Opinion of the Court.

at the time, and after the issue of the bonds, may be shown to aid in determining under what statute and by what authority the county proceeded in the issue of these bonds. Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Wall. 50, 54; Steinbach v. Stewart, 11 Wall. 566, 576; Canal Company v. Hill, 15 Wall. 94; Merriam v. United States, 107 U. S. 437; United States v. Gibbons, 109 U. S. 200. Again, it is urged that the order for the election was invalid, inasmuch as no corporation was named as the proposed recipient of the subscription, but it has been held to the contrary, and that it is sufficient if the route is designated, leaving to the county authorities the selection of the particular corporation to be the recipient of the subscription. Commissioners v. Thayer, 94 U. S. 631; Scipio v. Wright, 101 U. S. 665.

Another matter requires notice, and it is of great significance: The constitution of the State of Missouri, adopted July 4, 1865, article II, section 14, provided that "the general assembly shall not authorize any county, city or town to become a stockholder in or to loan its credit to any company, association or corporation unless two-thirds of the qualified voters of such county, city or town, at a regular or special election, to be held therein, shall assent thereto." At the October term, 1867, of the Supreme Court of Missouri, the case of State v. Macon County Court, 41 Missouri, 453, was decided, in which it was held that the constitution had no retroactive effect upon statutes passed before its adoption, and that, therefore, under the Missouri and Mississippi Railroad Company act, passed February 20, 1865, a few months before the adoption of the constitution, there was power in the county authorities to subscribe without the assent of the voters. It may well be believed as asserted by counsel for defendant in error, that, until that decision was announced, the understanding that the prohibition in the constitution superseded all unexecuted authority given by prior charters was so general, that no county court would have dared to subscribe stock and issue bonds without the assent of two-thirds of the qualified voters. This subscription was made, some of the bonds issued, as well as the vote held, before the decision in the Macon County case, and it is difficult to believe that the county court did not issue

Statement of the Case.

these bonds in reliance upon the authority given them by the vote of the people, in pursuance of the general laws of the State, although referring on the face of the bonds to the Missouri and Mississippi Railroad Company act, which specially authorized the company to receive and the counties through which it ran to make subscriptions. It is very likely that the county court had in mind the special act creating the Missouri and Mississippi Railroad Company, as well as the general law, and the vote of the people under it, and that it meant to exercise all the authority conferred by both. It is enough for this case that the vote of the people authorizing this issue of bonds was given, and that the county court acted in reliance thereon, for, by assent, through their vote, to such issue of bonds the people, in the way prescribed by the statutes of the State, in effect consented that a levy beyond the meagre one provided for by the Missouri and Mississippi Railroad Company act might be resorted to for the payment of these bonds.

These are the substantial matters involved in this litigation. We find no error in the proceedings of the Circuit Court, and its judgment is

Affirmed.

LAKE SHORE & MICHIGAN SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. PRENTICE.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.

No. 58. Argued November 23, 1892. Decided January 3, 1893.

A railroad corporation is not liable to exemplary or punitive damages for an illegal, wanton and oppressive arrest of a passenger by the conductor of one of its trains, which it has in no way authorized or ratified.

THIS was an action of trespass on the case, brought October 19, 1886, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, by Prentice, a citizen of Ohio,

Statement of the Case.

against the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company, a corporation of Illinois, to recover damages for the wrongful acts of the defendant's servants.

The declaration alleged, and the evidence introduced at the trial tended to prove, the following facts: The plaintiff was a physician. The defendant was engaged in operating a railroad, and conducting the business of a common carrier of passengers and freight, through Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and other States. On October 12, 1886, the plaintiff, his wife and a number of other persons were passengers, holding excursion tickets, on a regular passenger train of the defendant's railroad, from Norwalk in Ohio to Chicago in Illinois. During the journey the plaintiff purchased of several passengers their return tickets, which had nothing on them to show that they were not transferable. The conductor of the train, learning this, and knowing that the plaintiff had been guilty of no offence for which he was liable to arrest, telegraphed for a police officer, an employé of the defendant, who boarded the train as it approached Chicago. The conductor thereupon, in a loud and angry voice, pointed out the plaintiff to the officer, and ordered his arrest; and the officer, by direction of the conductor, and without any warrant or authority of law, seized the plaintiff and rudely searched him for weapons in the presence of the other passengers, hurried him into another car, and there sat down by him as a watch, and refused to tell him the cause of his arrest, or to let him speak to his wife. While the plaintiff was being removed into the other car, the conductor, for the purpose of disgracing and humiliating him with his fellow-passengers, openly declared that he was under arrest, and sneeringly said to the plaintiff's wife, "Where's your doctor now?" On arrival at Chicago, the conductor refused to let the plaintiff assist his wife with her parcels in leaving the train, or to give her the check for their trunk; and, in the presence of the passengers and others, ordered him to be taken to the station-house, and he was forcibly taken there, and detained until the conductor arrived and, knowing that the plaintiff had been guilty of no offence, entered a false charge against him of disorderly conduct, upon which he gave bail and was

Statement of the Case.

released, and of which, on appearing before a justice of the peace for trial on the next day, and no one appearing to prosecute him, he was finally discharged.

The declaration alleged that all these acts were done by the defendant's agents in the line of their employment, and that the defendant was legally responsible therefor; and that the plaintiff had been thereby put to expense, and greatly injured in mind, body and reputation.

At the trial, and before the introduction of any evidence, the defendant, by its counsel, admitted "that the arrest of the plaintiff was wrongful, and that he was entitled to recover actual damages therefor;" but afterwards excepted to each of the following instructions given by the Circuit Judge to the jury :

"If you believe the statements which have been made by the plaintiff and the witnesses who testified in his behalf (and they are not denied) then he is entitled to a verdict which will fully compensate him for the injuries which he sustained, and in compensating him you are authorized to go beyond the amount that he has actually expended in employing counsel; you may go beyond the actual outlay in money which he has made. He was arrested publicly, without a warrant, and without cause; and if such conduct as has been detailed before you occurred, such as the remark that was addressed by the conductor to the wife in the plaintiff's presence, in compensating him you have a right to consider the humiliation of feeling to which he was thus publicly subjected. If the company, without reason, by its unlawful and oppressive act, subjected him to this public humiliation, and thereby outraged his feelings, he is entitled to compensation for that injury and mental anguish.

"I am not able to give you any rule by which you can determine that; but bear in mind, it is strictly on the line of compensation. The plaintiff is entitled to compensation in money for humiliation of feeling and spirit, as well as the actual outlay which he has made in and about this suit.

"And, further, after agreeing upon the amount which will fairly compensate the plaintiff for his outlay and injured feel

Argument for Defendant in Error.

ings, you may add something by way of punitive damages against the defendant, which is sometimes called smart money, if you are satisfied that the conductor's conduct was illegal (and it was illegal), wanton and oppressive. How much that shall be the court cannot tell you. You must act as reasonable men, and not indulge vindictive feelings towards the defendant.

"If a public corporation, like an individual, acts oppressively, wantonly, abuses power, and a citizen in that way is injured, the citizen, in addition to strict compensation, may have, the law says, something in the way of smart money; something as punishment for the oppressive use of power."

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $10,000. The defendant moved for a new trial, for error in law, and for excessive damages. The plaintiff thereupon, by leave of court, remitted the sum of $4000, and asked that judgment be entered for $6000. The court then denied the motion for a new trial, and gave judgment for the plaintiff for $6000. The defendant sued out this writ of error.

Mr. George C. Greene for plaintiff in error.

Mr. W. A. Foster for defendant in error.

I. But one question arises upon the record, and that is, under the facts, is plaintiff in error liable for punitive damages?

That a master is liable for the trespass of his servant in the line of his employment, although wilful on the part of the servant, we assume is no longer an open question under the decisions in this country and in England.

That the liability of corporations for the acts of servants is the same as that of natural persons, may be conceded, and has received the sanction of this court in National Bank v. Graham, 100 U. S. 699, 702; and in Denver & Rio Grande Railway v. Harris, 122 U. S. 597. See also Salt Lake City v. Hollister, 118 U. S. 256, 260; New Jersey Steamboat Company v. Brockett, 121 U. S. 637; State v. Morris & Essex Railroad, 3 Zabriskie, (23 N. J. Law,) 360.