tions were regular in form. It seems from the correspondence, that so far from his having stirred up the collection of the taxes, they were in arrears for some time, and that the officials had been pressing for them before it reasonably could be imagined that he had any hand in what was done. The widow had shown a readiness to suspect him, without grounds so far as appears, two years before his suit was begun, and he had expressed his willingness to have her withdraw the power of attorney whenever she pleased. When the suit was brought they were at arms' length. It was argued that he procured the property attached to be appraised at too low a value, as we have said. But there is no evidence that he did; no sign of any protest on the part of the appraiser that the debtor was authorized to appoint; nothing to show that the judge did not do his duty in appointing a third competent and disinterested man. Arts. 1481, 1482, 1492. The appraisal seems to have agreed with that in the probate proceedings. It is said that that was fraudulent. But it appears that all the parties, after discussion, agreed to the appraisers appointed and to the appraisal, and it does not appear that they were misled in any way. Neither does it appear that the appraisal before execution was not the result of independent judgment, whether it agreed with the former appraisal or not. The whole property was sold by the heirs of Ubarri between 1898 and 1902 for little more than the amount of the judgment. In short, on questionable evidence as to the value of the estate and the fact that Ubarri was a man of great power and influence and bought the land, when sold for taxes and on execution, at much less than the value set by the plaintiffs, the case was sent to the jury with liberty for them to find upon suspicion that judges, mayors, appraisers and possible purchasers all were frightened or corrupt. We are of opinion that this was wrong, and that the exceptions taken by the plaintiffs in error should be sustained.

It is not likely that we shall hear of this case again, and therefore we leave many points untouched that would have

to be considered seriously before the judgment could be sustained, but we shall advert to one other matter. The court instructed the jury that because the defendant had not shown the contrary, it was to be presumed that the heirs of Pablo Ubarri took without benefit of inventory, and that therefore service upon one of them authorized the court to give judgment against the succession for whatever the verdict might be. In the light of this instruction and the prayer of the complaint, which was for judgment against the succession, it would seem that the judgment should be construed to follow the prayer. It reads that the plaintiffs "recover of and from the defendant Buenaventura Ubarri Yramategui of the succession of Pablo Ubarri," &c. This is ambiguous, but we assume it to be against the succession. But if so, we do not perceive the bearing of the presumed waiver of the benefit of inventory. The effect of such a waiver was to make the heir personally liable without limit, as he was in the early law of Rome, of England, and of France. Civil Code of 1889, Art. 1084; Glanville, Lib. 7, c. 8; Viollet, Hist. du droit civil Français, 2d ed., 829, 830. But as this was a suit against the succession that was immaterial, so far as the form or scope of the judgment was concerned. It was material, however, with reference to the nature of the suit. For unless we entirely misunderstand the meaning of the Code of 1889 and of the proceedings under the civil law in case of succession, after the inheritance has been divided the liability of the succession is at an end, and gives place to a personal liability of each heir for the whole debt to the extent of the assets received by him if he has accepted with benefit of inventory, or, otherwise, in full. Arts. 1003, 1023, 1084. It is for this reason, we presume, that creditors "recognized as such" were given the right to oppose the division until they were paid or secured. Art. 1082. If this suit is to be regarded as we have supposed and as the defendants in error say, it seems to be misconceived. If on the other hand it should be regarded as a suit against Buenaventura Ubarri personally, in respect of a liability of his ancestor, the complaint

does not allege that he inherited any property, or how much, or that the inheritance had been divided, or whether it was accepted with or without benefit of inventory. If we assume a division to have taken place, we see no ground for presuming that the defendant accepted his share without benefit of inventory or is liable for anything beyond the unascertained value of what he received. Whether he waived the benefit of inventory or not, is a pure question of fact. It was not material to a suit against the succession and therefore was not mentioned in the pleadings. Even the division of Pablo's inheritance was mentioned only incidentally in the evidence, and it does not appear whether it took place under the Code of 1889 or that of 1902. But if the supposed waiver were to be considered we know of no reason for presuming what probably is the exception not the rule to have happened in this case. For the foregoing reasons also the judgment was wrong.

Judgment reversed.

LABORDE v. UBARRI.

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR PORTO RICO.

No. 194. Argued April 30, 1909.-Decided May 17, 1909.

In the courts of the United States attachment is but an incident to a suit and falls unless the suit can be maintained, Ex parte Railway Co., 103 U. S. 794; and, unless the court has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the suit cannot be maintained.

Ubarri v. Laborde, ante, p. 168, followed to effect that after a succession in Porto Rico has been divided the liability of the heirs is personal; and, even if the suit can be maintained against the succession, private property of the heirs cannot be attached to answer for the judgment.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Willis Sweet and Mr. George H. Lamar for plaintiffs in

error.

Mr. John Maynard Harlan for defendant in error Pablo Ubarri.

MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.

This is the same suit that has been decided already. Ubarri v. Laborde, ante, p. 168. There is presented here a subordinate question as to the right of the plaintiffs in error, who were also the plaintiffs below, to retain an attachment against property alleged to belong to two non-resident heirs of Pablo Ubarri. The District Court ordered the complaint to be dismissed as to these heirs and the attachment against any of their property to be dissolved, on the principle that has been laid down more than once by this court, that in the courts of the United States "attachment is but an incident to a suit, and unless the suit can be maintained the attachment must fall." Ex parte Railway Co., 103 U. S. 794, 796. "Unless the suit can be maintained" means, of course, unless the court has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. See further Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300, 330, 336; Chaffee v. Hayward, 20 How. 208; Clark v. Wells, 203 U. S. 164.

It was admitted at the argument before us that if the suit against the other defendant should fail, as it has, there was no need to decide this case. But it must be disposed of in some way, and we are of opinion that the judgment below should be affirmed. The suit purports to be against the succession. Yet the property sought to be attached is alleged in the petition to belong to the defendants, and is not alleged even to have belonged to the succession in the past. It seems from what was admitted at the argument that a part at least never did. But if it had belonged to the succession, we gather from incidental testimony in the main case, from the allegations of separate titles in the petition for attachment, and from admissions at the bar, that it had been divided, and thereafter the liability of the heirs, if any, was personal, as explained in the

214 U. S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

other case. Even if a suit still could be maintained against the succession when there was no property left in the inheritance, the private property of the heirs could not be held to answer the judgment. On the other hand, if this could be regarded as a suit to enforce personal liability of such heirs as could be caught, it would fail for reasons stated in Ubarri v. Laborde. In view of the disposition of that case we deem it needless to say more.

Judgment affirmed.

LEECH v. STATE OF LOUISIANA.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA.

No. 152. Submitted April 15, 1909.—Decided May 17, 1909.

The Mississippi river is a boundary between Mississippi and Louisiana from below the port of Natchez as far north as Louisiana extends; but below Natchez all the river is wholly within Louisiana, and that State, subject only to the paramount power of Congress, has exclusive jurisdiction over pilotage in the river between points south of Natchez.

Section 4236, Rev. Stat., act of March 2, 1837, c. 22, 5 Stat. 153, allowing the master of vessels coming in or going out of ports on boundary rivers to employ any pilot licensed by either State, does not apply to pilotage to ports on a river below the point where it becomes a boundary river; and a pilot licensed only by Mississippi has no right to pilot a vessel from the Gulf of Mexico to New Orleans. Quare whether under § 4236 a pilot licensed only by Mississippi can pilot a vessel from the Gulf to Natchez.

Neither continuity of water nor identity of name will make a river a boundary river except where it flows between the States it separates for a part of its course; it ceases to be a boundary river wherever it is wholly within one State,

119 Louisiana, 522, affirmed.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. George H. Terriberry for plaintiff in error:

A regulation of pilots is a regulation of commerce, within