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Fire insurance.

own life, and expressed to be for the benefit of her husband, or of her children, or of her husband and children, or any of them, shall create a trust in favour of the objects therein named, and the moneys payable under any such policy shall not, so long as any object of the trust remains unperformed, form part of the estate of the insured, or be subject to his or her debts (x); provided, that if it shall be proved that the policy was effected and the premiums paid with intent to defraud the creditors of the insured, they shall be entitled to receive, out of the moneys payable under the policy, a sum equal to the premiums so paid.

Insurance against fire is a contract to indemnify against loss by fire, and is usually renewed from year to year on payment of a premium. The person who effects such an insurance must have an interest in the property insured, and he cannot recover beyond the extent of his interest. Neither can he, as a rule, assign his policy without the consent of the insurers; for policies of fire insurance usually take the form of a contract to indemnify the insured personally, or his representatives in law, but not his assigns otherwise than by will (y). When a house or other building is insured, by a provision of the old Metropolitan Building Act, any person interested may procure the insurance money, in case of fire, to be laid out in repairs or rebuilding (2). It has been decided that the operation of this provision is general, and is not confined to houses or buildings within the limits of the

(x) See Cleaver v. Mutual Re serve Fund Life Assn., 1892, 1 Q. B. 147.

(y) Lynch v. Dalzell, 4 Bro. Parl. Cas. 431; Saddlers Company v. Badcock, 2 Atk. 554; Darrell v. Tibbitts, 5 Q. B. D. 560; Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q. B. D. 380; Bunyon on Fire In

surance, 11, 182, 303, 304; Por ter on Insurance, 300, 2nd ed.; see Dart, V. & P. 197, 713, 6th ed.

(z) Stat. 14 Geo. III. c. 78, s. 83; see Williams's Conveyancing Statutes, pp. 155-157. This section is not repealed by stat, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 122. s. 109.

metropolis (a). The insurers are the proper parties to rebuild under this enactment. But a distinct request must be addressed to the insurers by a person interested in the house or building damaged, that the insurance money may be applied in reinstating the premises. If no such request be made, the insurers may pay the money to the person who effected the insurance (b). In consequence of this enactment, a covenant to insure a house or other building is tantamount to a covenant to repair to the extent of such insurance, and, if entered into by a lessee in his lease, will run with the land, so as to be binding on the assignee of the lease (c). But, upon the sale of a house or other building insured by a vendor, who was under no obligation to insure, the benefit of the contract of insurance does not pass to the purchaser, unless expressly assigned (d).

The insurance of ships and their cargoes from the Insurance of perils of the sea is a matter belonging rather to mer- ships. cantile law than to the department of conveyancing. In this kind of insurance, as well as in the others, an interest in the property insured must generally belong to the party effecting the insurance, if the ship be a British vessel, or the goods be laden on board any such vessel (e). Like a fire insurance policy, a policy of marine insurance is a contract of indemnity (ƒ). Con

(a) Ex parte Goreley, 4 De G. J. & S. 477; doubted, however, in Westminster Fire Office v. Glasgow Provident Investment Society, 13 App. Cas. 609.

(b) Simpson v. Scottish Union Insurance Co., 1 H. & M. 618; see also Collingridge v. Royal Exchange Corporation, 3 Q. B. D. 173; Cotton, L. J., 18 Ch. D). 7; Bowen, L. J., 11 Q. B. D. 401.

(e) Vernon v. Smith, 6 B. & A. 1: see Principles of the Law of Real Property, p. 471, 17th ed.; Williams's Conveyancing Statutes, pp. 104-109, 499, n. (i).

(d) Eldon, C., Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. 349, 352, 353; Poole v. Adams, Kindersley, V.-C., 12 W. R. 683; Rayner v. Preston, Jessel, M. R., 14 Ch. D. 297; affirmed, 18 Ch. D. 1, by Cotton and Brett, L.JJ. diss. James, L. J. As to the benefit of a contract of insurance upon a mortgage of the property insured, see Williams's Conveyancing Statutes, pp. 156-159.

(e) Stat. 19 Geo. III. c. 37, s. 1. See ante, p. 166.

(f) Powles v. Innes, 11 M. & W. 10; Blackburn, L. A., Bur

sue in his own

name.

tracts of marine insurance must, as a rule, be expressed in writing, and must be duly stamped (g). A statute of the year 1868 provides that whenever a policy of insurance on any ship, or on any goods in any ship, or on any freight, has been assigned so as to pass the beneficial interest in such policy to any person entitled Assignee may to the property thereby insured, the assignee of such policy shall be entitled to sue thereon in his own name (h). And since the commencement (i) of the Judicature Act of 1873 (k), the assignees in manner provided by the Act of all legal choses in action have been enabled to sue therefor at law in their own names, as we have seen (1). Unlike policies of fire insurance, the terms of a policy of marine insurance usually extend its benefit to the assigns of the insured, as well as himself (m). The benefit of a policy of marine insurance does not pass, however, upon the sale of the goods insured, unless expressly or impliedly assigned (n). But goods, which are at sea, or which are to be delivered by sea, are very frequently sold under a contract that the price shall include freight and insurance, and be payable on receipt of the shipping documents. In such cases, it is understood that the shipping documents shall comprise a proper policy of insurance effected by the shipper, and that the benefit of such a policy is included in the sale (o). Full information on the subject of marine

nand, v. Rodocanachi, 7 App. Cas.
333-339; Brett, Cotton, Bowen,
L.JJ., Castellain v. Preston, 11
Q. B. D. 380, 386, 393, 394, 397
-399.

(g) Stat. 54 & 55 Vict. c. 39, ss.
91, 93, 95, 97 and First Schedule.

(h) Stat. 31 & 32 Vict. c. 86, s. 1; Lloyd v. Fleming, L. R. 7 Q. B. 299; Pelias v. Neptunc Marine Insurance Co. 5 C. P. D.

34.

(i) 1st Nov. 1875; see stat. 37 & 38 Vict. c. 83.

(k) Stat. 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, s. 25, sub-s. 6.

(1) Ante, p. 37.

(m) Arnould on Marine Insurance, i. 107, 112, 231, 234, 6th ed.

(n) Powles v. Innes, 11 M. & W. 10; North of England Pure Oil-Cake Co. v. Archangel Maritime Insurance Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 249; Brett, L. J., Rayner v. Preston, 18 Ch. D. 1, 12.

(0) Tamvaco v. Lucas, 1 B & S. 185; 3 B. & S. 89; Blackburn,

insurance will be found in Park on Insurance, Arnould on Marine Insurance, Abbott on Shipping, and in the chapter on maritime insurance in the late J. W. Smith's admirable Compendium of Mercantile Law.

J., Lloyd v. Fleming, L. R. 7
Q. B. 299, 303; Cockburn, C. J.,
North of England Oil-Cake Co. v.

Archangel Maritime Insurance
Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 249, 254.

Personal annuity.

CHAPTER VI.

OF PERSONAL ANNUITIES, STOCKS AND SHARES. In addition to the things in action known to the old common law, we have seen that there exist in modern times several other species of property classed equally as personal, and consisting equally of mere rights, unaccompanied with the possession of anything corporeal (a). To these we now propose to direct our attention.

Amongst personal property of this description we shall first mention a personal annuity. This kind of property is not indeed of so modern an origin as some of those which we shall hereafter mention. It consists of an annual payment, not charged on real estate; but it may nevertheless be limited to the heirs, or the heirs of the body, of the grantee. In former times it was doubted whether an annuity was not a mere chose in action, and therefore incapable of assignment (b); but this objection has long been overruled. When limited to the heirs of the grantee it will, on his intestacy descend, like real estate, to his heir; but it is still personal property (c), and will pass by his will under a bequest of all his personal estate (d). When given to the grantee and the heirs of his body, the grantee does not acquire an estate tail; for this kind of inheritance is not a tenement within the meaning of the statute

(a) Ante, pp. 38-41; and see
Williams, R. P. 4—6, 17th ed.
(b) Co. Litt. 141 b, n. (1).
(c) Earl of Stafford v. Buckley,

3 Ves. sen. 171; Radburn v. Jervis, 3 Beav. 450, 461.

(d) Aubin v. Daly, 4 Barn. & Ald. 59.

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