ACCEPTANCE
(1, 2).
ACCOUNTING.
See REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS (5); SALES
Complainant's bill in equity was not demurrable on the
ground that the remedy at law was adequate, where it
averred that one of the defendants, in order to secure the
right to cross complainant's tracks, agreed, by parol, that it
would maintain and pay all expenses of the protection and of
the crossing so long as the same should remain, that the half
interlocker installed under the arrangement, having become
inadequate, was ordered replaced by a full interlocker by
action of the railroad commissioner, that after notifying de-
fendant and its successor that complainant relied on the said
oral arrangement, and was ready to comply with the order, and
that complainant thereupon proceeded to install the system
as required by the commissioner; the bill also praying for an
accounting, and a decree fixing times of payment and deter-
mining the rights of the parties. Grand Rapids & Indiana
R. Co. v. Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co., 534.
See CONTRACTS (1, 2); EVIDENCE (7), PARTNERSHIP (1).
ACTION-See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT (1); CERTIORARI (2); Con-
TRACTS (4); EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (1); MORTGAGES
(2); TAXATION (1).
ACTIONS, LIMITATION OF-See LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.
ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW-See AccOUNTING (1).
ADJOURNMENTS-See JUSTICES OF THE PEACE (1, 2).
ADMISSIONS-See EVIDENCE (16, 18); TAXATION (10).
ADOPTION-See HABEAS CORPUS (2, 4).
ADVANCES-See LOGS AND LOGGING (1).
AFFIDAVITS-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1); TAXATION (1).
ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS-See HUSBAND AND WIFE (3);
TRIAL (9).
ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS.
Interlineations made in a guardian's deed of property sold
under an order of the court, unexplained, are presumed to
have been inserted before execution: it is for the party at-
tacking the instrument to show its invalidity. Arnold v.
Brechtel, 148.
See BILLS AND NOTES (1, 2).
The allowance, at the trial, of an amendment to plaintiff's
declaration in ejectment, so as to relinquish claim to part of
the land described in the pleading, was discretionary with
the trial court and not reviewable. Arnold v. Brechtel, 147.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6).
1. Under 3 Comp. Laws, § 5593 (2 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 4362),
for double damages in case of injuries done by a dog to "sheep,
lambs, swine, cattle or other domestic animal," a declaration
setting up injuries done by defendant's dog to plaintiff's tur-
keys, was not demurrable. Holcomb v. Van Zylen, 274.
2. An animal is any animate being, which is not human, en-
dowed with the power of voluntary motion. Id.
ANSWER-See MANDAMUS (3); VARIANCE.
ANSWER SUPPORTING PLEA-See EQUITY (6).
APPEAL AND ERROR.
1. Appellant can only review error resulting from alleged im-
proper argument if a ruling of the court is obtained; and in
case the court interposes and corrects the improper statement
so as to remove any injurious effects from the minds of the
jurors, the error is not prejudicial. Township of Deep River
v. Van Antwerp, 20.
2. A demurrer to a bill in equity on the ground of multifarious-
ness is special and no appeal lies from an order overruling it.
Freeman v. Lowell Specialty Co., 59.
3. The objection that evidence of a compromise made between
the parties was incompetent under the pleadings, could not
be raised for the first time on error. Nelson v. Stewart, 127.
See AMENDMENTS; CRIMINAL LAW (8); DISMISSAL AND NON-
SUIT (2); EQUITY (2); HABEAS CORPUS (1); TRIAL (1).
APPEAL FROM JUSTICE'S COURT-See TRIAL (3).
APPLICATION-See INSURANCE (3).
ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL-See APPEAL AND ERROR (1); CRIM-
INAL LAW (5, 8); TRIAL (1, 10, 12).
ASSESSMENT DISTRICT-See TAXATION (3, 4).
1. While rentals from real estate may be an interest therein be-
fore they are collected or converted into money, after collec-
tion they become personal property and are assignable by
parol. Case v. Ranney, 674.
2. Where defendant arranged with plaintiff to collect rentals
from real estate which plaintiff claimed to own by virtue of a
parol agreement with his son, who gave plaintiff full charge
and executed a deed in blank, the grantee's name to be there-
after inserted by plaintiff, who, in pursuance of the arrange-
ment, added defendant's name as grantee, and where plain-
tiff twice sued defendant in justice's court for a part of the
rental collected, which defendant paid without claiming that
the son was the true owner, not raising such contention un-
til an action was commenced by plaintiff to recover for de-
fendant's negligence in failing to apply rentals on a mortgage
against the property, held, that defendant was estopped from
disputing plaintiff's claim to rents paid to and received by de-
fendant as plaintiff's agent. Id.
See EXEMPTIONS; INJUNCTION (3).
ASSUMPSIT
See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT (1); PLEADING; SET-
OFF AND RECOUPMENT (1).
ASSUMPTION OF RISK-See MASTER And Servant (1, 4, 6, 7).
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
1. Upon a writing executed by defendant to plaintiff ac-
knowledging liability to his client, the plaintiff, in a specified
sum, for neglect to apply rentals received on an incumbrance
against property entrusted to his management, only an action
of assumpsit would lie: the right to a capias ad respondendum
could not be based on the written instrument. Case v. Ran-
ney, 674.
2. On testimony showing that defendant was an attorney and
real estate dealer, that plaintiff consulted him as an attorney
and placed property in his hands to collect rentals and manage,
that defendant who claimed he never held himself out or
practiced as an attorney, had written letters to plaintiff on
a letterhead describing him as attorney and real estate dealer,
the question whether defendant acted in a professional capac-
ity within the meaning of the statute authorizing the arrest
of persons acting in professional capacity for neglect, etc., 3
Comp. Laws, § 9996 (5 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 12659), was prop-
erly submitted to the jury as a question of fact. Id.
See COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT (1); INSANE PERSONS (1).
ATTORNEY GENERAL-See TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES.
AUDITOR GENERAL-See TAXATION (11).
AUTHORITY-See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
AUTHORITY TO PURCHASE-See EVIDENCE (17).
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE-See INSURANCE (6, 7).
1. The phrase "owner of a motor vehicle" as employed in subd.
3. § 10, Act No. 318, Pub. Acts 1909 (2 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] §
2496, subd. 3), creating a liability in favor of persons injured
by negligent operation of the machine, refers to the proprietor
rather than the person in charge or control thereof, and
creates a liability broader than the common law affords.
Daugherty v. Thomas, 371.
2. In providing that the owner should not be held liable in case the
vehicle shall have been stolen, the legislature did not exclude
from the operation of the statute an owner whose car had
been taken without intent to steal it, as defined by Act No.
33, Pub. Acts 1909, and it was the intent of the legislature
that the owner should remain liable if his car was taken with-
out his authority and without any intent to steal it. Id.
3. In the absence of evidence tending to show that defendant's
son was using defendant's motor car as the agent of the
owner, or under what authority the driver was acting, de-
fendant should not have been held liable for the negligent or
wrongful death of plaintiff's decedent by the negligent driv-
ing of the son, under Act No. 318, Pub. Acts 1909 (2 How.
Stat. [2d Ed.] § 2487 et seq.), since the section of the statute
making the owner liable unless the car was stolen, is uncon-
stitutional and void. (Daugherty v. Thomas, ante, 371 [140 N.
W. 615].) It is to be inferred, where the facts were not shown,
that the operator of the car was using it with defendant's
permission or license, and for the operator's own pleasure.
Loehr v. Abell, 590.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3); NEGLIGENCE (9)
BALLOTS-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5, 6); ELECTIONS (1, 3).
Under Act of Congress July 12, 1882, chap. 290, 22 U. S. Stat.
162, section 4, a bill of complaint may be filed in Washtenaw
county, where complainant resides, against a national bank
of the county of Houghton. The act of 1882 providing that
jurisdiction should be the same as in actions against other
than national banks was not superseded or repealed by 24 U.
S. Stat. 554, as amended by act of August 13, 1888, 25 U. S.
Stat. 436 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 514). Nor does the
former statute refer only to the jurisdiction of Federal courts:
it applies to actions instituted in the courts of the State in
which the defendant is a resident. Levitan v. Houghton Nat.
Bank, 566.
See BILLS AND NOTES (3); NOVATION; SALES (2).
BAY CITY CHARTER-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1, 4).
BENEFICIARY, CHANGE OF-See INSURANCE (1).
BIAS-See EVIDENCE (3).
BILL OF COMPLAINT-See EQUITY (5).
BILL OF LADING-See CARRIERS (1, 2).
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