Opinion of the Court. Mr. Solicitor General and Mr. Felix Brannigan for appellants. Mr. Henry Pitman in person. MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the court. This case depends upon the construction to be given to Revised Statutes, § 828, wherein there is allowed to the clerk "five dollars a day for his attendance on the court while actually in session," taken in connection with § 583, which provides that "if the judge of any District Court is unable to attend at the commencement of any regular, adjourned or special term, the court may be adjourned by the marshal, by virtue of a written order directed to him by the judge, to the next regular term, or to any earlier day, as the order may direct;" and with § 672, which contains a similar provision with regard to the absence of the judges of a Circuit Court. The practice in the District of Rhode Island is stated in the opinion of the court below, to be "that the courts shall meet at the time fixed by law and transact such business as may then appear, and thereafter shall hold by successive adjournments and appointments at short intervals a substantially continuous session until the next succeeding day for the commencement of a regular term. During the continuance of these sessions the judges have attended in court here whenever their engagements did not take them elsewhere, and on 'the occasion of their absence or expected absence, for a time which might be definitely fixed, or which was indeterminate by reason of the doubtful exigencies of business elsewhere, they have sometimes, as in this case, made provision for adjournments according to the terms of sections 583 and 672." Whether this practice be conducive to the convenient dispatch of business or not, is a question for the judge to determine. After the term of a court has been regularly opened upon the day provided by law, the question how long it shall remain open, to what day it shall be adjourned, and whether and how often it shall be opened for incidental business after Opinion of the Court. the regular business of the term has been concluded, is a matter which rests in the discretion of the presiding judge. It is presumed that he will act in this particular in what he conceives to be the interest of the public, and that he will put the government to no unnecessary expense. It is clearly the duty of the officers of the court to be present at the adjourned day, and to obey the written order of the judge with respect to any further adjournment, and there is no reason why they should not receive their per-diems therefor as if the judge were actually present. It was held by this court in the case of McMullen v. United States, 146 U. S. 360, that when the court is open, by its order, for the transaction of business, it is in session within the meaning of this section, "but that if the court, by its own order, is closed for all purposes of business for an entire day, or for any given number of days, it is not in session on that day, or during those days, although the current term has not expired." We think the court should be deemed "actually in session" within the meaning of the law, not only when the judge is present in person, but when, in obedience to an order of the judge directing its adjournment to a certain day, the officers are present upon that day, and the journal is opened by the clerk, and the court is adjourned to another day by further direction of the judge. That this was the construction placed upon these sections by Congress is evident by the civil appropriation act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 509, 541, c. 362, which provided as follows: "Nor shall any part of any money appropriated be used in payment of a per-diem compensation to any attorney, clerk or marshal for attendance in court except for days when the court is open by the Judge for business, or business is actually transacted in court, and when they attend under sections five hundred and eighty-three, five hundred and eighty-four, six hundred and seventy-one, six hundred and seventy-two, and two thousand and thirteen of the Revised Statutes, which fact shall be certified in the approval of their accounts." Attendance upon the days when the court is opened under the provisions of these numbered sections is put by Congress Syllabus. upon the same footing as if the judge were actually present, and business were actually transacted. The restriction of perdiems to days when the court is actually in session was probably intended to be construed and explained in connection with section 831, which provides that no per-diem or other allowance shall be made for attendance at rule days. There was no obligation on the part of plaintiff to prove that the District Court was not in session on the days allowed for attendance at the place of holding the Circuit Court; or that the Circuit Court was not in session on the days allowed for attendance at the place of holding the District Court. The findings of fact, however, show that the plaintiff is entitled to but 98 days' attendance, instead of 99, and the judgment should, therefore, be reduced $5. This deduction being made, the judgment of the court below is UNITED STATES v. JONES. Affirmed. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA. No. 312. Submitted January 6, 1893. Decided March 6, 1893. A clerk of a District Court is entitled to charge for entering orders approving marshals' accounts. United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U. S. 169, approved. He is also entitled to charge for certifying copies of such orders to be forwarded to the department with the accounts, but not for the seals affixed to such copies unless such authentication is required by the Treasury Department. He is also entitled to charge for copies of orders for marshals to pay supervisors of elections, without regard to the necessity for such orders, or the power of the court to make them. He is also entitled to a fee for filing a marshal's account with vouchers attached, but not to a separate fee for filing each voucher. He is also entitled to fees for recording, after the determination of a prosecution, all the proceedings relating to it, including the order of commitment. Opinion of the Court. United States v. Harmon, 147 U. S. 268, affirmed to the point of the power of the Treasury to determine whether the several allowances increase his salary beyond the maximum compensation. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Solicitor General and Mr. Felix Brannigan for appellants. Mr. William W. Dudley, Mr. Louis T. Michener and Mr. Richard R. McMahon for appellee. MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the court. This was an action for fees alleged to be due the petitioner Jones for services rendered by him as clerk of the District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, the items of which were set out in a bill of particulars annexed to his petition. Judgment having been rendered in favor of the petitioner for $292.35, 39 Fed. Rep. 410, the United States appealed to this court. The government assigns as error in this case the allowance of certain items 1. For entering orders of the court approving marshals' accounts, making copies thereof, and attaching certificates under seal to such copies. 2. For copies of orders for marshals to pay supervisors of election. 3. For filing marshals' accounts current with vouchers thereto attached. 4. For making final records, recording bonds and commit ments. 1. Charges for entering orders approving marshals' accounts were allowed in the case of United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U. S. 169, 171, and we have seen no reason to change the opinion there expressed. The labor of preparing one's own accounts for services or fees is a mere incident to the rendition of the service, and is universally assumed by the creditor as his own burden; but the approval of the account of another VOL. CXLVII-43 Opinion of the Court. stands upon a different footing, and if performed at the request of the government, or under a statute requiring it to be performed for the protection of the government, there is no reason why the clerk should not receive such fees therefor as he receives for analogous services in other matters. We are referred to Revised Statutes, § 1765, as expressly inhibiting compensation for such services. This section provides that "no officer in any branch of the public service, or any other person whose salary, pay or emoluments are fixed by law or regulations, shall receive any additional pay, extra allowance or compensation in any form whatever, for any other service or duty whatever, unless the same is authorized by law," etc. It is sufficient to observe of this that the service charged by the clerk in entering these orders is strictly in the line of his duty as clerk; that his per folio fees for such orders are expressly allowed by section 828, and are not "additional pay, extra allowance or compensation in any form whatever." The clerk is also entitled to charge for certifying copies of such orders to be forwarded to the department, with the accounts, but not for seals affixed to such copies, unless, as was held in Van Duzee's case, page 174, the Treasury Department required the copy of such order to be authenticated, not only by the signature of the clerk, but under seal. The charge for seals does not seem to have been allowed. 2. The charge for copies of orders for marshals to pay supervisors of election is objected to on the ground that there is no law authorizing courts to issue orders to the marshal to pay supervisors of election or special deputies. The act of February 22, 1875, 18 Stat. 333, c. 95, does require, however, that "before any account payable out of the money of the United States shall be allowed . . in favor of clerks, marshals or district attorneys, the party claiming such account shall render the same . . to a United States Circuit or District Court, and the court shall thereupon cause to be entered of record an order approving or disapproving the account," etc. The account in question is clearly within this section. Supposing it, however, to be a question of doubt, |