3. Federal courts in applying statute of limitations governed by decisions of State where land lies.
Whether or not the statute of limitation bars a suit to foreclose is a question of substantive law, created by the State and not by the United States, and not one of procedure or jurisdiction; and the Federal court should be governed by the decisions of the State where the land lies. (Slide & Spur Mines v. Seymour, 153 U. S. 509.) Ib.
4. Federal; duty as to application of state statute of limitations. The Federal courts cannot declare it wrong or inequitable for a debtor to rely upon a state statute of limitations, as that would be to declare wrong or discreditable what the legislature of the State declares to be right. Ib.
5. Conclusiveness of decision of Land Department. Where a decision of the Land Department rests on the priority of equitable rights of a contestant it is conclusive upon the courts so far as it involves questions of fact; and on a mixed question of law and fact it is conclusive unless the court can so separate the question that the mistake of law is clearly apparent. Whit- comb v. White, 15.
Where the controversy in the Land Department involves the question of whether the first occupant occupied the land for homestead or town-site entry, and there is evidence to support the Secre- tary's finding, that finding is conclusive on the courts even though the evidence be conflicting. Ib.
7. Duty and power in determining validity of legislation. The constitutional right of Congress to enact legislation in regard to a matter wholly within its jurisdiction is the sole measure by which the validity of such legislation is to be determined by the courts, and the courts cannot proceed on the supposition that harm will follow if the legislature be permitted full sway and, in order to correct the legislature, exceed their own authority, and assume that wrong may be done in order to prevent wrong being accomplished. (McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27.) Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 320.
8. Determination of power of Congress to enact legislation.
The courts cannot make mere form and not substance the test of the
constitutional power of Congress to enact a statute in regard to a matter over which Congress has absolute control. Ib.
9. Presumption of fact not indulged.
Whether or not an heir in Porto Rico waives benefit of inventory is a pure question of fact; and, if the complaint is silent, the court will not presume that there was such a waiver. Ubarri v. Laborde, 168.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 9; LOCAL LAW (PORTO RICO, 1, 3, 4).
DELEGATION OF POWER.
See CONGRESS, POWERS OF, 1, 2;
FEDERAL QUESTION;
PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES.
DEPARTMENTAL REGULATIONS.
See PUBLIC OFFICERS, 2.
DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY. See JURISDICTION, A 12.
DISCRIMINATORY LEGISLATION. See CONGRESS, POWERS OF, 3, 4.
DISEASE.
See IMMIGRATION;
PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES.
1. Power of Congress to create system for District of Columbia. Neces- sity for system not a question for property owner.
A property owner cannot urge against a statutory drainage system the non-existence of the necessity for drainage, or the fact that he had adopted a system of his own which is either sufficient or better than that required by the law. Such a contention would deny to Congress the right to create any drainage system for the District of Columbia. District of Columbia v. Brooke, 138.
2. Compulsory drainage of unoccupied dwelling not a deprivation of property without due process of law.
The mere existence of dwelling houses, whether occupied or not, indi- cates the necessity for drainage; and the owner is not deprived of his property without due process of law by a compulsory drainage act because the house happens to be unoccupied at the time. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 12.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
See CONGRESS, POWERS OF, 3;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5-9, 12, 13, 17; DRAINAGE, 2.
Estoppel to maintain action against railroad.
Judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona holding that ejectment should not be maintained against a railroad company where the owner had remained inactive and permitted the construction of the track affirmed without opinion on authority of Roberts v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company, `158 U. S. 1, and Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. Smith, 171 U. S. 260. Donohue v. El Paso & Southwestern R. R., 499.
EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYÉ.
See MASTER AND SERVANT.
Admissibility of extrinsic evidence to show that conveyance absolute in
form is intended as security.
The face of an instrument is not always conclusive of its purpose; and, in equity, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show that a con- veyance, absolute in form, is intended as security; and in this case testimony addressed to the consideration of the bill of sale, and showing that although on its face the vendee agreed to give up its debt the real consideration was to help the vendor and give the vendee additional security, would be admissible under our own, as well as the Spanish, law; and quare whether the Spanish law does not permit oral testimony, as to all the terms of a contract upon an equal footing with the written instrument itself, to an extent beyond that which our own law permits. Cabrera v. American Colonial Bank, 224.
EXEMPTIONS.
See BANKS ANd Banking, 2;
STATUTES, A 3.
1. Indictment or affidavit as prerequisite; application of § 5278, Rev. Stat. Unless the State demanding the return of an alleged fugitive from justice furnishes a copy of an indictment against the accused or an affidavit before a magistrate as provided by § 5278, Rev. Stat., the executive of the State upon whom the demand is made, may decline to honor the requisition; and, in the absence of such indictment or affidavit, no authority is conferred upon him by § 5278, Rev. Stat., to issue his warrant of arrest for a crime committed in another State. Compton v. Alabama, 1.
2. Affidavit to support; sufficiency under § 5278, Rev. Stat.
An affidavit before a notary public is sufficient under § 5278, Rev. Stat., upon which to base a demand for return of a fugitive from justice if such officer is, as he is regarded in Georgia, a magis- trate under the law of the State.
3. Interference by judiciary-When habeas corpus not available to one held for. Where the papers upon which the requisition for the return of an alleged fugitive from justice is based are regarded as sufficient by the executive authorities of both the States making, and honoring, the demand, the judiciary should not interfere on habeas corpus and discharge the prisoner upon technical grounds unless it is clear that the action plainly contravenes the law. Ib.
4. Immunity from trial for offense other than that for which extradited. The rule that a person extradited under treaty provisions cannot be tried for an offense other than that for which he was extradited until after he has had opportunity to leave the country to which he was surrendered does not apply to an offense committed after he arrives in the latter country. (United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407.) Collins v. O'Neil, 113.
5. Discretion of country to which surrender made in matter of trial of person extradited.
Whether a person extradited and who thereafter commits a crime in the country to which he is surrendered shall be first tried for the earlier or later crime is a matter wholly within the jurisdic- tion of the country to which he is surrendered and is of no in- terest to the surrendering country. Ib.
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