defendant its carrying charges. It is not competent for the State of Kentucky to declare such a contract unlawful, or to punish defendant for performing it, or to regulate its performance by forbidding delivery to the consignee on the claim that he is a person who is in the habit of becoming intoxicated. If such regulation of interstate commerce is deemed advisable it must proceed from Congress. The States cannot interfere until the interstate transportation has been completed by delivery to the consignee. The court has so construed the Wilson Act repeatedly. American Exp. Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 133; Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 125 U. S. 465; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; Vance v. Vandercook Co. (No. 1), 170 U. S. 438; Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 206 U. S. 129; Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412, 426.

The Kentucky statute is an illegal regulation of interstate commerce. A state statute which compels a carrier to know the contents of his packages, and to ascertain at his peril whether the consignees of all interstate shipments of intoxicating liquor are in the habit of becoming intoxicated, and which denies the right to deliver to such persons an article of commerce in course of transportation from another State, is a plain regulation of interstate commerce. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557; Vance v. Vandercook Co. (No. 1), 170 U. S. 438, 444; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100-110; Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328, 334; Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Murphey, 196 U, S. 194; Houston & T. C. R. R. Co. v. Mayes, 201 U. S. 321; McNeill v. So. Ry. Co., 202 U. S. 543.

No counsel appeared for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

The jurisdiction of this court is not open to dispute. Defendant contended that the Kentucky statute as applied to

the transportation of liquor from State to State was in conflict with the section of the Federal Constitution vesting jurisdiction in Congress over interstate commerce. This contention was denied by the state court, and thus a question arose under the Federal Constitution decided adversely to the plaintiff in error. Western Turf Association v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359.

Liquor, however obnoxious and hurtful it may be in the judgment of many, is a recognized article of commerce. License Cases, 5 How. 504, 577; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 110.

In Vance v. Vandercook Company (No. 1), 170 U. S. 438, 444, Mr. Justice White, delivering the opinion of the court, said:

"Equally well established is the proposition that the right to send liquors from one State into another, and the act of sending the same, is interstate commerce, the regulation whereof has been committed by the Constitution of the United States to Congress, and, hence, that a state law which denies such a right, or substantially interferes with or hampers the

is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States." That the transportation is not complete until delivery to the consignee is also settled.

In Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412, 426, it was held that the Wilson Act "was not intended to and did not cause the power of the State to attach to an interstate commerce shipment, whilst the merchandise was in transit under such shipment, and until its arrival at the point of destination and delivery there to the consignee."

This legislation is in the exercise of the police power, a power which, generally speaking, belongs to the State, and is an attempt in virtue of that power to directly regulate commerce, but in case of conflict between the powers claimed by the State and those which belong exclusively to Congress, the former must yield, for the Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof are "the supreme law of the land."

Section 5258 of the Revised Statutes of the United States

provides:

"Every railroad company in the United States

hereby authorized to carry upon and over its road

all passengers

is

freight, and property on their way

from any State to another State, and to receive compensation therefor." New Orleans Gas Company v. Louisiana Light Company, 115 U. S. 650; Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557.

In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328, 334, it was declared "that any exercise of state authority, in whatever form manifested, which directly regulates interstate commerce, is repugnant to the commerce clause of the Constitution."

In Adams Express Company v. Kentucky, 206 U. S. 129, 135, it was said:

"The testimony showed that the package, containing a gallon of whiskey, was shipped from Cincinnati, Ohio, to George Meece, at East Bernstadt, Kentucky. The transaction was therefore one of interstate commerce, and within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. The Kentucky statute is obviously an attempt to regulate such interstate commerce. This is hardly questioned by the Court of Appeals, and is beyond dispute under the decisions of this court."

Clearly within the cases above cited the statute before us as applied to transportation from State to State cannot be sustained.

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Hart County, Kentucky, is reversed, and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views expressed in this opinion.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissents.

Statement of the Case.

214 U.S.

CABRERA v. AMERICAN COLONIAL BANK.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR PORTO RICO.

No. 136. Submitted April 7, 1909.-Decided May 24, 1909.

The provisions of the Spanish Civil Code, which was in force in Porto Rico until 1902, to the effect that the obligations of a contract must be complied with according to their terms and that evidence cannot be introduced to vary them are practically the same as the principles of the common law and are subject to similar well-recognized exceptions.

The face of an instrument is not always conclusive of its purpose; and, in equity, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show that a conveyance, absolute in form, is intended as security; and in this case testimony addressed to the consideration of the bill of sale, and showing that although on its face the vendee agreed to give up its debt the real consideration was to help the vendor and give the vendee additional security, would be admissible under our own, as well as the Spanish, law; and quare whether the Spanish law does not permit oral testimony, as to all the terms of a contract upon an equal footing with the written instrument itself, to an extent beyond that which our own law permits.

One guaranteeing a loan by mortgage is not released from the guaranty because the loan is subsequently further secured by a bill of sale of other property, absolute on its face but in fact given as additional security, by the principal debtor.

In Porto Rico one can mortgage an interest in a succession after it has accrued notwithstanding it has not been actually assigned or delivered to the mortgagor; this is not prohibited by articles 108 of the mortgage law, nor are articles 110, 111 of that law applicable thereto. The liability of one who binds himself with others for the whole debt extends to the whole and not to a part of the debt.

3 Porto Rico, 14, affirmed.

THIS is a suit to foreclose a mortgage given by the appellant, Maria de las Nieves Cabrera y Pruna, to the appellee bank, executed by her on certain property in Porto Rico, to secure a promissory note for 8,000 pesos, provincial money, made

in favor of the bank by a mercantile firm in San Juan, known as Successores de J. M. Suarez y Compania, as principals, and the appellant above named as surety. The Banco Territorial y Agricola was also made a party, but as it disclaimed any interest in the controversy, no further proceedings were taken against it. Magdalena de la Cruz Cabrera y Pruna was made a party because, as it is alleged in the bill, the property mortgaged was conveyed to her by Maria de las Nieves Cabrera y Pruna, who was her sister, for the purpose of depriving the plaintiff (appellee here) of the benefit of its security, and that the conveyance was made without consideration. She answered, denying the allegations, and averred that the conveyance was made upon certain valuable considerations, which were set out.

The answer of Maria de las Nieves Cabrera y Pruna set up that her signature to the mortgage had been obtained by fraud, an that Suarez & Co. had paid the debt secured thereby, that the original note signed by her had been renewed without her knowledge or consent, that the bank had accepted a bill of sale of the stock of merchandise belonging to Suarez & Co. in full payment of the indebtedness, and had executed a public document acknowledging the same. She also averred the good faith of the conveyance to her sister.

The principal contention of appellants in this court turns entirely on the truth of the allegation that the bank had accepted the bill of sale of the stock of Suarez & Co. in full payment of the indebtedness. Of this bill of sale we may say at the outset that the District Court found, and we concur in that finding, that it was not executed with such intention. Appellants, therefore, are limited to the proposition that it had such effect by operation of law. They so contend, insisting that it was a conveyance of property on its face, and that it could not be varied or changed by parol testimony. The District Court having admitted such testimony, it is further contended, committed error. The ruling that parol evidence will not be received to vary a written instrument is elementary, VOL. CCXIV-15