therefore, disregard the provision of the statute which directs the Secretary to determine and ascertain the full amount which should have been paid if the said contract had been carried out in full without change or default made by either of the parties. And it seems to us that these words express the subject of inquiry, the exact command to the Secretary to which the other provisions of the statute are subordinate. He was not to determine if Parish was in default. That inquiry was precluded. It had been adjudged otherwise by the Court of Claims and by this court. It had been declared otherwise by the legislature. The act of Congress of February 20, 1886, passed to complete the judgments of the courts, appropriated the sum of $58,341.85, "being the balance of money laid out and expended by him (Parish) in the purchase of 17,232 tons of ice, for the use and at the request of the Government of the United States, which were not afterwards called for, but were wholly lost to said Parish" (the italics ours).

The following things therefore had been determined: The existence of a contract for the delivery of ice, quantity not mentioned, at different points and at different prices. The quantity was afterwards fixed at 30,000 tons and the contract made specific in every particular, quantity, quality, places of delivery and prices. Performance was undertaken and 12,768 tons delivered. Then came the order of suspension-not revocation, it must be kept in mind, and Parish had to keep prepared. He was not permitted to fulfill his contract, he dared not be unprepared to do so upon any notice. This court in Parish v. United States, supra, has portrayed the situation. The demand upon him was "an unequivocal demand," the court said, for 30,000 tons, and "to enable him to fulfill this demand required promptitude and diligence in securing the ice." The court states why. A moment's reflection on the situation shows us why. The ice was needed for the use of the armies in the field. It might be demanded at any time. The necessity for it might be imperative. If Parish could not have supplied it, this court said, the officers of the

Government would have procured it at any price in the market, a price which would have been enormously enhanced by that very demand, and Parish would have been liable for the difference between such price and the contract price. He was, therefore, this court said, "under an imperative necessity to prepare to fulfill this requirement." He realized his situation, and that he prepared against its contingencies was the finding of the Court of Claims, it was the declaration of Congress in the act of February 20, 1886, and it was the repeated declaration of the committees of Congress in their recommendation of the passage of the act in controversy. We see now the reason for regarding the opening clause of the act as its principal and dominating clause. We see now why his readiness to perform, the possession of the means of performance and the offer of performance were to be assumed by the Secretary and the loss of profits only was to be determined. And the profits, the committees said, "were readily and easily ascertainable." Indeed, because they were, their calculation was referred to an executive officer. If to ascertain them involved an intricate judicial problem the reference would have been to the judicial tribunals, for we cannot agree with the intimation of the Government that Congress would imagine that the Court of Claims and this court were unable "to master the difficulties" of that problem. The better supposition is that Congress regarded the controversy as over and that the time for reparation had arrived, and, that it might be quick and complete, referred the matter to that officer who could best state the balance due and pay it.

It does not militate with this conclusion that the duty enjoined was simple. The committees of Congress believed it to be so, believed that the extent of relief to which Parish was entitled and the items of it had been established. The act in controversy was the expression of that belief. Its purpose was relief shown to be due from a problem already solved, not to start another problem. The duty enjoined required a reference in a sense to evidence, it may be, but it was to evidence

whose probative force had been estimated and declared. It conduced to but one conclusion. That conclusion was stated by the Auditor of the War Department, following the direction of the statute, to be a balance in Parish's favor of $181,358.95. This amount represented the amount that Parish should have received over and above what he was paid by direct payment, judgment or appropriation by Congress and the balance due him under the rule in the Behan case.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that court is directed to reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court and direct the latter court to sustain the demurrer of relator to the return of respondent and enter judgment as prayed for in petition of relator.

MR. JUSTICE MOODY took no part in the decision.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. BROOKE.

ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

No. 117. Argued April 7, 1909.-Decided May 17, 1909.

Where no objection was made to a technical defect in the return which could have been rectified by amendment had attention seasonably been called thereto, a party who, as disclosed by the record, was not prejudiced, cannot raise the objection at a later date.

Quare, whether there is any distinction between "a parcel" and "a letter" that renders defective a return showing service of statutory notice by mail.

A property owner cannot urge against a statutory drainage system the non-existence of the necessity for drainage, or the fact that he had adopted a system of his own which is either sufficient or better than that required by the law. Such a contention would deny to Congress the right to create any drainage system for the District of Columbia. The mere existence of dwelling houses, whether occupied or not, indicates the necessity for drainage; and the owner is not deprived of his property without due process of law by a compulsory drainage act because the house happens to be unoccupied at the time. The police power is one of the most essential of governmental powers,

at times one of the most insistent, and always one of the least limitable.

A wide range of discretion is necessary to make legislation practical and the courts cannot be made a refuge from ill-advised, unjust or oppressive laws.

Quare, and not decided, whether there is any prohibition on Congress from enacting discriminatory legislation, and whether, in the absence of any express prohibition to that effect any prohibition can be implied, especially in regard to the exercise of police power in the District of Columbia. See United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, as to power of Congress to enact discriminatory legislation under the commerce clause of the Constitution.

If the power of Congress to enact discriminatory legislation as to the District of Columbia is limited either expressly or by implication, the prohibition cannot be stricter or more extensive than the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment are upon the States.

The Fourteenth Amendment does not deprive the States of the power of classification or require the classification to be logically or scientifically accurate; and sufficient practical reasons exist for a classification of resident and non-resident property owners in the enforcement of police regulations, provided that the act is impartial as between the classes. Field v. Barber Asphalt Co., 194 U. S. 618. While the enforcement of a statute enacted under the police power by criminal proceedings against resident owners, and by civil proceedings against non-resident owners is a discrimination, if, as in this case, it is justified by the circumstances it does not render the statute unconstitutional, nor is it so rendered by the fact that the remedy as to one class may be more efficient than the remedy as to the other. In determining whether a statute is constitutional suppositions and questions which might possibly arise, but which have not arisen, will be answered when they do arise and affect the operation of the status. The act of May 19, 1896, c. 206, 29 Stat. 125, providing for the drainage of the District of Columbia, is not unconstitutional as depriving r.on-resident owners of their property without due process of law, or denying them the equal protection of the law on account of the different methods provided for enforcing the law against resident and non-resident owners.

29 App. D. C. 563, reversed.

THIS writ was issued to review a judgment of the Court of Appeals, affirming a judgment of the Supreme Court, quash

ing and vacating certain proceedings taken for the assessment of a drainage tax upon the property of defendant in error under the authority of an act of Congress of May 19, 1896, "An act to provide for the drainage of lots in the District of Columbia." 29 Stat. 125, c. 206, May 19, 1896.

The act provides (1) that each original lot or subdivisional lot in the District of Columbia, where there is a public sewer, shall be connected with such sewer, and where there is a water main, connected with such water main, under certain conditions, which are enumerated. (2) It is made the duty of the Commissioners of the District to notify the owner or owners of every lot required by the act to be connected with a public sewer or water main, as the case may be, to so connect such lot, the work to be done in accordance with the regulations governing plumbing and house drainage in the District. (3) If the owner or owners neglect for thirty days after receipt of notice to make such connections he shall or they shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and be punished by a fine of not less than one dollar nor more than five dollars for each day of neglect. (4) If the owner be a non-resident of the District or cannot be found therein, the Commissioners shall give notice by publication twice a week for two weeks in some newspaper published in the city of Washington, to such owners, directing the connection of such lot with such sewer or such water main, as the case may be; "Provided, however, that if the residence or place of abode of the said non-resident lot owner be known or can be ascertained on reasonable inquiry, then, and in that case, a copy of the aforesaid notice shall be mailed to said nonresident, addressed to him in his proper name, at his said place of residence with legal postage prepaid; and in case such owner or owners shall fail or neglect to comply with the notice aforesaid within thirty days it shall be the duty of said Commissioners to cause such connection to be made, the expense to be paid out of the emergency fund; such expense, with necessary expense of advertisement, shall be assessed as a tax against such lot, which tax shall be carried on the regular tax