and the exceptional rule as to certain classes of commercial paper
that the person having knowledge of the genuine signature of the
payee whose signature is forged is negligent in paying on such
an indorsement and therefore cannot recover, does not apply to
the United States in regard to pension checks. Leather Manu-
facturers' Bank v. Merchants' National Bank, 128 U. S. 26, ap-
proving White v. Continental National Bank, 64 N. Y. 316, fol-
lowed. United States v. Nat. Exchange Bank, 302.

2. Character of government pension checks.

Quare and not decided whether government pension checks are official
warrants or are checks and, as such, subject to the general rules
of commercial paper as between private parties. Ib.

COMMON CARRIERS.

Compensation to which entitled-Extra services.

A carrier which is at service and expense in stopping goods in transit
for inspection and reloading for the benefit of the shipper is en-
titled to compensation in addition to the actual expense incurred.
Southern Ry. Co. v. St. Louis Hay Co., 297.

COMPENSATION OF PUBLIC OFFICERS.

See PUBLIC OFFICERS, 1.

CONDEMNATION OF LAND.
See JURISDICTION, A 15.

CONDITIONAL SALES.

See BANKRUPTCY, 2, 3;

VENDOR AND VENDEE, 1, 2.

CONGRESS, POWERS OF.

1. Alien immigration.

Congress has power to deal with the admission of aliens and to confide
the enforcement of laws in regard thereto to administrative
officers. (United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253.) Oceanic Steam
Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 320.

2. Imposition of penalties and delegation of enforcement thereof to exec-
utive officers.

It is within the competency of Congress, when legislating as to mat-
ters exclusively within its control, to impose appropriate obliga-
tions and sanction their enforcement by reasonable money penal-

ties, giving to executive officers the power to enforce such pen-
alties without the necessity of invoking the judicial power. Ib.
3. Power to enact discriminatory legislation as to the District of Columbia.
If the power of Congress to enact discriminatory legislation as to the
District of Columbia is limited either expressly or by implication,
the prohibition cannot be stricter or more extensive than the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment are upon the States. District of Columbia v. Brooke, 138.

4. Police power in District of Columbia; quære as to.
Quare, and not decided, whether there is any prohibition on Congress
from enacting discriminatory legislation, and whether, in the ab-
sence of any express prohibition to that effect any prohibition
can be implied, especially in regard to the exercise of police power
in the District of Columbia. See United States v. Delaware &
Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, as to power of Congress to enact
discriminatory legislation under the commerce clause of the
Constitution. Ib.

1. Commerce clause; conflict of state law denying interstate transportation
of liquor.
However obnoxious and hurtful, in the judgment of many, liquor may
be, it is a recognized article of commerce, Leisy v. Hardin, 135
U. S. 100; and a state law denying the right to send it from one
State to another is in conflict with the commerce clause of the
Constitution of the United States. (Vance v. Vandercook Co.,
No. 1, 170 U. S. 438.) Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 218.

2. Commerce clause; repugnancy of exercise of state authority directly
regulating interstate commerce.

Congress has by § 5258, Rev. Stat., authorized every railroad com-

pany in the United States to carry all passengers and freight over
its road from one State to another State and receive compensa-
tion therefor; and any exercise of state authority directly regulat-
ing interstate commerce is repugnant to the commerce clause of
the Constitution. (Atlantic Coast Line v. Wharton, 207 U. S.
328.) Ib.

3. Commerce clause; repugnancy of § 1307 of Statutes of Kentucky of
1903 relative to sale, etc., of liquors.

Section 1307 of the Statutes of Kentucky of 1903 making it an offense
to furnish, sell or give liquor to any person who is an inebriate,
as applied to a common carrier bringing the liquor to such a
person from another State, is an attempted regulation of inter-
state commerce, and, as such, is in conflict with the commerce
clause of the Constitution of the United States and void. Ib.
See CONGRESS, POWERS OF, 4.

4. Contract impairment-Effect of resolution of municipal council
relative to removal and replacement of street railway tracks.
A resolution of a municipal council, directing a street railway com-
pany to remove and replace tracks and wires, and, in case of
failure to comply, instructing the City Solicitor to take such ac-
tion as he deems advisable to enforce the resolution, amounts
only to direction to bring a suit; and, even if contract rights
should be violated if the resolution were enforced, the resolution
does not of itself amount to an ordinance or law impairing the
obligation of contracts and the Circuit Court has no jurisdiction
of a suit to enjoin its enforcement. Des Moines v. City Railway
Co., 179.

See Infra, 17.

5. Due process of law-Right to hearing of persons on whom penalty im-
posed by executive officer under authority of Congress.

The greater includes the less and where Congress has power to sanction
a prohibition by penalties enforcible by executive officers without
judicial trial on the ascertainment in a prescribed manner of cer-
tain facts, the person upon whom the penalty is imposed is not
entitled to any hearing in the sense of raising an issue and ten-
dering evidence as to the facts so ascertained, and is not, there-
fore, denied due process because the time which the executive
officer allows him after notice of the ascertainment and imposi-
tion to produce evidence as to certain facts on which the fine
might be remitted is too short. Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Strana-
han, 320.

6. Due process of law-Imposition of penalty by executive officer.
The imposition of a penalty by an executive officer when authorized
by Congress in a matter wholly within its competency, such as
alien immigration, is not unconstitutional under the Fifth Amend-
ment as taking property without due process of law. Ib.

7. Due process of law; compensation for interference with property under
statute limiting height of buildings.

Where there is justification for the enactment of a police statute
limiting the height of buildings in a particular district, an owner
of property in that district is not entitled to compensation for
the reasonable interference with his property by the statute.
Welch v. Swasey, 91.

8. Due process of law; deprivation of property without; limitation of
height of buildings.

A statute limiting the height of buildings cannot be justified under the
police power unless it has some fair tendency to accomplish, or
aid in the accomplishment of, some purpose for which that power
can be used; if the means employed, pursuant to the statute,
have no real substantial relation to such purpose, or if the statute
is arbitrary, unreasonable and beyond the necessities of the case,
it is invalid as taking property without due process of law. Ib.

9. Due process of law. Sufficiency of notice of probate proceeding.
Validity of §§ 1633, 1634, Civil Code of California.
Whether or not a State can arbitrarily determine by statute the
length of notice to be given of steps in the administration of
estates in the custody of its courts, ten days' notice for the settle-
ment of the final accounts of an executor and action on final
distribution is not so unreasonable as to be wanting in due process
of law under the Fourteenth Amendment; and so held that the
contention that §§ 1633 and 1634 of the Civil Code of California
prescribing such length of notice are unconstitutional as depriving
a distributee of his property without due process of law is without
merit. Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398, distinguished. Goodrich v.
Ferris, 71.

See Infra, 12, 13;

CONGRESS, POWERS OF, 3;
DRAINAGE, 2.

10. Equal protection of the laws. Classification of resident and non-
resident owners of property within police power.

While the enforcement of a statute enacted under the police power by

(

criminal proceedings against resident owners, and by civil pro-
ceedings against non-resident owners, is a discrimination, if, as in
this case, it is justified by the circumstances it does not render
the statute unconstitutional, nor is it so rendered by the fact that
the remedy as to one class may be more efficient than the remedy
as to the other. District of Columbia v. Brooke, 138.

11. Equal protection of the laws. Power of States to make classifications
in enforcement of police power.
The Fourteenth Amendment does not deprive the States of the power
of classification or require the classification to be logically or
scientifically accurate; and sufficient practical reasons exist for
a classification of resident and non-resident property owners in
the enforcement of police regulations, provided that the act is
impartial as between the classes. (Field v. Barber Asphalt Co.,
194 U. S. 618.) Ib.

12. Equal protection and due process of lau-Validity of act of May 19,
1896, providing for drainage in District of Columbia.

The act of May 19, 1896, c. 206, 29 Stat. 125, providing for the drain-
age of the District of Columbia, is not unconstitutional as de-
priving non-resident owners of their property without due process
of law, or denying them the equal protection of the law on ac-
count of the different methods provided for enforcing the law
against resident and non-resident owners. Ib.

13. Equal protection and due process of law. Validity of Massachusetts
laws limiting height of buildings.

Chapters 333 of the acts of 1904 and 383 of the acts of 1905 of Massa-
chusetts, limiting the heights of buildings in Boston and pre-
scribing different heights in different sections of the city are, in
view of the decision of the highest court of Massachusetts holding
that the discrimination is based upon reasonable grounds, a
proper exercise of the police power of the State, and are not un-
constitutional under the equal protection and due process clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Welch v. Swasey, 91.

See CONGRESS, POWERS OF, 3;
STATUTES, A 8.

14. Full faith and credit. Effect of erroneous construction of constitution
of another State, to deny.

The mere construction, even if erroneous, by a state court of the
statute or, as in this case, of a provision of the constitution of
another State does not deny to it the full faith and credit de-
manded by the Federal Constitution. Smithsonian Institution v.
St. John, 19.