See COMMON CARRIER, 1, 3.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 3.
1. A patent for an invention issued to the inventor, "his heirs or assigns,"
after his death, is a valid patent, and should be construed in the alter-
native as a grant to him, or his heirs or assigns. De la Vergne
Refrigerating Machine Co. v. Featherstone, 209.
2. Such a construction would include a grantee or grantees in being cap-
able of taking the patent and to whose benefit the grant would enure.
Ib.
3. In such case an executor de son tort may, in Texas, make an assignment
of an interest in the patent which will convey a valid title to the
assignee, if not repudiated by the executor or administrator of the
inventor when duly appointed, or by his children. Ib.
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