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the records he acted in good faith believing the proceedings were illegal, then he had the right to act and use his best judgment and best skill as a lawyer to aid her to obtain her liberty from that institution and have set aside what he believed was an illegal order. He claims to have examined the records in this case and found that a petition had been filed and she was adjudged an epileptic, for which the law does not allow people to be sent to an asylum, unless the reason of that person is shown by the testimony to be undermined and unsound, there being another place for the detention of feeble-minded people. He claims the letters he considered tended to show she was not insane, that is of unsound mind, and that she was begging to get out; that acting in good faith he performed certain services which tended to her benefit. The claim is made that finally she did obtain her liberty through the efforts in part of Mr. Lyon; that is his claim; that later papers were filed in this court in regard to habeas corpus writ asked for and process obtained, but that that was dismissed; that later efforts were being made to review all of the orders of the probate court and this court; and that she died before the matter was fully completed. I say to you, as matter of law, she had a right to make her appeal; and though she may have been insane, yet, if the plaintiff was acting in good faith looking to her relief on account of her illegal restraint, he would have the right to act for her and use his best efforts. It would be his duty after assuming to act at all to take every proper legal step towards looking up evidence and looking up the law, making examination of the records to ascertain the legality or illegality of the processes or judgments whereby she had been sent to the institution, and, if he found in his opinion that she was suffering from improper or illegal restraint, he had a duty to perform under those circumstances of using his best judgment and skill in obtaining her liberty for her, and, so acting, no matter whether successful in whole or not, he would be entitled to receive from her estate what the services were reasonably worth."

It is the contention of counsel for appellant that the claimant in this cause acted without any authority whatsoever; that Mrs. Freshour was incompetent to make any contract; that it was claimant's duty to lay the facts before the probate court of Montcalm county and ask for leave to institute proceedings; and that, no such proceed

ings having been taken by herself or the guardian of the incompetent person, he cannot recover.

It is an old and well-established rule of law that, when necessaries have been furnished to a person, it matters not whether the recipient is mentally competent or otherwise. If there is no express agreement to pay for the necessaries, an implied agreement arises. The rule is stated in 4 Cyc. p. 993, as follows:

"The services of an attorney will usually be considered as necessaries, and a promise to pay for them will be implied when rendered in a proceeding personal to an infant or other person incapable of entering into a contract, such as an habitual drunkard or an insane man.”

It is claimed in this cause that the attorney is not entitled to compensation because his efforts did not result to the benefit of Mrs. Freshour. We hold the rule to be that an attorney is entitled to compensation for his services, whether those services have been beneficial to his client or not, so long as the services have been faithfully and intelligently performed.

The circuit judge did not err in submitting the case to the jury upon the theory outlined in his charge, and the real question at issue was: Did the claimant act in good faith and give the client the benefit of his best intelligence, industry and effort?

Counsel for appellant insist that the court had no right to charge the jury, as a matter of fact, that the appellee is a reputable lawyer, and that by using this language the court sustained the character of the appellee, as a fact, and that in this case the character and reputation of the appellee as a man or as a lawyer was not involved, as his character as a lawyer or as a man had not been assailed. It is the contention of the appellee that the word "reputable" as used cannot be said to mean more than this, that the claimant was a duly accredited member of the Montcalm county bar, and as a practicing attorney was entitled to his compensation, if the other essential facts were proven. We are of the opinion that

the word "reputable," as used in this connection and as generally understood by the profession, does not mean more than if the court had said that he was a regular lawyer. We do not believe that the language used did, or could, mislead or influence the jury. An examination of the whole charge of the court satisfies us that it was a full, fair, and comprehensive statement of the law of the case and not subject to the criticism made by counsel for appellant, that it was argumentative in its nature.

We have examined the assignments of error with reference to the reception of testimony, and find no prejudicial error committed by the court with reference thereto.

The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed, with costs.

STEERE, C. J., and MOORE, MCALVAY, BROOKE, STONE, OSTRANDER, and BIRD, JJ., concurred.

POTTER v. SHIELDS.

1. SALES-WARRANTY-CONTRACTS.

No warranty of fitness could be implied as to a boiler that defendant installed in plaintiff's residence, expressly refusing to guarantee any boiler installed with the existing system of piping in the house.

2. SAME.

Nor would any other warranty be implied if, as claimed by plaintiff, the defendant expressly warranted the boiler to be as good as another kind mentioned.

3. EVIDENCE-PAROL TESTIMONY-SALES.

The contract consisting of a written proposition accepted orally by plaintiff, and not including all the terms, was not governed by the parol evidence rule and plaintiff could show an express warranty by parol evidence.

4. DAMAGES-INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY.

It was insufficient to instruct the jury as to the damages, "You will have to rely again on the evidence that is before you. How much was plaintiff damaged, if he was damaged at all? You have heard the testimony; as reasonable, honest, intelligent men you would have to decide that, if you come to that point." More explicit instructions should have been given.

Error to Ingham; Collingwood, J. Submitted November 21, 1912. (Docket No. 80.) Decided March 20, 1913.

Assumpsit in justice's court by James W. Potter against Thomas J. Shields and another for breach of warranty of a steam boiler. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appealed to the circuit court. Judgment for plaintiff, defendants bring error. Reversed.

Frank L. Dodge, for appellants.
Cummins & Nichols, for appellee.

KUHN, J. The plaintiff is the owner of a house in the city of Lansing which had a steam-heating system with about 550 feet of radiation. Desiring to install a boiler of greater capacity than the one then in use, in the winter of 1910, he examined a boiler known as the Ideal No. 046, manufactured by the American Radiator Company, and which was in the home of Richard Scott in said city, to which was attached at that time about 600 feet of radiation. Wishing to install "a duplicate of the Scott job,' he applied to the defendants for a price to furnish and install the same, and in reply he received the following letter:

"LANSING, MICHIGAN, July 1, 1910. "J. W. POTTER, Lansing, Michigan.

"DEAR SIR:

"We will furnish and install a No. S-25-5 Ideal Sectional Steam Boiler as manufactured by the American Radiator Company of Chicago, complete, for the sum of $213.60. This includes disconnecting the old boiler now

in place, cleaning and piping brick in the cellar, making proper connections from steam mains and returns, and new boiler covered with asbestos cement 14 inches thick. The 046 Ideal Steam Boiler, same as installed in Mr. Scott's residence, is not manufactured only on request. The No. 8-25-5 taking its place, but same can be had at an additional cost of $55 to the above price.

"Yours respectfully,

"SHIELDS & LEADLEY."

It is claimed by plaintiff that after receiving this letter he had a conversation with Mr. Leadley, in which he objected to anything but the 046 boiler, and that Mr. Leadley said:

"The 25 is being made to take its place, and is an improvement on the 046, and you had not ought to hesitate about buying it."

This is denied by Leadley. Plaintiff says he made no further investigation of the boiler, but, relying upon this claimed statement, gave the defendants the order, and the boiler was promptly installed and the work paid for.

It is further claimed that the boiler did not give satisfaction, would not make steam and heat the house satisfactorily, and, after notifying the defendants and giving them an opportunity to make the boiler work satisfactorily, the plaintiff had it removed from his house, sold it for $75, retained some of the fittings, and reinstalled the old one.

Suit was brought in the justice's court, and on appeal to the circuit court the case was tried by a jury, and the plaintiff had a verdct in the sum of $81.10. Judgment being had thereon, the case was brought here by writ of error. Counsel for defendants assign 89 errors.

The first serious question that presents itself in examining the charge of the court is that the judge submitted to the jury the question of an implied warranty. He said:

"I will say, in regard to an implied warranty, that when a dealer, knowing that a purchaser is relying upon his skill and judgment, and knowing that the purchaser himself is ignorant as to the fitness and suitability of the article which he is offering for sale, sells the article to

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