filing duplicate accounts: also for entering separate orders of court excusing jurors, entering orders of court to issue subpoenas, and enter- ing an order for alias capias when such orders are made by the court and the fees allowed; and also for drawing recognizances of defend- ants. He is not entitled to fees for filing vouchers: nor for making dockets and indexing where no indictment is found: nor for attend- ance upon the District Court as a jury commissioner in drawing jurors. United States v. Payne, 687.
23. On the authority of United States v. Ewing, 140 U. S. 142, the charges of a commissioner of a Circuit Court for docket fees are disallowed, and the charges for acknowledgments of sureties on recognizances of defendants in prosecutions brought by the United States reduced to a fee for a single acknowledgment. United States v. Hall, 691. 24. There is no legal objection to the same person holding the offices of clerk and of commissioner of a Circuit Court, and the person so hold- ing them is entitled to the fees and emoluments of both. United States v. McCandless, 692.
25. The court disallows the following charges by a clerk of a District Court: (1) Docket fees where the grand jury returned "not true bill;" (2) Docket fees where the case is not finally disposed of; (3) A charge for miscellaneous fees, entering orders of court, making copies, certificates, and seals, as being too general; (4) A charge for issuing commitments to jail in addition to copy of order of removal, as being too indefinite; (5) An item for entering orders of court, approving accounts of officers, and copies of certificates and seals. Ib. 26. Only one fee is allowed for taking the acknowledgment of a defend- ant and his sureties unless it be made to appear that it was necessary to take them separately. United States v. Taylor, 695.
27. A clerk may charge for copies of orders of court directing the marshal to pay witnesses and jurors, but not for affixing seals thereto. Ib. 28. No charge can be made for filing orders from the District Attorney discharging witnesses from attendance. lb.
29. A fee may be charged for an affidavit of a witness as to his mileage and attendance; but this affidavit need not be filed. Ib.
30. The rule in United States v. King, ante, 676, that proceedings before a commissioner form no part of the record, applies to affidavits. Ib. 31. The comptroller cannot prescribe the length of capiases or bonds, or limit a clerk to a certain number of folios. Ib.
See COSTS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
COSTS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
The Circuit Court had a right, under § 15 of the act of March 3, 1887, c. 359, 24 Stat. 505, 508, c. 359, to award certain costs to the plaintiff, considering the frivolous and vexatious nature of the objections taken to the greater part of this claim. United States v. Harmon, 268.
It is not reversible error in a judge of a Federal Court to express his own opinion of the facts, if the rules of law are correctly laid down, and if the jurors are given to understand that they are not bound by such expressions of opinion. Doyle v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 413.
Knit woollen undershirts, drawers and hosiery are subject to duty as "wool-wearing apparel," under paragraph 396 of section 1 of the act of October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567, 597, c. 1244, and not as "knit fabrics made on frames," under paragraph 392 of the same act. Arnold v. United States, 494.
A railroad corporation is not liable to exemplary or punitive damages for an illegal, wanton and oppressive arrest of a passenger by the con- ductor of one of its trains, which it has in no way authorized or ratified. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Prentice, 101.
See COMMON CARRIER, 3, 4, (4) (6).
1. The proviso in the Maryland act of cession of the District of Columbia, that nothing therein contained should be "so construed to vest in the United States any right of property in the soil, as to affect the right of individuals therein, otherwise than the same shall or may be trans- ferred by such individuals to the United States," has no reference to the power of eminent domain which belongs to the United States as the grantee in the act of cession. Shoemaker v. United States, 282. 2. The United States possess full and unlimited jurisdiction, both of a political and municipal nature, over the District of Columbia. Ib. 3. In the District of Columbia a judgment in an action of tort does not bear interest. Washington & Georgetown Railroad Co. v. Harmon, 571.
1. Land taken in a city for public parks and squares by authority of law, is taken for a public use. Shoemaker v. United States, 282.
2. The extent to which such property shall be taken for such use rests wholly in legislative discretion, subject only to the restraint that just compensation must be made. Ib.
3. The approval by the President of the price to be paid by the United States for private land, condemned for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, is not a judicial act. Ib.
4. An intention expressed by Congress not to go beyond a sum named as the aggregate, in condemning land for a park in Washington, is not a direction to appraisers to keep within any given limit in valuing any particular piece of property. Ib.
5. It is competent for the legislature, in providing for the cost of a public park, to assess a proportionate part of it upon property specially
6. In condemning lands for a public park, it is competent for the court, in the absence of a legislative direction prescribing the form of the oath to be administered to appraisers, to direct them to take an oath to "faithfully, justly and impartially appraise the value or values of said parcels of land, and of the respective interests therein, to the best of their skill and judgment." Ib.
7. In determining the values of lands so taken appraisers should exercise their own judgment, derived from personal knowledge and inspection of the lands, as well as their knowledge derived from the evidence adduced by the parties. Ib.
8. An appellate court will not interfere with the report of commissioners, (or appraisers,) in such case, to correct the amounts reported, except in case of gross error showing prejudice, corruption or plain mistake. Ib.
1. The verdict of a jury upon an issue submitted to it by order of a Court of Chancery is advisory only, and is binding upon the court only so far as it chooses to adopt it. Kohn v. McNulta, 238.
See FRAUD;
RAILROAD, 2;
TAX AND TAXATION, 2.
1. When the genuineness of a paper sued on is put in issue, papers not otherwise competent may be introduced in Oregon for the purpose of enabling the jury to make a comparison of handwritings. Holmes v. Goldsmith, 150.
2. A witness who has sworn to the genuineness of a disputed signature to a note, may be further asked if he would act upon it if it came to him in an ordinary business transaction. Ib.
3. The admission of evidence of a collateral fact, which might have been rejected by the trial court without committing error, does not consti-
tute error which will of itself justify reversal of the judgment below if the case of the plaintiff in error was not injured by it.
See ADMIRALTY, 6;
COMMON CARRIER, 4 (8).
1. In view of the requirements of Rev. Stat. § 953, respecting the authentication of bills of exceptions, it will be assumed, where a bill is certified by a District Judge holding Circuit Court, that the Circuit Justice and Circuit Judge were not present at the trial, unless the record clearly and affirmatively shows the contrary. Cooke v. Avery, 375.
2. Detached sentences in a charge to a jury cannot be selected as grounds of objection, but must be read in connection with the whole charge. New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad Co. v. Estill, 591.
1. A decision of the Secretary of the Interior, in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by the act of March 3, 1875, c. 152, 18 Stat. 482, that a desiguated railroad company is entitled to a right of way over public land, cannot be revoked by his successor in office. Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad Co., 165.
2. Whether a railroad company applying for such a grant is a company which the statute authorizes to receive a grant of a right of way is a quasi judicial question, which, when once determined by the Secretary, is finally determined so far as the executive is concerned. Ib. See JURISDICTION, C, 2.
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
A citizen of Pennsylvania, born in New Jersey, devised and bequeathed the residue of his estate, real and personal, consisting mostly of prop- erty in Pennsylvania and in Michigan, with some real estate in New Jersey, to his executors, in trust to sell and invest at their discretion, "and to appropriate and use the principal or income thereof for the purpose of founding and supporting, or uniting in the support of any institution that may be then founded, to furnish a retreat and home for disabled or aged and infirm and deserving American mechanics;" and appointed as his executors H, a citizen of New Jersey, and W, a citizen of Pennsylvania, "and in the event of the death of either or both of them, first, P, and next, N, to supply vacancy." W took out letters testamentary in Pennsylvania, and there administered the property in Pennsylvania and in Michigan, and, with the approval of a Pennsylvania court, appropriated it to found a home for such mechanics, incorporated by the legislature of Pennsylvania to carry
out the testator's charitable intention. H took out letters testamen- tary in New Jersey, and took care of the real estate there, and died having done nothing beyond obtaining the opinion of counsel that the executors would be authorized, in their discretion, to provide a bed for such mechanics in a hospital, incorporated in New Jersey, for "the care, nurture and maintenance of sick, infirm, aged and indigent persons, and of orphan and destitute children," and whose by-laws provided that patients in a condition to be discharged, or whose dis- ease was incurable, should not remain in the hospital, and that those able to pay for their maintenance should do so. After the deaths of H and W, a son of I took out letters of administration with the will annexed of the unadministered goods, chattels and effects of the origi- nal testator in New Jersey; and, after having assured P that he would not dispose of the real estate in New Jersey without giving him an opportunity to show that the Pennsylvania corporation was entitled to it, sold it, and, without any order of court, and without P's knowledge or consent, paid the proceeds to the New Jersey corporation taking a bond of indemnity. Held, that P, on taking out letters testamentary in Pennsylvania, was entitled, as executor, and upon filing a copy of those letters, to maintain a bill in equity against the New Jersey administrator in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Dis- trict of New Jersey to recover those proceeds, with interest, and costs. Hayes v. Pratt, 557.
1. Where the defendant in a suit in equity answers under oath denying charges of fraud, and no other evidence is offered, the charges are not sustained. Monroe Cattle Co. v. Becker, 47.
2. Charges of fraud made upon information and belief and not sustained by proof must be treated as not sustained. Ib.
In computing the time during which the alienation of public land acquired by an Indian under the provisions of § 16 of the act of March 3, 1875, c. 131, 18 Stat. 402, is forbidden, the day of the issue of the patent should be included. Taylor v. Brown, 640.
INJUNCTION.
See JURISDICTION, C, 2;
TAX AND TAXATION, 2.
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