adopted by the Supreme Court upon the hearing, without protest or question on her part, was not an accurate translation, and the following was asserted to be the true translation:

"I, the undersigned, a leper residing at Kalaupapa, Island of Molokai, Territory of Hawaii, make this my last testament concerning all chattels known as mine and in my possession, being in Kalaupapa aforementioned; with sane mind I bequeath all those said goods of mine described as follows, to wit, "1 Creamed colored horse,

"1 Bay mare,

"1 Black mare,

"1 Wooden house together with certain other houses, and all other chattels belonging to me, to my husband, David Noholoa, residing at said Kalaupapa and to his heirs and assigns forever. My heirs shall not have any right to claim these at law.

"In witness whereof I hereunto subscribe my name this 18th day of November, 1901."

The court refused to accept such translation or to set aside or correct the translation already made and adopted by it, and thereupon denied the motion for a rehearing, Frear, Chief Justice, dissenting.

From the decree of affirmance, Kaimiola Nakookoo Gray has appealed to this court.

Mr. David L. Withington, Mr. J. Alfred Magoon and Mr. J. Lightfoot for appellant.

Mr. William L. Stanley, Mr. Clarence H. Olson and Mr. Henry Holmes for appellee.

MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing state- ment, delivered the opinion of the court.

The sole question in this case is whether property which belonged to testatrix in her lifetime, and was situated outside

of the leper island, or settlement, at the time of her death passed by her will.

The appellant asserts that the translation of the will, although made by one and adopted by both courts below without opposition, and offered on her part in this proceeding, both in the trial court and upon review, is, nevertheless, inaccurate; that the translation which she submitted in her motion for a rehearing, as contained in certain ex parte affidavits, is the more accurate of the two, and if it were adopted the original will in such case, as so translated, would not dispose of any property which belonged to the testatrix at the time of her death, situated outside of the leper settlement; and, as no executor was appointed in the will, the petition of the appellant for the appointment of an administrator with the will annexed as to all outside property of which the testatrix died intestate should, as she claims, have been granted, and to that end the order should be reversed.

What is the correct English translation of the original will in this case, written in the Hawaiian language, is a pure question of fact.

The record shows that Judge Kepoikai, judge of the probate branch of the Circuit Court, Second Circuit, himself translated, at least in part, the will now before us for construction. The record discloses no objection or opposition to such translation, or any criticism of its accuracy at that time. The Supreme Court, on appeal, used the same translation, without criticism or opposition, as had been used by the trial court, and, upon that translation, affirmed the decree. Mr. Justice Hartwell, in writing the opinion of the Supreme Court, said: "The original of the will shows more clearly than does the evidently defective translation that the intention was to dispose of 'also all the other property known to be mine.' The decedent evidently knew well what her property at Kalaupapa was, and there is no reason to suppose she did not know of the property in Honolulu." So that whether the translation adopted by the court below and the Supreme Court was defective or not, the

view of the latter court was that a correct translation showed the intention of the testatrix to dispose of all her property, or, as the court said, "also all the other property known to be mine."

As the two courts below have determined the question of fact, we follow our usual course in such cases and adopt the translation of the will which they have adopted.

The legal question then arising is, what did the testatrix mean by her will? Her intention is to be derived from her language, and we are of opinion that the lower court was correct in its construction as given to us.

A perusal of the will as translated and adopted by the courts below leaves us in no doubt that the testatrix's intention was to give to her husband, not only the property which she left situated at Kalaupapa, but also all other property owned by her, wherever it might be situated and whatever it might be. We do not think she intended to die intestate as to any portion of her property, or to limit her bounty to her husband to such property only as was situated at Kalaupapa.

The decree of the Supreme Court of the Territory is therefore

Affirmed.

COLLINS v. O'NEIL, SHERIFF.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. SAME v. THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.

Nos. 241, 320. Argued April 5, 1909.-Decided May 17, 1909.

Where a provision in a treaty or convention is plain it must receive a reasonable and sensible construction, and not one which it is impossible to conceive that the representatives of civilized countries would enter into.

VOL. CCXIV-8

The rule that a person extradited under treaty provisions cannot be tried for an offense other than that for which he was extradited until after he has had opportunity to leave the country to which he was surrendered does not apply to an offense committed after he arrives in the latter country. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407. Whether a person extradited and who thereafter commits a crime in the country to which he is surrendered shall be first tried for the earlier or later crime is a matter wholly within the jurisdiction of the country to which he is surrendered and is of no interest to the surrendering country.

A fugitive from justice has no inherent right of asylum; his rights in that respect depend wholly upon the treaty between the countries demanding and surrendering him.

Under the treaty of 1842 and convention of 1889 with Great Britain a surrendered person can be tried for an offense committed in this country after his arrival; and the trial for such offense does not have to await the conclusion of the trial of the offense for which he was surrendered; and so held that one who, on the trial of the offense for which he was surrendered and which resulted in a disagreement, committed perjury could be indicted and tried for that offense without being allowed an opportunity to leave this country and without waiting for the final conclusion of the trial for the crime for which he was surrendered.

151 California, 340, and 154 Fed. Rep. 980, affirmed.

IN No. 241, the plaintiff in error, being imprisoned in the county jail of San Francisco, in the State of California, by the sheriff, applied to the Supreme Court of that State in banc for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain his discharge from imprisonment. The writ was granted, and after hearing was dismissed, and the petitioner remanded to the custody of the sheriff. 151 California, 340. A writ of error was then sued out from this court and the case brought here.

In No. 320 the appellant applied to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California for a similar writ, which was issued, and a hearing had and the writ dismissed by the court. 149 Fed. Rep. 573; and see 151 Fed. Rep. 358; 154 Fed. Rep. 980. From the order of dismissal an appeal was allowed to this court. The two cases have been heard here as one.

The material facts are these: On July 13, 1905, an indictment was found by the grand jury of San Francisco county, California, against the plaintiff in error, charging him with the crime of perjury, alleged to have been committed in San Francisco on June 30 of that year. The plaintiff in error not being found within the State, it was subsequently discovered was in Victoria, British Columbia, and proper demand, under the treaty between the United States and Great Britain, being made for his surrender upon that indictment for trial, he was, on October 7, 1905, duly surrendered, and removed from Victoria by one Gibson, the agent designated in the Canadian extradition warrant, to San Francisco, where he was placed in the custody of the then sheriff, who also had a bench warrant issued from the Superior Court on the perjury indictment against the plaintiff in error.

His trial upon the indictment upon which he had been extradited began in San Francisco in December, 1905, and resulted in the disagreement of the jury on the twenty-third of December of that year, and the case was then continued, to be thereafter reset for trial. Upon the trial of the indictment for which plaintiff in error was extradited he was himself sworn, and testified as a witness, and on the twenty-ninth of December, 1905, after he had given such evidence, he was indicted again by the grand jury of San Francisco county, the indictment charging him with perjury committed on December 12, 1905, while testifying on his own behalf on the trial, as already stated. He was arraigned on this indictment in January, 1906; and after he had made all objections to his being arraigned or placed on trial on this second indictment. until the conclusion of the first, and until he had then been afforded opportunity to return to Victoria, he was, nevertheless, brought to the bar and the trial proceeded with, resulting in a verdict of guilty on February 27, 1906, upon which judgment was entered that he be imprisoned in the state prison for the term of fourteen years.

From that judgment he appealed to the District Court of