in connection with such vessels, until all maritime liens had been
paid in full, refused. Matter of Hudson Oil & Supply Co., 487;
Matter of McWilliams, 488.
2. Leave to file petition for, denied.
Leave to file petition for writ of prohibition to prohibit the United
States Circuit Court from retaining jurisdiction of a case, denied.
Matter of Consolidated Rubber Tire Co., 490.
PROPERTY RIGHTS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7, 8, 17;
NAVIGABLE WATERS.
PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS.
See ASSESSMENT AND TAXATION.
1. Extra compensation-Section 1765, Rev. Stat., construed.
Where there is no specific provision in the appropriation for govern-
ment work and there is no intention of the department in which a
government employé is employed to call upon him to fill another
separate and distinct office, his designation by the head of his
department to do certain work for another department does not
entitle him to extra compensation; and, under § 1765, Rev.
Stat., he cannot be allowed extra compensation therefor, even
though the services be of value to the Government, are rendered
out of hours, and are in addition to the full performance of his
regular employment. Woodwell v. United States, 82.
2. Executive officers; power to make regulations in aid of a law.
Where the head of a department of the Government is authorized
to make regulations in aid of a law, he cannot make regulations
which defeat it. (Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425.)
Bong v. Campbell Art Co., 236.
See ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTING;
PUBLIC USE.
See NAVIGABLE WATERS, 5, 6.
RAILROADS.
See COMMON CARRIERS;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 3, 4;
1. Right of one removing to Federal court to thereafter deny its jurisdic-
tion.
The right of a defendant who has petitioned for removal of a case to
the Federal court cannot be extended beyond what is necessary
to defend the case; he cannot deny the jurisdiction after invoking
it for affirmative relief. Texas & Pacific Railway v. Eastin, 153.
2. Effect of removal to Federal court on jurisdiction of state court.
A defendant's right to remove to the Federal court is amply pro-
tected. He may file his record in the Circuit Court and thereby
completely take jurisdiction from the state court. Ib.
3. Estoppel of defendant to attack in this court action of state court in
denying petition for removal.
Even though a defendant's petition to remove is wrongfully denied
by the state court, and in his answer he protests against the right
of the state court to retain jurisdiction, if he asserts an affirmative
remedy in the state court, as in this case in which he brought in a
third party for liability over, he submits his whole case and can-
not attack the action of the state court in denying his petition
for removal in this court on writ of error. Ib.
4. Waiver of defect where neither party a resident of the Federal district
into which case removed.
Where at the time of removal to the Federal court neither of the
parties was a resident nor citizen of the district, that defect, al-
though jurisdictional, being only as to the particular district,
can be waived; and is waived, if, as in this case, the parties make
up the issues on the merits without objecting to the jurisdiction.
(Re Moore, 209 U. S. 490; Western Loan Co. v. Butte Co., 210
U. S. 368.) Kreigh v. Westinghouse & Co., 249.
See JURISDICTION, A 4;
MANDAMUS, 8.
REQUISITIONS.
See EXTRADITION, 1, 3.
RES JUDICATA.
See COURTS, 5, 6.
REVISED STATUTES.
See ACTS OF CONGRESS;
STATUTES, A 2, 3.
1. Reference to report of congressional committee.
In construing a congressional statute this court may consider the re-
port of the committee as a guide to its true interpretation in
order to dispel ambiguity, if any exists. (The Delaware, 161
U. S. 459; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470.) Oceanic Steam
Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 320.
2. Recourse to prior legislation in construction of sections of Revised
Statutes.
Where two sections of the Revised Statutes when taken together are
not free from ambiguity and cannot be harmoniously applied,
recourse may be had to legislation prior to the Revised Statutes
from which the provisions of those sections were drawn in order
to arrive at the correct meaning. Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175
U. S. 418, and Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U. S. 1,
distinguished. Merchants' Nat. Bank v. United States, 33.
3. Sections 5214 and 3411, Rev. Stat., not capable of being construed
together.
Sections 5214 and 3411, Rev. Stat., cannot be so construed together,
and effect given to both, as to leave a national bank liable to the
duty imposed by § 5214 and yet entitle it to the exemption pro-
vided by § 3411 under the contingency stated therein. Ib.
4. Effect of long.continued construction.
A uniform construction ever since its enactment for a long period, in
this case over thirty-five years, engenders doubt of a new and
different construction. Ib.
5. Intent of Congress in statute referring claim to executive officers for
ascertainment of amount due.
The statute involved in this case, referring the ascertainment of the
amount due a claimant to the Secretary of the Treasury, con-
strued on the supposition that Congress regarded the contro-
versy as over and that only the amount remained for ascer-
tainment, as any intricate judicial problem would naturally be
referred to the judicial tribunals. Parish v. MacVeagh, 124.
6. Suppositions and possible questions affecting validity not answered
before they arise.
In determining whether a statute is constitutional suppositions and
questions which might possibly arise, but which have not arisen,
will be answered when they do arise and affect the operation of
the statute. District of Columbia v. Brooke, 138.
7. Determination of validity of state statute affecting height of buildings.
In determining the validity of a state statute affecting height of build-
ings, local conditions must be considered; and, while the judg-
ment of the highest court may not be conclusive, it is entitled to
the greatest respect, and will not be interfered with unless clearly
wrong.
Welch v. Swasey, 91.
8. Same-When determination of state court as to reasonableness of
state statute followed.
Where the highest court of the State has held that there is reasonable
ground for classification between the commercial and residential
portions of a city as to the height of buildings, based on practical
and not æsthetic grounds, and that the police power is not to be
exercised for merely æsthetic purposes, this court will not hold
that such a statute, upheld by the state court, prescribing differ-
ent heights in different sections of the city, is unconstitutional
as discriminating against, and denying equal protection of the
law to, the owners of property in the district where the lower
height is prescribed. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 14;
COPYRIGHT, 5;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 3.
B. STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.
See ACTS OF CONGRESS.
C. STATUTES OF THE STATES AND TERRITORIES.
See LOCAL LAW.
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