been ascertained, the claimant is entitled to a writ of mandamus
directing the Secretary to issue his warrant therefor. Ib.
6. To compel court to take jurisdiction.
Petition for leave to file petition for mandamus to compel the Circuit
Court of Appeals to take jurisdiction of a writ of error to the
Circuit Court to review an order fining petitioner for contempt
denied without opinion. Ex parte Heller, 501.
7. To compel action by Court of Claims, denied.
Leave to file petition for mandamus to the Chief Justice and the as-
sociate justices of the Court of Claims to make a report to the
President of the Senate on petitioner's claim denied. Matter of
Pearson, 505.
8. To compel remanding of case to state court.
Leave to file petition for mandamus to remand a case to the state
court denied. Matter of Tobin, 506.
MARSHAL'S SALE.
See JURISDICTION, A 12.
1. Duty of master as to safety of place. Right of servant to assume exer-
cise of care in furnishing appliances.
It is the duty of the master to use reasonable diligence in providing a
safe place for his employés to work in and to carry on his busi-
ness; and the employé may, in the absence of notice to the
contrary, assume that the master will use reasonable care in
furnishing appliances for carrying on the business. (Choctaw &
Oklahoma R, R. v. McDade, 191 U. S. 64.) Kreigh v. Westing-
house & Co., 249.
2. Master's duty a continuing one.
The duty of the master to provide safe place and appliances for his
employés is a continuing one and must be exercised whenever
circumstances demand it, Sante Fe & Pacific R. R. v. Holmes,
202 U. S. 438; and this applies where the workmen are engaged
in work more or less dangerous and it is only a matter of using
due skill and care to make the place and appliances safe. (Choc-
taw & Oklahoma R. R. v. McDade, 191 U. S. 64.) Ib.
3. Master's liability not affected by concurring negligence of others.
Where the negligence of the master in failing to provide and maintain
a safe place contributes to the injury of the employé, the master
is liable notwithstanding the concurring negligence of those
performing the work. (Deserant v. Cerillos Coal R. R. Co., 178
U. S. 409.) Ib.
MILITARY GOVERNMENT.
See PORTO RICO, 1, 2;
TERRITORIES, 1, 2.
MISSISSIPPI.
See PILOTAGE.
MISSISSIPPI RIVER.
See PILOTAGE.
MOB VIOLENCE.
See CONTEMPT OF COURT.
MORTGAGES.
See COURTS, 2, 3;
GUARANTY, 1;
LOCAL LAW (PORTO RICO, 1).
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4.
NATIONAL BANKS.
See BANKS AND BANKING, 1, 2;
STATUTES, A 3.
1. Wharf as private property.
A wharf on a navigable stream is private property and subject to the
absolute control of the owner as other property is. Weems
Steamboat Co. v. People's Co., 345.
2. Riparian owners; rights of; law governing.
The rights of a riparian owner on a navigable stream are governed by
the law of the State in which the stream is situated, but subject
to the paramount public right of navigation. Ib.
3. Wharves; right of riparian owners to construct and maintain.
One of the rights of a riparian proprietor is to build private wharves
out so as to reach the navigable waters of the stream, and this
right has been affirmed by the courts of Virginia; but a wharf
obstructing navigation or private rights of others or encroaching
upon any public landing may be abated. Ib.
4. Wharves; property rights in.
A private wharf on a navigable stream is the exclusive property of
the owner of which he can only be deprived in accordance with
established law, and, if taken for public use, on compensation
being made. Ib.
5. Wharves, right of third person to demand use of.
A private wharf on a navigable stream is not held by the owner, as a
railroad is, subject to the public use, and a third person has no
right to demand its use even on tendering compensation there-
for and even though there may be no other wharf at the place.
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, distinguished. Louisville & Nash-
ville Railway Co. v. West Coast Naval Stores Co., 198 U. S. 483,
followed. Ib.
6. Wharves; rights of public; effect of user.
The public obtains no adverse right against the owner of a private
wharf by mere user; in the absence of an intent on the owner's
part to dedicate, and an acceptance by the public authority,
the use is mere license subject to withdrawal. Ib.
7. Wharves; right of owner to make arbitrary charges for use of.
The remarks of Mr. Justice Bradley in Transportation Co. v. Parkers-
burg, 107 U. S. 691, as to the right of the owner of a private
wharf to make arbitrary charges are obiter and are not applicable
to the present case.
NAVIGATION.
See NAVIGABLE WATERS, 2, 3;
PILOTAGE.
NAVY YARDS.
See JURISDICTION, A 6;
UNITED STATES, 1, 2.
1. When question for jury and when for court.
Questions of negligence do not become questions of law except where
all reasonable men must draw the same conclusion from the
evidence, nor should a case be withdrawn from the jury unless
the conclusion follows as a matter of law that no recovery can
be had upon any view which can be properly taken of the facts
which the evidence tends to establish. (Gardner v. Michigan Cent.
R. R., 150 U. S. 349.) Kreigh v. Westinghouse & Co., 249.
In this case held that there was sufficient evidence as to the defective
condition of a derrick and the method in which it was operated
to require the submission, under proper instructions from the
court, to the jury. Ib.
See COMMERCIAL PAPER, 1;
CONTEMPT OF Court, 3, 5;
MASTER AND SERVANT, 3.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
See COMMERCIAL PAPER.
NORFOLK NAVY YARD.
See UNITED STATES, 1, 2.
NOTARIES PUBLIC.
See EXTRADITION, 2.
Sufficiency Setting aside notice prescribed by legislature of State.
Even though the power of the State to prescribe length of notice be
not absolute, a notice authorized by the legislature will only be
set aside as ineffectual on account of shortness of time in a clear
(Bellingham Bay Co. v. New Whatcom, 172 U. S. 314.)
Goodrich v. Ferris, 71.
OFFICIAL WARRANTS.
See COMMERCIAL Paper, 2.
OPEN ACCOUNTS.
See BANKRUPTCY, 1.
1. Patentability; improvement in art of making expanded metal work.
The patent involved in this case shows a method for expanding metal
consisting of two operations, which when combined produce a
new and useful result covered by the claim allowed; and this
result, when read in connection with the specifications, shows
substantial improvement in the art of making expanded metal
work. Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 366.
2. Patentability; new combination of old elements patentable.
A new combination of elements, though old in themselves, which pro-
duces a new and useful result, entitles the inventor to the pro-
tection of a patent. (Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U. S. 580.) Ib.
3. Patentability of method.
While the mere function or effect of the operation of a machine cannot
be the subject-matter of a patent, a method of doing a thing so
clearly indicated that those skilled in the art can avail them-
selves of mechanism to carry it into operation can be the subject-
matter of a patent. (Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U. S. 780.) Ib.
4. Patentability-Process and apparatus.
A process and an apparatus by which it is performed are distinct
things. They may be found in one patent; they may be the
subject of different patents. (Leeds & Catlin v. Victor Talking
Machine Co., 213 U. S. 301.) Ib.
5. Patentability of process-Limitation of process.
An invention or discovery of a process or method involving mechan-
ical operation and producing a new and useful result, such as
expanding metal, may, and in this case does, entitle the inventor
to a patent, and such a process is not limited to those showing
chemical action or elemental changes. Risdon Locomotive Works
v. Medart, 158 U. S. 68, distinguished. Ib.
6. Patentability of Golding process of expanding metal.
In this case, held, that the Golding patent No. 547,242 for the process
of expanding metal was a substantial improvement of the art
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