The decision of the Court of Appeals of New York that a statute of
Ohio authorizing the formation of corporations general in terms,
but applicable to a special situation, did not contravene the pro-
hibition of the constitution of Ohio against the general assembly
passing any special act conferring corporate powers, and that a
corporation organized under such a statute could take as legatee,
held, not to question the validity of the constitutional provision
and, even if erroneous, such decision did not repudiate the obli-
gations of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion and is not reviewable by this court under § 709, Rev. Stat. Ib.
16. Full faith and credit. Force and effect to be given constitution of
another State.
It is as obligatory upon the courts of a State to give the same full
force and effect to the constitution of another State as it must
give to its judicial proceedings. (Chicago & Alton Railroad v. Wig-
gins Ferry Co., 119 U. S. 615.) Ib.
Jurisdiction of Federal Government. See UNITED STates, 1.
17. Property rights; uncompensated obedience to municipal ordinance
passed in exercise of police power not violative of.
The exercise of the police power in the interest of public health and
safety is to be maintained unhampered by contracts in private
interests, and uncompensated obedience to an ordinance passed
in its exercise is not violative of property rights protected by the
Federal Constitution; held, that an ordinance of a municipality
of that State, valid under the law of that State as construed by
its highest court, compelling a railroad to repair a viaduct con-
structed, after the opening of the railroad, by the city in pur-
suance of a contract relieving the railroad, for a substantial con-
sideration, from making any repairs thereon for a term of years
was not void under the contract, or the due process, clause of the
Constitution. (Northern Pacific Railway v. Duluth, 208 “U. S.-
583.) St. Paul, Minn. & Man. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 497.
CONSTRUCTION.
See CONTRACTS;
STATUTES, A;
CONTAGIOUS DISEASES.
See IMMIGRATION;
PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES.
CONTEMPT OF COURT.
1. Evidence held to establish contempt of this court.
The court, having already held, 203 U. S. 563, that the information
sufficiently set forth a contempt of the court, to punish which
the court has jurisdiction, now finds on the testimony taken under
its direction that certain of the defendants named were guilty of
the contempt as charged and directs that attachments issue
against them, and that the defendants not found guilty be dis-
charged. United States v. Shipp, 386.
2. Participation in defiance of mandate of this court constituting con-
tempt.
Where a riot and the lawless acts of those engaged therein are the
direct result of opposition to the administration of the law by
this court, those who defy its mandate and participate in, or
who knowingly fail to take the proper means within their official
power and duty to prevent, acts of violence having for their
object to, and which do, defeat the action of this court are guilty
of, and must be punished for, contempt. Ib.
3. Negligence of one charged with custody and safe-keeping of Federal
prisoner pending appeal to this court as contempt thereof,
One, who after conviction by the state court has applied to the Fed-
eral court for his release on habeas corpus on the ground that he
was denied due process of law is remanded by the Federal court
to the custody of the sheriff to be detained for a specified time
in which to enable him to prosecute an appeal to this court, is
held under § 766, Rev. Stat., as a Federal prisoner and the sheriff
is accountable to the Federal courts; and to the extent of his
power and the means under his control, he must exercise due
diligence and reasonable efforts to protect the prisoner from mob
violence, and if, after this court has granted an appeal, he negli-
gently fails in his duty in this behalf, he is guilty of contempt. Ib.
4. Knowledge of order of court sufficient to render one defying same
guilty of contempt.
Knowledge of an allowance by this court of an appeal and a stay of
proceedings renders those who defy the mandate of the court
and so conduct themselves as willfully to defeat the administra-
tion of the law liable for contempt. Ib.
5. Those charged with custody of Federal prisoner pending appeal to this
court held guilty of contempt in failing to protect prisoner from
mob violence.
This court having allowed an appeal from an order of a Circuit Court
discharging a writ of habeas corpus and remanding the prisoner
to the custody of the sheriff to be held for a specified period for
prosecution of the appeal, the sheriff and his deputies and the
jailer, who had knowledge of such allowance of appeal and also
of an intense feeling in the neighborhood against the prisoner
which on previous occasions had threatened his safety, were
bound to use all means within their power to protect him, and
failure on their part to take any precautions whatever to prevent
the seizure and killing of the prisoner at the hand of a mob at-
tacking the jail while in a defenseless condition was, under the
circumstances of this case, willful negligence, and disregard of
duty to, and contempt of, this court; and so held as to the sheriff
of Hamilton County, Tennessee, and his deputy and the jailer,
in connection with the lynching on March 19, 1906, of Ed John-
son by a mob after this court had allowed his appeal from an
order refusing relief on habeas corpus. Ib.
6. Members of mob lynching Federal prisoner pending appeal to this
court, guilty of contempt.
Those of a mob who attack a state jail and lynch a person held therein
as a Federal prisoner under an order of this court of which they
have had notice are guilty of contempt of this court. Ib.
See MANDAMUS, 6.
1. Construction; reference to similar prior contract between parties.
Where a contract requires construction as to the mode of its per-
formance, a similar contract in writing between the same parties
which had been fully performed prior to the execution of the
contract to be construed, serves, within proper limitations, to
throw light upon the construction of the later contract and may
be referred to for that purpose. Ceballos & Co. v. United States,
47.
A contract having been made by the United States with Ceballos & Co.
for the repatriation of the Spanish prisoners in Cuba after the
Spanish war, similar in terms to another contract subsequently
made with the same parties for the repatriation of the Spanish
prisoners in Manila, providing certain accommodations for officers
and steerage accommodations for men and other persons desig-
nated by the Secretary of War, the fact that in the performance
of the Cuban contract the wives and children of the officers were
given similar cabin accommodations to those of their respective
husbands and fathers, and the United States had paid therefor
the higher rate, held to be material in construing the Philippine
contract and also held that Ceballos & Co. were entitled to pay-
ment for the transportation of the wives and children of officers
at cabin rates. Ib.
3. Construction of contracts carrying out treaty obligations to be liberal.
The same contract construed as entitling Ceballos & Co. to half rates
of cabin transportation for children under ten, and steerage rates
for the "other persons designated by the Secretary of War,"
that expression not embracing wives and children of officers,
but embracing all designated persons other than officers and their
wives and children. A contract carrying out treaty obligations
should be liberally construed so as to effectuate the purposes
intended by the treaty. lb.
4. Construction of contract for repatriation of Spanish prisoners of war
from Philippine Islands.
In the light of all the surrounding circumstances it will not be as-
sumed that the United States. in carrying out its stipulations for
the capitulation of Manila would commit an act of inhumanity
such as separating the surrendered officers from their wives and
children by furnishing the former with cabin, and the latter with
steerage, accommodations on the voyage to Spain under the
repatriation provision of the treaty of peace. Ib.
See BANKRUPTCY, 3;
LOCAL LAW (PORTO RICO, 2);
CONVEYANCES.
See EVIDENCE.
1. Who entitled under § 4952, Rev. Stat., as amended by act of March 3,
1891. Citizenship of assignee affecting right.
Under § 4952, Rev. Stat., as amended by the act of March 3, 1891,
c. 565, 26 Stat. 1106, the assignee of an author of a painting is
not entitled to copyright unless the author is a citizen of a coun-
try to the citizens of which reciprocal copyright privileges have
actually been extended by proclamation of the President in con-
formity with 13 of the act of March 3, 1891. The fact that the
assignee is a citizen of such a country does not entitle him to
copyright. Bong v. Campbell Art Co., 236.
2. Who entitled-Assignee defined.
An assignee within the meaning of the copyright statute is one who
receives a transfer not necessarily of the painting but of the right
to multiply copies thereof, and such right depends not only upon
the statute but is derived also from the painter, who must have
the right to copyright in order to assign it. Ib.
3. Who entitled-Effect of membership in Montevideo Union of country
of person claiming.
A citizen of a country not in copyright relations with the United
States under § 13 of the act of 1891 is not entitled to avail of
the copyright because his country is a member of the Montevideo
Union. Ib.
4. Who entitled-Effect of provision in § 13, act of March 3, 1891, on
right of foreign citizen.
The provision in § 13 of the act of 1891, providing that the President
on determining certain conditions extend the privileges of copy-
right to citizens of countries which are parties to a copyright
union to which the United States may become a party is not
directory and confers no rights independent of the President's
proclamation. Ib.
5. Reciprocity of rights-Extension of right by executive proclamation.
Where a statute contemplates reciprocity of rights the President is
the best fitted officer to determine whether the conditions on
which reciprocity depends exist; and this court approves the
construction given by the State Department and the Librarian
of Congress to the copyright statutes as denying copyright pro-
tection to Peru, no proclamation extending copyright to the citi-
zens of that country having ever been made by the President. Ib.
COPYRIGHT RULES.
See p. 533.
1. As refuge from ill-advised, unjust or oppressive laws.
A wide range of discretion is necessary to make legislation practical
and the courts cannot be made a refuge from ill-advised, unjust
or oppressive laws. District of Columbia v. Brooke, 138.
2. Enforcement in Federal courts of statute of limitations of State.
Where it is established law of a State, as it is of Texas, that when a
debt is barred by limitations an action to foreclose a lien or mort-
gage given as security for it is barred also, the law must be en-
forced in the courts of the United States, whether sitting in law
or in equity. Dupree v. Mansur, 161.
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