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filing duplicate accounts: also for entering separate orders of court
excusing jurors, entering orders of court to issue subpoenas, and enter-
ing an order for alias capias when such orders are made by the court
and the fees allowed; and also for drawing recognizances of defend-
ants. He is not entitled to fees for filing vouchers: nor for making
dockets and indexing where no indictment is found: nor for attend-
ance upon the District Court as a jury commissioner in drawing
jurors. United States v. Payne, 687.

23. On the authority of United States v. Ewing, 140 U. S. 142, the charges
of a commissioner of a Circuit Court for docket fees are disallowed,
and the charges for acknowledgments of sureties on recognizances of
defendants in prosecutions brought by the United States reduced to a
fee for a single acknowledgment. United States v. Hall, 691.
24. There is no legal objection to the same person holding the offices of
clerk and of commissioner of a Circuit Court, and the person so hold-
ing them is entitled to the fees and emoluments of both. United States
v. McCandless, 692.

25. The court disallows the following charges by a clerk of a District
Court: (1) Docket fees where the grand jury returned "not true
bill;" (2) Docket fees where the case is not finally disposed of;
(3) A charge for miscellaneous fees, entering orders of court, making
copies, certificates, and seals, as being too general; (4) A charge for
issuing commitments to jail in addition to copy of order of removal,
as being too indefinite; (5) An item for entering orders of court,
approving accounts of officers, and copies of certificates and seals. Ib.
26. Only one fee is allowed for taking the acknowledgment of a defend-
ant and his sureties unless it be made to appear that it was necessary
to take them separately. United States v. Taylor, 695.

27. A clerk may charge for copies of orders of court directing the marshal
to pay witnesses and jurors, but not for affixing seals thereto. Ib.
28. No charge can be made for filing orders from the District Attorney
discharging witnesses from attendance. lb.

29. A fee may be charged for an affidavit of a witness as to his mileage
and attendance; but this affidavit need not be filed. Ib.

30. The rule in United States v. King, ante, 676, that proceedings before
a commissioner form no part of the record, applies to affidavits. Ib.
31. The comptroller cannot prescribe the length of capiases or bonds, or
limit a clerk to a certain number of folios. Ib.

See COSTS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

COSTS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

The Circuit Court had a right, under § 15 of the act of March 3, 1887,
c. 359, 24 Stat. 505, 508, c. 359, to award certain costs to the plaintiff,
considering the frivolous and vexatious nature of the objections taken
to the greater part of this claim. United States v. Harmon, 268.

COURT AND JURY.

It is not reversible error in a judge of a Federal Court to express his own
opinion of the facts, if the rules of law are correctly laid down, and if
the jurors are given to understand that they are not bound by such
expressions of opinion. Doyle v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 413.

CUSTOMS DUTIES.

Knit woollen undershirts, drawers and hosiery are subject to duty as
"wool-wearing apparel," under paragraph 396 of section 1 of the act
of October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567, 597, c. 1244, and not as "knit fabrics
made on frames," under paragraph 392 of the same act. Arnold v.
United States, 494.

DAMAGES.

A railroad corporation is not liable to exemplary or punitive damages for
an illegal, wanton and oppressive arrest of a passenger by the con-
ductor of one of its trains, which it has in no way authorized or
ratified. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Prentice,
101.

See COMMON CARRIER, 3, 4, (4) (6).

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

1. The proviso in the Maryland act of cession of the District of Columbia,
that nothing therein contained should be "so construed to vest in the
United States any right of property in the soil, as to affect the right
of individuals therein, otherwise than the same shall or may be trans-
ferred by such individuals to the United States," has no reference to
the power of eminent domain which belongs to the United States as
the grantee in the act of cession. Shoemaker v. United States, 282.
2. The United States possess full and unlimited jurisdiction, both of a
political and municipal nature, over the District of Columbia. Ib.
3. In the District of Columbia a judgment in an action of tort does not
bear interest. Washington & Georgetown Railroad Co. v. Harmon, 571.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

1. Land taken in a city for public parks and squares by authority of law,
is taken for a public use. Shoemaker v. United States, 282.

2. The extent to which such property shall be taken for such use rests
wholly in legislative discretion, subject only to the restraint that just
compensation must be made. Ib.

3. The approval by the President of the price to be paid by the United
States for private land, condemned for public use in the exercise of
the right of eminent domain, is not a judicial act. Ib.

4. An intention expressed by Congress not to go beyond a sum named as
the aggregate, in condemning land for a park in Washington, is not a
direction to appraisers to keep within any given limit in valuing any
particular piece of property. Ib.

5. It is competent for the legislature, in providing for the cost of a public
park, to assess a proportionate part of it upon property specially

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6. In condemning lands for a public park, it is competent for the court, in
the absence of a legislative direction prescribing the form of the oath
to be administered to appraisers, to direct them to take an oath to
"faithfully, justly and impartially appraise the value or values of said
parcels of land, and of the respective interests therein, to the best of
their skill and judgment." Ib.

7. In determining the values of lands so taken appraisers should exercise
their own judgment, derived from personal knowledge and inspection
of the lands, as well as their knowledge derived from the evidence
adduced by the parties. Ib.

8. An appellate court will not interfere with the report of commissioners,
(or appraisers,) in such case, to correct the amounts reported, except
in case of gross error showing prejudice, corruption or plain mistake.
Ib.

See ROCK CREEK PARK.

EQUITY.

1. The verdict of a jury upon an issue submitted to it by order of a Court
of Chancery is advisory only, and is binding upon the court only so
far as it chooses to adopt it. Kohn v. McNulta, 238.

See FRAUD;

RAILROAD, 2;

TAX AND TAXATION, 2.

ESTOPPEL.

See MUNICIPAL BOND, 10.

EVIDENCE.

1. When the genuineness of a paper sued on is put in issue, papers not
otherwise competent may be introduced in Oregon for the purpose of
enabling the jury to make a comparison of handwritings. Holmes v.
Goldsmith, 150.

2. A witness who has sworn to the genuineness of a disputed signature to
a note, may be further asked if he would act upon it if it came to him
in an ordinary business transaction. Ib.

3. The admission of evidence of a collateral fact, which might have been
rejected by the trial court without committing error, does not consti-

tute error which will of itself justify reversal of the judgment below
if the case of the plaintiff in error was not injured by it.

See ADMIRALTY, 6;

COMMON CARRIER, 4 (8).

EXCEPTION.

Ib.

1. In view of the requirements of Rev. Stat. § 953, respecting the
authentication of bills of exceptions, it will be assumed, where a
bill is certified by a District Judge holding Circuit Court, that the
Circuit Justice and Circuit Judge were not present at the trial, unless
the record clearly and affirmatively shows the contrary. Cooke v.
Avery, 375.

2. Detached sentences in a charge to a jury cannot be selected as grounds
of objection, but must be read in connection with the whole charge.
New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad Co. v. Estill, 591.

EXECUTIVE.

1. A decision of the Secretary of the Interior, in exercise of the powers
conferred upon him by the act of March 3, 1875, c. 152, 18 Stat. 482,
that a desiguated railroad company is entitled to a right of way over
public land, cannot be revoked by his successor in office. Noble v.
Union River Logging Railroad Co., 165.

2. Whether a railroad company applying for such a grant is a company
which the statute authorizes to receive a grant of a right of way is a
quasi judicial question, which, when once determined by the Secretary,
is finally determined so far as the executive is concerned. Ib.
See JURISDICTION, C, 2.

EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.

A citizen of Pennsylvania, born in New Jersey, devised and bequeathed
the residue of his estate, real and personal, consisting mostly of prop-
erty in Pennsylvania and in Michigan, with some real estate in New
Jersey, to his executors, in trust to sell and invest at their discretion,
"and to appropriate and use the principal or income thereof for the
purpose of founding and supporting, or uniting in the support of any
institution that may be then founded, to furnish a retreat and home
for disabled or aged and infirm and deserving American mechanics;"
and appointed as his executors H, a citizen of New Jersey, and W, a
citizen of Pennsylvania, "and in the event of the death of either or
both of them, first, P, and next, N, to supply vacancy." W took out
letters testamentary in Pennsylvania, and there administered the
property in Pennsylvania and in Michigan, and, with the approval of
a Pennsylvania court, appropriated it to found a home for such
mechanics, incorporated by the legislature of Pennsylvania to carry

out the testator's charitable intention. H took out letters testamen-
tary in New Jersey, and took care of the real estate there, and died
having done nothing beyond obtaining the opinion of counsel that
the executors would be authorized, in their discretion, to provide a
bed for such mechanics in a hospital, incorporated in New Jersey, for
"the care, nurture and maintenance of sick, infirm, aged and indigent
persons, and of orphan and destitute children," and whose by-laws
provided that patients in a condition to be discharged, or whose dis-
ease was incurable, should not remain in the hospital, and that those
able to pay for their maintenance should do so. After the deaths of
H and W, a son of I took out letters of administration with the will
annexed of the unadministered goods, chattels and effects of the origi-
nal testator in New Jersey; and, after having assured P that he would
not dispose of the real estate in New Jersey without giving him an
opportunity to show that the Pennsylvania corporation was entitled to
it, sold it, and, without any order of court, and without P's knowledge
or consent, paid the proceeds to the New Jersey corporation taking a
bond of indemnity. Held, that P, on taking out letters testamentary
in Pennsylvania, was entitled, as executor, and upon filing a copy of
those letters, to maintain a bill in equity against the New Jersey
administrator in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Dis-
trict of New Jersey to recover those proceeds, with interest, and costs.
Hayes v. Pratt, 557.

FRAUD.

1. Where the defendant in a suit in equity answers under oath denying
charges of fraud, and no other evidence is offered, the charges are not
sustained. Monroe Cattle Co. v. Becker, 47.

2. Charges of fraud made upon information and belief and not sustained
by proof must be treated as not sustained. Ib.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

See MARRIED WOMAN.

ILLINOIS.

See INTERSTATE BOUNDARY.

INDIAN.

In computing the time during which the alienation of public land acquired
by an Indian under the provisions of § 16 of the act of March 3, 1875,
c. 131, 18 Stat. 402, is forbidden, the day of the issue of the patent
should be included. Taylor v. Brown, 640.

INJUNCTION.

See JURISDICTION, C, 2;

TAX AND TAXATION, 2.

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