age of about 37 years at the time, sustained serious injuries. She lost her left hand, the left arm being amputated about the middle third. The left foot was crushed, and had to be amputated above the ankle. There was a disfiguring scalp wound over the left forehead above the eye. She also sustained a nervous shock, which it is claimed will be permanent. She suffers from sleeplessness, and is affected with melancholy. She suffered severe pain. The elements of compensatory damages iL such a case are well stated in Sherwood v. Railway Co., 82 Mich., at page 383 (46 N. W. 773). Appellant's counsel state in their brief that:

"The record discloses, and it is proper to have in mind, that the plaintiff's husband was killed in the same accident in which she sustained the injuries sued for."

Certainly we cannot consider any elements of damage there may be pertaining to his injury or death in this action. The fact, however, remains that the plaintiff is a widow, and not a married woman. We are, however, impressed with the fact that the verdict and judgment in this case are excessive. At the time of the injury the plaintiff's expectation of life was about 30 years, as shown by the table of mortality. The sum of $17,000 placed at interest at 5 per cent. would bring an income of $850 a year, and at 4 per cent. would bring an income of $680 a year, without the impairment of any of the principal sum. We cannot overlook the fact that from $50 to $70 a month would bring to this plaintiff, in her station in life, a support that would be equal to her wants, and equal or greater than she could earn if uninjured. If in the later years of her life she should need to use some part of the principal sum, that fact would not be inconsistent with the rule of compensatory damages. It is not the object of the law in such a case to provide the plaintiff with a competency, or a fortune; but compensation for all the injury sustained is the rule.

We have examined the claim of improper argument of

174 MICH.-14.

counsel. In view of the recent rulings of this court which are collected in People v. Sartori, 168 Mich., at page 317 (134 N. W. 200), we must hold that, except upon the measure or amount of damages, no question is preserved for review.

Other assignments of error, not here specifically treated, have all received careful consideration, and we find no prejudicial error except as indicated in the amount of the verdict. Unless the plaintiff shall within 30 days from the filing of this opinion remit all damages in excess of $17,000 and interest from the date of the judgment, the judgment will stand reversed and a new trial be granted, with costs to appellant. In case such excess is remitted as above indicated, the judgment of $17,000 and interest will stand affirmed, with costs of the court below. In either event the defendant will recover its costs in this court.

STEERE, C. J., and MOORE, KUHN, OSTRANDER, and BIRD, JJ., concurred.

BROOKE, J. If the liability of the defendant is established, as my Brethren believe, I am of opinion that the judgment should be affirmed.

MCALVAY, J. I think the judgment should be reduced to $12,500.

YATES v. MCGAHEN.

1. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-LACHES.

Complainant in a suit in aid of execution to set aside the conveyance executed by defendant to defendant's son in 1905, having obtained judgment in attachment commenced in 1907 upon an indebtedness incurred in 1903 and 1904, was not barred by laches; and the fact that the son had made improvements on the premises did not render the doctrine applicable, since the son participated in the fraud.

2. SAME.

Evidence that defendant's son had little or no property, that the consideration stated in the deed was $800, and was double the value of the land, that the conveyance was made soon after complainant demanded payment of the debt, that the son knew of it although he testified that he did not, held, to require the court to reverse a decree dismissing the bill and to enter a decree for complainant.

Appeal from Oceana; Sessions, J., presiding. Submitted November 2, 1912. (Docket No. 170.) Decided March 20, 1913.

Bill by Alonzo Yates against Clinton McGahen and Monroe McGahen for a decree in aid of execution. From a decree for defendants, complainant appeals. Reversed.

F. E. Wetmore, for complainant.

Fred J. Russell, for defendants.

BIRD, J. The bill of complaint in this cause was filed to aid in the enforcement of an execution for $231.69 against the defendant Clinton McGahen. After a hearing the complainant was denied relief, and his bill dis

missed.

It appears that in the years 1903 and 1904, when Clinton McGahen became indebted to complainant, he was

the owner of an 80-acre farm in Oceana county, upon which he lived with his wife and son, Monroe. In November, 1905, he conveyed 40 acres of the farm to the son. It is charged that this was done to defraud complainant out of his claim. The defendants deny any fraudulent intent on their part, and insist that the sale was made in good faith for a consideration of $800; and that the consideration was actually paid by the son.

There are several suspicious circumstances attending the sale and transfer of the 40 acres to the son, which tend to characterize the transaction as a fraudulent one, and it is our purpose to advert to some of them: (a) The elder McGahen knew, when he made the conveyance, that he was indebted to the complainant; and that he was conveying away the only property which he possessed that was not exempt from levy and sale upon execution. (b) Complainant called upon Clinton McGahen at his home on November 15, 1905, and urged him to make payment of his note. On the following day McGahen made the conveyance to his son. (c) The consideration named in the deed of the land was $800. This was shown to be double its market value. (d) The vendee of the land was a member of the family, and had little or no means with which to purchase it.

While these circumstances are not conclusive of the question they are very suggestive of fraud upon the part of those participating in the transfer. The defendant Monroe McGahen professed a lack of knowledge that his father was indebted to complainant, notwithstanding he had lived at home and had been present at least on one occasion when complainant called and requested payment of his note. A close reading of his cross-examination leads to the belief that he was fully informed of the transactions between his father and the complainant.

The chancellor who heard the case observed and commented upon the suspicious features of the transfer, but was of the opinion that defendants had overcome them by their proof; and he expressed the opinion that complain

ant should be denied relief because of his laches in waiting nearly four years before attempting to enforce his claim. The debt seems to have been contracted in 1903 and 1904. The transfer was made in November, 1905. Attachment proceedings were begun and the land attached in September, 1907. The doctrine of laches could be invoked only in behalf of the son, who had made improvements upon the land transferred. Under our view of the case, he was an active party to the fraud, and there was no such delay as would entitle him to have that doctrine applied in his behalf.

The denials and explanations of the defendants have failed to convince us that no wrong was intended to the complainant. The case made by the complainant, aided as it is by the statute (3 Comp. Laws, § 10203, 5 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 12864), clearly entitles him to the relief which he seeks. The decree of the trial court, dismissing the bill, will be reversed, and the conveyance of the 40 acres will be vacated and set aside as to complainant's judgment with directions to the sheriff to proceed with the execution of his writ.

By stipulation of the parties, the decree in the trial court corrected the spelling of the names of the parties to the deed. As to this part of the decree, it will be affirmed. The complainant will recover his costs in both courts. STEERE, C. J., and MOORE, MCALVAY, BROOKE, KUHN, STONE, and OSTRANDER, JJ., concurred.