That speaks of "the middle channel of said river," and counsel contend that there is no pretense of three channels, and therefore the language should properly be construed as the middle of the main channel of said river, and we are inclined to think that that is the true construction. But it must be remembered that the boundary in the first instance passes around the north of Sand Island, in what was known as the north channel, and it does not strike any channel which deserves to be called the main channel until it has passed to the eastward of Sand Island. While the testimony is not satisfactory as to the point, at the time of the admission of the State of Oregon, at which this north channel, after passing Sand Island, touched any other channel, we are of the opinion that it must have been at a point east and north of Desdemona Sands. Of course, in considering this matter we assume that the contention of the State of Washington is correct, that Desdemona Sands could have then properly been termed an island.

With reference to Snag Island, the question is a difficult one. We agree with counsel that the term "widest channel" does not mean the broadest expanse of water. There must be in the first instance a channel—that is, a flow of water deep enough to be used and in fact used by vessels in passing up and down the river; but it does not mean the deepest channel but simply the widest expanse of water which can reasonably be called a channel. Now, close to Snag Island there appear several channels, the principal ones being Woody Island channel and Cordell channel, both used at different times by vessels navigating the river. The Cordell channel runs to the north of Snag Island, the Woody channel to the south, while the boundary claimed by the State of Oregon runs in a channel far to the north of both Woody Island and Cordell channels.

Further, it appears that in December, 1877, the State of Oregon conveyed Snag Island, in consideration of the sum of $143.75, to J. W. and V. Cook. While of course this is not conclusive, yet taken in connection with the fact that the

State of Washington has never attempted to interfere with the jurisdiction of the State of Oregon over Snag Island, and the doubt that hangs about the position and depth and width of the various channels in the vicinity at the time of the admission of the State of Oregon, we hold that that island is within its territorial limits.

It must be borne in mind that an inquiry of this kind is attended with much difficulty. Here is a river of great width, three miles or so at certain places, whose bed is largely of sand, and whose channels have been naturally affected by the flow of the water, and also of late years by the jetties constructed by the Government in order to facilitate navigation. Congress, evidently recognizing the difficulty which attended the location of the exact boundaries, provided that the States of Washington and Oregon should have concurrent "jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases upon the Columbia River." Yet this provision does not determine the boundaries between the two States, and has proved insufficient to settle the disputes between them as to things done upon the Columbia River. Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U. S. 315.

We may be pardoned if, in closing this opinion, we refer to the following:

"Joint Resolution To enable the States of Mississippi and Arkansas to agree upon a boundary line and to determine the jurisdiction of crimes committed on the Mississippi River and adjacent territory.

'Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the consent of the Congress of the United States is hereby given to the States of Mississippi and Arkansas to enter into such agreement or compact as they may deem desirable or necessary, not in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, or any law thereof, to fix the boundary line between said States, where the Mississippi River now, or formerly, formed the said boundary line and to cede respectively each to the other such

tracts or parcels of the territory of each State as may have become separated from the main body thereof by changes in the course or channel of the Mississippi River and also to adjudge and settle the jurisdiction to be exercised by said States, respectively, over offenses arising out of the violation of the laws of said States upon the waters of the Mississippi River. "Approved January 26, 1909."

Similar ones have passed Congress in reference to the boundaries between Mississippi and Louisiana and Tennessee and Arkansas. We submit to the States of Washington and Oregon whether it will not be wise for them to pursue the same course, and, with the consent of Congress, through the aid of commissioners, adjust, as far as possible, the present appropriate boundaries between the two States and their respective jurisdiction.

The petition for rehearing is

Denied.

ADAMS EXPRESS COMPANY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HART COUNTY, STATE OF

KENTUCKY.

No. 144. Argued April 8, 1909.-Decided May 24, 1909.

Where the state court denied the contention of plaintiff in error, defendant below, that a state statute as applied to transportation of an article from one State to another was in conflict with the commerce clause of the Constitution, a Federal question is involved and this court has jurisdiction. Western Turf Association v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359.

However obnoxious and hurtful, in the judgment of many, liquor may be, it is a recognized article of commerce, Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; and a state law denying the right to send it from one State to another is in conflict with the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States. Vance v. Vandercook Co., No. 1, 170 U. S. 438.

Transportation of an article in interstate commerce is not completed until the article is delivered to the consignee; and the Wilson Act of August 8, 1890, c. 728, 26 Stat. 313, does not cause state laws to attach to an interstate shipment until the completion of the transit by delivery to the consignee. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412. Generally speaking, the police power belongs to, and is to be exercised by, the State, but it must yield to Congress wherever it conflicts with the powers belonging exclusively to Congress.

Congress has by § 5258, Rev. Stat., authorized every railroad company in the United States to carry all passengers and freight over its road from one State to another State and receive compensation therefor; and any exercise of state authority directly regulating interstate commerce is repugnant to the commerce clause of the Constitution. Atlantic Coast Line v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328. Section 1307 of the Statutes of Kentucky of 1903 making it an offense to furnish, sell or give liquor to any person who is an inebriate, as applied to a common carrier bringing the liquor to such a person from another State, is an attempted regulation of interstate commerce, and, as such, is in conflict with the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States and void.

124 Kentucky, 182, reversed.

SECTION 1307, Kentucky Statutes, 1903, provides:

Any person who shall sell, lend, give, procure for or furnish spirituous, vinous or malt liquors, or any mixture of either, knowingly, to any person who is an inebriate or in the habit of becoming intoxicated or drunk by the use of any such liquors, or who shall suffer or permit any such person to drink any such liquors in his barroom, saloon or upon the premises under his control or in his possession, shall be fined, for each offense, fifty dollars," etc.

The Adams Express Company was prosecuted in the Circuit Court of Hart County for a violation of that statute. The facts were agreed upon. It was a company engaged in the express business. W. G. Tharp was a resident of Hart County, Kentucky, who bought and paid for liquor in Nashville, Tennessee, and New Albany, Indiana. The sellers were licensed dealers in those places, and shipped the liquors to him, by the defendant, prepaying the express charges. Tharp was in the habit of becoming intoxicated, and the defendant's agent in.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

214 U. S.

Hart County knew of this fact when he delivered the liquors. On the trial the court ruled "that the said transportation and delivery of said liquor to said Tharp by defendant did not constitute interstate commerce within the meaning of the clause of the Federal Constitution, which gives to the Congress of the United States power to regulate commerce between the States, and that the defendant is guilty of knowingly furnishing liquor to an inebriate, as charged in the information herein."

The defendant prayed an appeal to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, which was denied, and thereupon the case was brought here directly from the Circuit Court of Hart County, the highest court of the State in which a decision could be had. Ky. Stat. 1903, § 1307, p. 579; Id. § 950, p. 482 § 347 Crim. Code, p. 567.

Mr. Lawrence Maxwell, with whom Mr. Joseph S. Graydon was on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

This court has jurisdiction.

The Federal question was duly raised and overruled in the trial court. The case is brought here direct because the Circuit Court of Hart County is the highest court of the State in which a decision can be had. The information was based on § 1307, Ky. Stat. 1903, which fixes the only penalty at a fine of fifty dollars. Under § 347, Criminal Code, and Ky. Stat. 1903, § 950, the trial court properly refused an appeal to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, and allowed the writ from this court with supersedeas.

This proposition that the transaction was interstate commerce is well settled. Tharp lawfully bought and paid for the liquor in another State from dealers duly licensed there to sell it. The only connection of the defendant with the transaction was to carry the liquor to Kentucky and there deliver it to the consignee. This it did in discharge of its duty as a common carrier engaged in interstate transportation, under the laws of the United States, and in pursuance of a lawful contract entered into in another State with the shipper, who there paid