Opinion of the Court.

use of the stream seems to belong, as before, to the State whose territory the river has forsaken."

The middle of the channel of a navigable river between independent States is taken as the true boundary line from the obvious reason that the right of navigation is presumed to be common to both in the absence of a special convention between the neighboring States, or long use of a different line equivalent to such a convention.

Phillimore, in his Commentaries on International Law, in the chapter upon acquisitions, (c. xii,) speaks of decisions upon the law of property as incident to neighborhood proceeding upon the principle that "midchannel" is the line of demarcation between the neighbors. (Vol. 1, 239.)

The reason and necessity of the rule of international law as to the midchannel being the true boundary line of a navigable river separating independent States may not be as cogent in this country, where neighboring States are under the same general government, as in Europe, yet the same rule will be held to obtain unless changed by statute or usage of so great a length of time as to have acquired the force of law.

As we have stated, in international law and by the usage of European nations, the terms "middle of the stream" and "midchannel" of a navigable river are synonymous, and interchangeably used. The enabling act of April 18, 1818, (3 Stat. 428, c. 67,) under which Illinois adopted a constitution and became a State and was admitted into the Union, made the middle of the Mississippi River the western boundary of the State. The enabling act of March 6, 1820, (3 Stat. c. 22, § 2, p. 545,) under which Missouri became a State and was admitted into the Union, made the middle of the main channel of the Mississippi River the eastern boundary, so far as its boundary was conterminous with the western boundary of Illinois. The enabling act of August 6, 1846, (9 Stat. 56, c. 89,) under which Wisconsin adopted a constitution. and became a State and was admitted into the Union, gives the western boundary of that State, after reaching the river St. Croix, as follows: "Thence down the main channel of said river to the Mississippi, thence down the centre of the main

Opinion of the Court.

channel of that" (Mississippi) "river to the northwest corner of the State of Illinois." The northwest corner of the State of Illinois must therefore be in the middle of the main channel of the river which forms a portion of its western boundary. It is very evident that these terms, "middle of the Mississippi River," and "middle of the main channel of the Mississippi River," and "the centre of the main channel of that river," as thus used, are synonymous. It is not at all likely that the Congress of the United States intended that those terms, as applied to the Mississippi River separating Illinois and Iowa, should have a different meaning when applied to the Mississippi River separating Illinois from Missouri or a different meaning when used as descriptive of a portion of the western boundary of Wisconsin. They were evidently used as signifying the same thing.

The question involved in this case has been elaborately considered, both by the Supreme Court of Iowa and the Supreme Court of Illinois, in cases relating to the assessment and taxation of bridges crossing the Mississippi River, as to the point to which the jurisdiction of each State for taxation extends, and they differed in their conclusions. In Dunlieth and Dubuque Bridge Company v. County of Dubuque, 55 Iowa, 558, 565, the Supreme Court of Iowa, after observing that the act of Congress admitting Iowa into the Union and the constitution of Iowa in its preamble declare that the eastern boundary of the State shall be "the middle of the main channel of Mississippi River," proceeds to inquire what line is understood by those words, "middle of the main channel." The defendant maintained that the deep water of the stream used in the navigation of the river was meant, while the plaintiff insisted that the words described the bed in which. the stream of the river flows; that is, the bed over which the water flows from bank to bank. The court thought that the words, when applied to rivers generally, without the purpose of describing their currents or navigable characters, always bore the latter signification, observing that this was their primary meaning, and was of opinion that they were used in that sense in the act of Congress admitting the State into the

Opinion of the Court.

Union, and in the constitution of Iowa. In support of this view the court referred to the changing character of the currents of the river followed by vessels, caused by the shifting nature of the sand bars found in the river. "The course of navigation," it said, "which follows what boatmen call the channel, is extremely sinuous, and often changing, and is unknown except to experienced navigators. On the other hand, the bed of the main river, designated by the word channel, used in its primary sense, is the great body of water flowing down the stream; it is broad and well defined by islands or the main shore. It cannot be possible that Congress and the people of the State, in describing its boundary, used the word channel to describe the sinuous, obscure and changing line of navigation, rather than the broad and distinctly defined bed of the main river. The centre of this river bed channel may be readily determined, while the centre of the navigable channel often could not be known with certainty. The first is a fit boundary line of a State; the second cannot be."

In Buttenuth v. St. Louis Bridge Co., 123 Illinois, 535, 548, the Supreme Court of Illinois reached a different conclusion after an elaborate consideration of the same question. That was a case where an alleged over-estimate was made of a bridge crossing the Mississippi River at St. Louis, and the question discussed was, how far did the jurisdiction of Illinois extend over the river? After observing that when a river is a boundary between States, as is the Mississippi between Illinois and Missouri, it is the main-the permanent-river which constitutes the boundary, and not that part which flows in seasons of high water and is dry at others, the court proceeds, treating the Mississippi River as a common boundary between the States of Illinois and Missouri, to inquire the meaning of the term, "middle of the Mississippi River," used in the enabling act of Congress and in the constitution, defining the boundaries of the State of Illinois. It answers the inquiry by observing that the word "channel" is used as indicating "the space within which ships can and usually do pass," and says: "It is apprehended it is in this sense the expressions 'middle

6

Opinion of the Court.

of the river,' middle of the main channel,' 'midchannel,' 'middle thread of the channel,' are used in enabling acts of Congress and in state constitutions establishing state boundaries. It is the free navigation of the river-when such river constitutes a common boundary, that part on which boats can and do pass, sometimes called 'nature's pathway' — that States demand shall be secured to them. When a river, navigable in fact, is taken or agreed upon as the boundary between two nations or States, the utility of the main channel, or, what is the same thing, the navigable part of the river, is too great to admit a supposition that either State intended to surrender to the State or nation occupying the opposite shore the whole of the principal channel or highway for vessels and thus debar its own vessels the right of passing to and fro for purposes of defence or commerce. That would be to surrender all, or at least the most valuable part, of such river boundary, for the purposes of commerce or other purposes deemed of great value, to independent States or nations."

The opinions in both of these cases are able and present, in the strongest terms, the different views as to the line of jurisdiction between neighboring States, separated by a navigable stream; but we are of opinion that the controlling consideration in this matter is that which preserves to each State equality in the right of navigation in the river. We therefore hold, in accordance with this view, that the true line in navigable rivers between the States of the Union which separates the jurisdiction of one from the other is the middle of the main channel of the river. Thus the jurisdiction of each State extends to the thread of the stream, that is, to the "midchannel," and, if there be several channels, to the middle of the principal one, or, rather, the one usually followed.

It is therefore ordered, adjudged and declared that the boundary line between the State of Iowa and the State of Illinois is the middle of the main navigable channel of the Mississippi River. And, as the counsel of the two States both desire that this boundary line be established at the places where the several bridges mentioned in the pleadings — nine in number- cross the Mississippi River, it is further ordered

Syllabus.

that a commission be appointed to ascertain and designate at said places the boundary line between the two States, such commission, consisting of three competent persons, to be named by the court upon suggestion of counsel, and be required to make the proper examination and to delineate on maps prepared for that purpose the true line as determined by this court, and report the same to the court for its further action.

In re MORRISON, Petitioner.

In re MORRISON, Petitioner.1

ORIGINAL.

Nos. 8, 9. Original. Argued December 12, 13, 1892. — Decided January 3, 1893.

A collision occurred, in Vineyard Sound, between the steam yacht A., at anchor, owned by V. of New York, and the steamship D., owned by a Massachusetts corporation. The A. sank. The corporation filed a libel against V., to limit its liability, in the District Court for Massachusetts, under §§ 4283 and 4284 of the Revised Statutes, alleging that the D. was lying at Boston, and averring no negligence in the D., and negligence in the A., and praying for an appraisement of the value of the D. and her pending freight at the time of the collision, and offering to give a stipulation therefor. It was alleged that the A. was worth over $250,000, and that the value of the D. and her freight was less than $150,000. The court appointed three appraisers, who made the appraisement ex parte, and reported the value of the D. at $80,000 and of her freight at $2395.33, and a stipulation was given for those amounts. A monition was then issued for notice to V. and all persons concerned to prove their claims for loss by a day named. The monition was duly published but was not personally served on V. in the Massachusetts District. The court made an order enjoining V. and all other persons from suing the corporation

1 No. 8 is entitled in the opinion of the court" Henry Morrison, Petitioner, v. The District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, and the Honorable Addison Brown, Judge of the said Court. Petition for a writ of mandamus." No. 9 is entitled in the opinion "Henry Morrison, Petitioner, v. The District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts and the Honorable Thomas L. Nelson, Judge of the said Court. Petition for a writ of prohibition."