3. Federal courts in applying statute of limitations governed by decisions
of State where land lies.
Whether or not the statute of limitation bars a suit to foreclose is a
question of substantive law, created by the State and not by the
United States, and not one of procedure or jurisdiction; and the
Federal court should be governed by the decisions of the State
where the land lies. (Slide & Spur Mines v. Seymour, 153 U. S.
509.) Ib.
4. Federal; duty as to application of state statute of limitations.
The Federal courts cannot declare it wrong or inequitable for a debtor
to rely upon a state statute of limitations, as that would be to
declare wrong or discreditable what the legislature of the State
declares to be right. Ib.
5. Conclusiveness of decision of Land Department.
Where a decision of the Land Department rests on the priority of
equitable rights of a contestant it is conclusive upon the courts
so far as it involves questions of fact; and on a mixed question
of law and fact it is conclusive unless the court can so separate
the question that the mistake of law is clearly apparent. Whit-
comb v.
White, 15.
Where the controversy in the Land Department involves the question
of whether the first occupant occupied the land for homestead
or town-site entry, and there is evidence to support the Secre-
tary's finding, that finding is conclusive on the courts even
though the evidence be conflicting. Ib.
7. Duty and power in determining validity of legislation.
The constitutional right of Congress to enact legislation in regard to a
matter wholly within its jurisdiction is the sole measure by
which the validity of such legislation is to be determined by the
courts, and the courts cannot proceed on the supposition that
harm will follow if the legislature be permitted full sway and,
in order to correct the legislature, exceed their own authority,
and assume that wrong may be done in order to prevent wrong
being accomplished. (McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27.)
Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 320.
8. Determination of power of Congress to enact legislation.
The courts cannot make mere form and not substance the test of the
constitutional power of Congress to enact a statute in regard to
a matter over which Congress has absolute control. Ib.
9. Presumption of fact not indulged.
Whether or not an heir in Porto Rico waives benefit of inventory is a
pure question of fact; and, if the complaint is silent, the court
will not presume that there was such a waiver. Ubarri v. Laborde,
168.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 9; LOCAL LAW (PORTO RICO, 1, 3, 4).
DELEGATION OF POWER.
See CONGRESS, POWERS OF, 1, 2;
FEDERAL QUESTION;
PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES.
DEPARTMENTAL REGULATIONS.
See PUBLIC OFFICERS, 2.
DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY.
See JURISDICTION, A 12.
DISCRIMINATORY LEGISLATION.
See CONGRESS, POWERS OF, 3, 4.
DISEASE.
See IMMIGRATION;
PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES.
1. Power of Congress to create system for District of Columbia. Neces-
sity for system not a question for property owner.
A property owner cannot urge against a statutory drainage system
the non-existence of the necessity for drainage, or the fact that
he had adopted a system of his own which is either sufficient or
better than that required by the law. Such a contention would
deny to Congress the right to create any drainage system for the
District of Columbia. District of Columbia v. Brooke, 138.
2. Compulsory drainage of unoccupied dwelling not a deprivation of
property without due process of law.
The mere existence of dwelling houses, whether occupied or not, indi-
cates the necessity for drainage; and the owner is not deprived
of his property without due process of law by a compulsory
drainage act because the house happens to be unoccupied at
the time. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 12.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
See CONGRESS, POWERS OF, 3;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5-9, 12, 13, 17;
DRAINAGE, 2.
Estoppel to maintain action against railroad.
Judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona holding that ejectment
should not be maintained against a railroad company where the
owner had remained inactive and permitted the construction of
the track affirmed without opinion on authority of Roberts v.
Northern Pacific Railroad Company, `158 U. S. 1, and Northern
Pacific Railroad Company v. Smith, 171 U. S. 260. Donohue v.
El Paso & Southwestern R. R., 499.
EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYÉ.
See MASTER AND SERVANT.
Admissibility of extrinsic evidence to show that conveyance absolute in
form is intended as security.
The face of an instrument is not always conclusive of its purpose; and,
in equity, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show that a con-
veyance, absolute in form, is intended as security; and in this
case testimony addressed to the consideration of the bill of sale,
and showing that although on its face the vendee agreed to give
up its debt the real consideration was to help the vendor and
give the vendee additional security, would be admissible under
our own, as well as the Spanish, law; and quare whether the
Spanish law does not permit oral testimony, as to all the terms
of a contract upon an equal footing with the written instrument
itself, to an extent beyond that which our own law permits.
Cabrera v. American Colonial Bank, 224.
EXEMPTIONS.
See BANKS ANd Banking, 2;
STATUTES, A 3.
1. Indictment or affidavit as prerequisite; application of § 5278, Rev. Stat.
Unless the State demanding the return of an alleged fugitive from
justice furnishes a copy of an indictment against the accused or
an affidavit before a magistrate as provided by § 5278, Rev.
Stat., the executive of the State upon whom the demand is made,
may decline to honor the requisition; and, in the absence of such
indictment or affidavit, no authority is conferred upon him by
§ 5278, Rev. Stat., to issue his warrant of arrest for a crime
committed in another State. Compton v. Alabama, 1.
2. Affidavit to support; sufficiency under § 5278, Rev. Stat.
An affidavit before a notary public is sufficient under § 5278, Rev.
Stat., upon which to base a demand for return of a fugitive from
justice if such officer is, as he is regarded in Georgia, a magis-
trate under the law of the State.
3. Interference by judiciary-When habeas corpus not available to one
held for.
Where the papers upon which the requisition for the return of an
alleged fugitive from justice is based are regarded as sufficient
by the executive authorities of both the States making, and
honoring, the demand, the judiciary should not interfere on
habeas corpus and discharge the prisoner upon technical grounds
unless it is clear that the action plainly contravenes the law. Ib.
4. Immunity from trial for offense other than that for which extradited.
The rule that a person extradited under treaty provisions cannot be
tried for an offense other than that for which he was extradited
until after he has had opportunity to leave the country to which
he was surrendered does not apply to an offense committed after
he arrives in the latter country. (United States v. Rauscher, 119
U. S. 407.) Collins v. O'Neil, 113.
5. Discretion of country to which surrender made in matter of trial of
person extradited.
Whether a person extradited and who thereafter commits a crime in
the country to which he is surrendered shall be first tried for
the earlier or later crime is a matter wholly within the jurisdic-
tion of the country to which he is surrendered and is of no in-
terest to the surrendering country. Ib.
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