findings below show that on the arrival of a vessel, if the examining medical officers discovered that an immigrant was afflicted with one of the prohibited diseases, the owner of the vessel was notified of the fact, and, indeed, that the steamship company had at the place where the examination was made what is known as a landing agent, whose business it was to keep informed as to the result of medical examinations, and to know when an immigrant was detained by the medical officers because afflicted with a prohibited disease. The findings also established that where a fine was imposed under § 9 by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor it was only done after the transmission to that official of the certificate of the examining medical officer that a particular alien immigrant had been found to be afflicted with one of the prohibited diseases, and that the state of the disease established in the opinion of the medical officer that it existed at the time of embarkation, and could then have been detected by a competent medical examination. Prior to a certain date the action of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor imposing a fine was notified to the steamship company and demand of payment was practically at once made. After a certain date, by what is known as circular No. 58, the same process was followed as to the imposition of the fine, but a period of time-fourteen days—was allowed to intervene between the notice given of the imposition of the fine and its final and compulsory exaction. As to the action of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor before the promulgation of circular No. 58, the court below found that no adequate opportunity was afforded the vessel or its owner to be heard, and, as to the notice given after the promulgation of circular No. 58, it was found that the fourteen days allowed by that circular, and the practice under it, "did not afford the plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to obtain evidence from the port of embarkation and to be heard upon the question whether a fine should be imposed." Much contention is made in argument concerning these findings, it being insisted that there is conflict between them, and different views are taken as to

which of the findings should, under the circumstances of the case, be treated as dominant. But into that controversy we do not think it necessary to enter, since, as previously pointed out, it is evident that the statute unambiguously excludes the conception that the steamship company was entitled to be heard, in the sense of raising an issue and tendering evidence concerning the condition of the alien immigrant upon arrival at the point of disembarkation, as the plain purpose of the statute was to exclusively commit that subject to the medical officers for which the statute provided. We shall, therefore, test the soundness of the proposition we are considering upon that assumption.

In view of the absolute power of Congress over the right to bring aliens into the United States we think it may not be doubted that the act would be beyond all question constitutional if it forbade the introduction of aliens afflicted with contagious diseases, and, as a condition to the right to bring in aliens, imposed upon every vessel bringing them in, as a condition of the right to do so, a penalty for every alien brought to the United States afflicted with the prohibited disease, wholly without reference to when and where the disease originated. It must then follow that the provision contained in the statute is of course valid, since it only subjects the vessel to the exaction when, as the result of the medical examination.for which the statute provides, it appears that the alien immigrant afflicted with the prohibited malady is in such a stage of the disease that it must in the opinion of the medical officer have existed and been susceptible of discovery at the point of embarkation. Indeed, it is not denied that there was full power in Congress to provide for the examination of the alien by medical officers and to attach conclusive effect to the result of that examination for the purposes of exclusion or deportation. But it is said the power to do so does not include the right to make the medical examination conclusive for the purpose of imposing a penalty upon the vessel for the negligent bringing in of an alien. We think the argument-rests

upon a distinction without a difference. It disregards the purpose which, as we have already pointed out, Congress had in view in the enactment of the provision, that is, the guarding against the danger to arise from the wrongful taking on board of an alien afflicted with a contagious malady, not only to other immigrant passengers, but ultimately it might be to the entire people of the United States, a danger arising from the possible admission of aliens who might contract the contagion during the voyage and yet be entitled to admission because apparently not afflicted with the prohibited disease, owing to the fact that the time had not elapsed for the manifestation of its presence. In effect, all the contentions pressed in argument concerning the repugnancy of the statute to the due process clause really disregarded the complete and absolute power of Congress over the subject with which the statute deals. They mistakenly assume that mere form and not substance may be made by the courts the conclusive test as to the constitutional power of Congress to enact a statute. These conclusions are apparent, we think, since the plenary power of Congress as to the admission of aliens leaves no room for doubt as to its authority to impose the penalty, and its complete administrative control over the granting or refusal of a clearance also leaves no doubt of the right to endow administrative officers with discretion to refuse to perform the administrative act of granting a clearance as a means of enforcing the penalty which there was lawful authority to impose.

There are many other propositions urged in argument which we do not deem it necessary to specifically notice, as in effect they are all disposed of by the considerations which we have stated.

We have not considered the questions which would arise for decision if the case presented an attempt to endow administrative officers with the power to enforce a lawful exaction by methods which were not within the competency of administrative duties, because they required the exercise of judicial authority. Affirmed.

Opinion of the Court.

214 U.S.

INTERNATIONAL MERCANTILE MARINE COMPANY v. STRANAHAN.

SAME v. SAME.

IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

Nos. 510, 511. Argued January 11, 12, 1909.-Decided June 1, 1909.

Decided on the authority of the preceding case.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. William G. Choate and Mr. Lucius H. Beers for plaintiffs in error.1

Mr. Wade H. Ellis, Assistant to the Attorney General, with whom Mr. Henry L. Stimson, Mr. Winfred T. Demson and Mr E. P. Grosvenor were on the brief for defendant in error.1

MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

These writs of error are prosecuted to obtain the reversal of judgments entered in favor of the United States in actions brought to recover back sums paid as penalties imposed and collected under authority of 89 of the Immigration Act of March 3, 1903. One action concerned penalties exacted before and the other related to a penalty which attached after the promulgation by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor of a certain rule of procedure known as circular No. 58. As the controversies in these cases are of the same nature as that presented by the record in Oceanic Steam Navigation Company, Limited, v: The United States, No. 509, just decided, ante, p. 320, and as the principles which controlled the decision in that case are here absolutely decisive, the judgments in these cases must be, and they are,

1 For abstracts of argument see pages 322-329, ante.

Affirmed.

WEEMS STEAMBOAT COMPANY OF BALTIMORE v. PEOPLE'S STEAMBOAT COMPANY.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.

No. 181. Argued April 26, 1909.-Decided June 1, 1909.

A wharf on a navigable stream is private property and subject to the absolute control of the owner as other property is.

The rights of a riparian owner on a navigable stream are governed by the law of the State in which the stream is situated, but subject to the paramount public right of navigation.

One of the rights of a riparian proprietor is to build private wharves out so as to reach the navigable waters of the stream, and this right has been affirmed by the courts of Virginia; but a wharf obstructing navigation or private rights of others or encroaching upon any public landing may be abated.

A private wharf on a navigable stream is the exclusive property of the owner of which he can only be deprived in accordance with established law, and, if taken for public use, on compensation being made. A private wharf on a navigable stream is not held by the owner, as a railroad is, subject to the public use, and a third person has no right to demand its use even on tendering compensation therefor and even though there may be no other wharf at the place. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, distinguished. Louisville & Nashville Railway Co. v. West Coast Naval Stores Co., 198 U. S. 483, followed.

The public obtains no adverse right against the owner of a private wharf by mere user; in the absence of an intent on the owner's part to dedicate, and an acceptance by the public authority, the use is mere license subject to withdrawal.

The remarks of Mr. Justice Bradley in Transportation Co. v. Parkers

burg, 107 U. S. 691, as to the right of the owner of a private wharf to make arbitrary charges are obiter and are not applicable to the present case.

141 Fed. Rep. 454, and judgment of Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming it, reversed.

THE Complainant (the above-named petitioner) commenced this suit in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia against the defendant, the Peo