of the principle we are considering than the following from an opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson of the Supreme Court of the United States: "The good sense of mankind has at length settled down to this: That these words were intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice." Again he says (page 358), speaking of the cases where courts of equity order the property of one man to become vested in another: 'In these cases the courts proceed in accordance with "the law of the land," and the right of the one man is divested by way of enforcing a higher and better right in another.' Again he says (page 175): The bills of rights in the American Constitutions forbid that parties shall be deprived of property, except by the law of the land; but if the prohibition had been omitted, a legislative enactment to pass one man's property over to another would nevertheless be void.' In People v. Morris, 13 Wend. [N. Y.] 328, it is said that, 'Vested rights of the citizen are sacred and inviolable against the plenitude of power in the legislative department.' In Ham v. McClaws, 1 Bay (S. Č.), 93, it is laid down that, 'Statutes passed against the plain and obvious principles of common right and common reason are null and void, so far as calculated to operate against those principles;' and in Morrison v. Barksdale, Harp. [S. C.] 101, that, ‘If absurd consequences, or those manifestly against common reason, arise collaterally out of a statute, it is void pro tanto.' And see Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 150 [79 Am. Dec. 239]."

In that case, however, the court was able to say that by the term "owner" the legislature intended, not the literal or technical owner, but the person in possession or control, mediately or immediately, of the vehicle, a conclusion which we are not able to reach in the instant case.

Counsel for appellant has also cited the much criticised case of Ives v. Railway Co., 201 N. Y. 271 (94 N. E. 431, 34 L. R. A. [N. S.] 162, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 156), and quotes the language of Mr. Justice Werner, beginning with the words:

"When our Constitutions were adopted, it was the law of the land that no man who was without fault or negli

gence could be held liable in damages for injuries sustained by another."

In that case the constitutional limitations upon the police power are discussed at great length. The instant case is a much stronger case for the defendant than was the Ives Case, for in the instant case the relation of master and servant, or employer and employé, is not involved, but the bald proposition is presented that the owner of property can be made liable for the negligence of one not a servant, or occupying a similar relation.

In 28 Cyc. p. 37, it is said:

"Liability for injury by a motor vehicle must be predicated upon some negligent act or omission on the part of the person to be held, or his agent or servant."

In 8 Cyc., at page 1099, in the discussion of constitutional law, it is said:

"But the owner of property, the ordinary use of which is beneficial to the public, cannot be made liable for the negligence of one not a servant, or occupying a similar relation"-citing Camp v. Rogers, supra.

At page 1094, discussing the question of deprivation of property, it is said:

"The term 'property' is used in a broad sense in the constitutional guaranty forbidding the deprivation of property without due process of law, and has received a liberal construction analogous in spirit to that applied to 'life' and 'liberty.' All rights to the use, title, and possession of private property are held subject to the right of the legislature to control them, according to the established principles of our jurisprudence, so far as may be necessary for the public welfare; the only limitations upon the legislative power being found in specific and applicable constitutional restrictions"-citing numerous State and Federal cases.

In Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Lackey, 78 Ill. 55 (20 Am. Rep. 259), it was held that the act of Illinois making railroad companies liable for all expenses of the coroner and his inquest, and the burial of persons who might be killed by

collision, or other accident occurring on such cars, or otherwise, was unconstitutional and void, so far as it attempted to make such companies liable in cases where they had violated no law, or had been guilty of no negligence on their part. The court said:

"An examination of the section will show that no default, or negligence of any kind, need be established against the railroad company; but they are mulcted in heavy charges if, notwithstanding all their care and caution, a death should occur on one of their cars, no matter how caused, even if by the party's own hand. Running of trains by these corporations is lawful and of great public benefit. It is not claimed that the liability attaches for any violation of law, the omission of any duty, or the want of proper care and skill in running their trains. The penalty is not aimed at anything of this kind. We say penalty, for it is in the nature of a penalty, and there is a constitutional inhibition against imposing penalties where no law has been violated or duty neglected. Neither is pretended in this case; nor are they in the contemplation of the statute. A passenger on the train dies from sickness. He is a man of wealth. Why should his burial expenses be charged to the railroad? There is neither reason nor justice in it."

In Burrows v. Transportation Co., 106 Mich. 582, at page 603 (64 N. W. 508, 29 L. R. A. 468), this court said:

"The courts cannot, however, declare a statute unconstitutional and void solely on the ground of unjust and oppressive provisions, or because it is supposed to violate the natural, social, or political rights of the citizen, unless it can be shown that such injustice is prohibited or such rights guaranteed or protected by the Constitution. Cooley, Const. Lim. (6th Ed.) p. 197. The learned author says further, at page 200: The rule of law upon this subject appears to be that, except where the Constitution has imposed limits upon the legislative power, it must be considered as practically absolute, whether it operate according to natural justice or not in any particular case. The courts are not the guardians of the rights of the people of the State, except as those rights are secured by some constitutional provision which comes within the judicial cognizance.'”

In Volume 1 of Tiedeman on State and Federal Control

of Persons and Property, beginning at page 8, and concluding with page 19, that author discusses the legal limitations upon police power. It is there stated that, whenever an act of the legislature contravenes a constitutional provision, it is void, and it is the duty of the courts so to declare it and refuse to enforce it. The author then discusses the question of the power of the judiciary to declare an act of the legislature void because it violates some abstract rule of justice when there is no constitutional prohibition. With that question we are not concerned farther than to remark that the author holds that in such a case the regulation to be sustained must fall within the enforcement of the legal maxim, "Use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another." The author says:

"Powers which can only be justified on this specific ground (that they are police regulations), and which would otherwise be clearly prohibited by the Constitution, can be such only as are so clearly necessary to the safety, comfort, and well-being of society, or so imperatively required by the public necessity, as to lead to the rational and satisfactory conclusion that the framers of the Constitution could not, as men of ordinary prudence and foresight, have intended to prohibit their exercise in the particular case, notwithstanding the language of the prohibition would otherwise include it"-citing CHRISTIANCY, J., in People v. Plank Road Co., 9 Mich. 285. "And in all such cases it is the duty of the courts to determine whether the regulation is a reasonable exercise of a power which is generally prohibited by the Constitution. It is the province of the lawmaking power to determine when the exigency exists for calling into exercise the police power of the State; but what are the subjects of its exercise is clearly a judicial question."" Lake View v. Cemetery, 70 Ill. 192 (22 Am. Rep. 71).

"Chief Justice Marshall said in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (U. S.), 137: The courts are not bound by mere forms, nor are they to be misled by mere pretenses. They are at liberty-indeed they are under a solemn duty-to look at the substance of things whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature had transcended the lim

its of its authority. If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety has no real or substantial relations to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the court to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution.' The principal constitutional limitations, which are designed to protect private rights, against the arbitrary exercise of governmental power, and which therefore operate to limit and restrain the exercise of police power, are the following: * * *(8) (8) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. * * * (12) Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

* **

*

For an able discussion of the limitations of the police power, in which quotations are made from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, and other text-writers, and many decisions, see State v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530 (90 N. W. 1098, 58 L. R. A. 748, 91 Am. St. Rep. 934; State v. Froehlich, 115 Wis. 32 (91 N. W. 115, 58 L. R. A. 757, 95 Am. St. Rep. 894). In the case last cited the court says:

"Concede the State government has the police power, and that such works fall within it; nevertheless the State is prohibited from exercising that power by means of works of internal improvements. The police power has been wittily defined as the power to pass unconstitutional laws, and some utterances of courts have seemed to justify such conception. It is nevertheless erroneous. An act which the Constitution clearly prohibits is beyond the power of the legislature, however proper it might be as a police regulation but for such prohibition "-citing cases.

See, also, State v. Redmon, 134 Wis. 89 (114 N. W. 137, 14 L. R. A. [N. S.] 229, 120 Am. St. Rep. 1003, 15 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 408). In the last cited case Justice Marshall, speaking for the court, said:

"Again this court said, by way of approval of expressions of standard authors and opinions in leading cases,

174 MICH.-25.