214 U.S.

Argument for Appellant.

GOODRICH v. FERRIS.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.

No. 120. Argued March 19, 22, 1909.—Decided May 17, 1909.

The mere fact that a constitutional question is alleged does not suffice to give this court jurisdiction of a direct appeal from the Circuit Court if such question is unsubstantial and so clearly devoid of merit as to be clearly frivolous. Farrell v. O'Brien, 199 U. S. 100. A probate proceeding by which jurisdiction of the probate court is asserted over a decedent's estate for the purpose of administration is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, as to which all the world is charged with notice; the law of California conforms to this rule. Even though the power of the State to prescribe length of notice be not absolute, a notice authorized by the legislature will only be set aside as ineffectual on account of shortness of time in a clear case. Bellingham Bay Co. v. New Whatcom, 172 U. S. 314. Whether or not a State can arbitrarily determine by statute the length of notice to be given of steps in the administration of estates in the custody of its courts, ten days' notice for the settlement of the final accounts of an executor and action on final distribution is not so unreasonable as to be wanting in due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment; and so held that the contention that §§ 1633 and 1634 of the Civil Code of California prescribing such length of notice are unconstitutional as depriving a distributee of his property without due process of law is without merit. Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398, distinguished.

Writ of error to review 145 Fed. Rep. 844, dismissed.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr John G. Johnson, with whom Mr Henry Arden, Mr. Tyson S. Dines and Mr. L. Sidney Carrère were on the brief, for appellant:

The notice of final settlement and distribution posted for ten days in San Francisco, did not constitute due process of law as to appellant, who was and is a citizen and resident of

Argument for Appellees.

214 U. S.

the State of New York. Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U, S. 409, 447; Chicago &c. R. R. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 232; Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; Hagar v. Rec. Dist., 111 U. S. 712.

In Roller v. ilolly, 176 U. S. 398, five days' personal service on a defendant residing in Virginia was made of a process issued in Texas, and the court in holding it insufficient said. that a man is entitled to some notice before he can be deprived of his liberty or property is an axiom of the law to which no citation of authority would give additional weight. It is manifest that the requirement of notice would be of no value whatever, unless such notice were reasonable and adequate for the purpose. Citing Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U. S. 701, 712.

The notice, even if it had been served upon him personally, would not have given appellant an opportunity to make a proper appearance in court, and due process of law has been repeatedly interpreted by this court to mean not only that a party shall have notice, but that he shall have a reasonable and fair opportunity of being heard. Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U. S. 722.

Mr. J. W. Dorsey and Mr. Henry E. Davis, with whom Mr. Henry Ach was on the brief, for appellees:

No question of a Federal nature is involved in this case. It is not a matter of National concern whether or not succession in cases of intestacy shall be determined under the ancient rules of the civil, the common, or the Scotch law, or through restricted and arbitrary rules of the local government. Who are heirs of a deceased person is determined and declared by statute. As the heir takes by the grace of the State, he can only take to the extent and under the procedure established by the State, which has entire freedom of choice as to the selection of persons who shall stand as heirs at law or beneficiaries of a decedent, intestate or testate, as well as the methods and procedure by and through which succession is

effected. No fundamental rights are involved in probate proceedings. In matters of this sort the power to limit involves the power to dispense with limitations. Allen v. Georgia, 166 U. S. 138; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409; Wilson v. North Carolina, 169 U. S. 586.

The probate jurisdiction of the Superior Court is essentially a jurisdiction under the control of the state legislature which the law-making power may enlarge or restrict, and it necessarily follows that opportunity to be heard, accorded by the statute of the State controlling the subject-matter, is sufficient to constitute due process of law. Lent v. Tillson, 72 California, 404.

As said by Mr. Chief Justice Waite, due process of law is process according to the law of the land. This process in the States is regulated by the law of the State. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90.

It necessarily follows, that if any notice is given, or its service made, in pursuance of the requirements of the statute, it cannot be violative of any inherent or constitutional right of the persons affected thereby, and hence must be in accord with the law of the land, and amount to due process of law. Estate of Davis, 136 California, 590, 596; Wulzen v. Board of Supervisors, 101 California, 15, 22; Burnam v. Commonwealth, 1 Duv. (S. C.) 210; Shepherd v. Ware, 46 Minnesota, 174; Taylor v. Judges of Court, 175 Massachusetts, 71; Dillon v. Heller, 39 Kansas, 607; In re Empire City Bank, 18 N. Y. 199, 216.

The sufficiency of the notice must be determined in each case from the particular circumstance of the case in hand. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97.

The objects of probate proceedings are to administer, settle and distribute the estates of deceased persons, and our system contemplates that these objects shall be accomplished with reasonable dispatch-that the administration shall be speedily accomplished, and closed, and the estate devolve to a new and competent ownership. Maddock v. Russell, 109 California, 422, 423; Estate of Moore, 72 California, 342; Estate of

Davis, 136 California, 596; Carran v. O'Calligan, 125 Fed. Rep. 663; Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256.

The State has provided a complete and effective probate jurisdiction. The world must move on and those who claim an interest in persons or things must be charged with notice of their status and condition and of the vicissitudes to which they are subject. Townsend v. Eichelberger, 38 N. E. Rep. 207, 208; De Mares v. Gilpin, 24-Pac. Rep. 568, 572; Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Spates, 23.S. E. Rep. 683, 685; Naddo v. Barden, 47 Fed. Rep. 787; Manning v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 9 Fed. Rep. 737; Rudland v. Mastick, 77 Fed. Rep. 688; Robbins v. Hope, 57 California, 495.

A person is conclusively presumed to know the state of his own title to property. Cobb v. Wright, 43 Minnesota, 85; Robbins v. Hope, 57 California, 495. See also Townsend v. Eichelberger, 38 N. E. Rep. 207; De Mares v. Gilpin, 24 Pac. Rep. 568; Rudland v. Mastick, 77 Fed. Rep. 688; Case of Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 503; Davidson v. New Orleans Board, 96 U. S. 97, 105; Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 533; State v. Boswell, 4 N. E. Rep. 677; Wilson v. North Carolina, 169 U. S. 586.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

Upon demurrers, the court below dismissed the bill filed by Goodrich, the appellant, for want of equitable jurisdiction to grant the relief which was prayed. 145 Fed. Rep. 844. To review that decree this appeal direct to this court is prosecuted. Jurisdiction to review is challenged. That question therefore at the outset requires attention.

To clarify the issue for decision, instead of reciting the allegations of the bill in the order in which they are therein stated, we shall briefly recapitulate the facts alleged in their chronological order, in so far as essential to be borne in mind for the purpose of the question of our jurisdiction.

In February, 1886, Thomas H. Williams, a resident of California, died in San Francisco, leaving as his lawful heirs four

sons, viz., Sherrod, Thomas H., Jr., Percy and Bryant, and one daughter, Mary, who was the wife of Frank S. Johnson. The wife of the deceased and the mother of his children had died before him. Williams left an estate of large value, composed principally of real property. Shortly after his death, on April 2, 1886, in the court having probate jurisdiction in San Francisco, a last will and codicil thereto of Williams were duly admitted to probate. Leaving out of view certain bequests of personal property and small legacies in money, the estate was principally disposed of as follows: The title of the property was vested in the executor and trustee named in the will, George E. Williams, a brother of the deceased, for the purpose of making the distribution which the will provided. To one of the sons, Sherrod, nothing was given. It was provided that the sum of $50,000 should be absolutely vested in the son Percy, that $200,000 should "be set aside absolutely" for the benefit of the daughter Mary, wife of Johnson, and that. $100,000 should be set aside for the benefit of each of the sons, Thomas H., Jr., Percy and Bryant. The will, however, provided that the gifts to the children above stated, other than the gift of $50,000, which was to vest absolutely in Percy, were only intended for the use and benefit of the children to whom they were given during their respective lives, with the remainder in fee to the lineal descendants, or if none such, to the surviving brothers or sister, as the case might be. The residuum of the estate was directed to be set aside in equal shares for the benefit of the daughter and two of the sons (Thomas H., Jr., and Percy) during their respective lives, with the remainder in fee as heretofore recited. The will contained the following clause:

"Item 4. When the term of three years after my death, shall have elapsed, unless the executor, herein named, shall for good cause extend it for two years, or in case there be another executor, three of my children, or representatives, shall by writing, extend it for two years, distribution of my estate, shall be made, as herein directed."