Opinion of the Court. made dangerous, then the above rules as to notice will apply. The burden is on the plaintiff to prove either that the thing was originally dangerous or had become so long enough before. the accident for the authorities to have known it, so as to impose upon them the obligation to put it in proper condition. In regard to the amount of damages, the court said: "The rule laid down in the instructions asked on the part of the plaintiff is to the effect that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, if he is entitled to recover at all, for his loss of time, the expenditure of money made necessary by his injury, and compensation for his suffering in body and mind, and his whole condition and prospects are to be considered in case you find a verdict in his favor. It is impossible for me to say what the compensation should be, as there is no mathematical rule. by which his losses can be estimated, and it is a matter for sound judgment in this as in all cases." As to so much of the charge as instructed the jury that it was to be presumed that a permit had been given by the defendant for doing the work in the sidewalk of the street, and to so much as related to the liability of the defendant incident to and consequent upon such permit, the defendant excepted. In reference to the entire charge to the jury, it is unneces sary to say more than that it correctly stated the rules of law applicable to the case. It omitted nothing that ought to have been said, and contained nothing that was inconsistent with the principles announced in Barnes y. District of Colum bia, or that was not in harmony with the established rules of evidence. We will not extend this opinion by comments upon the instructions asked by the defendant; for the charge to the jury covered all the issues, and gave, in clear language, the whole law applicable to the case. It is, also, assigned for error that the court below, in general term, refused to consider that one of the grounds for a new trial which stated that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; thereby, it is contended, disregarding the rule announced in Metropolitan Railroad v. Moore, 121 U. S. 561. It is attempted to support this assignment by referring to the Opinion of the Court. stenographic report of the oral opinion of Mr. Justice Hagner, speaking for the general term. It is to be found in 5 Mackey, 127, 143. This report cannot control the record of the case as certified to us. It does not appear from the record that the general term declined to pass upon any question which it was its duty to consider. This objection is, therefore, without any basis upon which to rest. Upon the whole case we are of opinion that no error of law was committed by the court below, and the judgment must be Affirmed. Opinion of the Court. STEVENS v. FULLER. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS. No. 1617. Submitted May 5, 1890. Decided May 19, 1890. On a body execution issued against a debtor on a judgment in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts, his arrest was authorized on the ground that he had property not exempt which he did not intend to apply to pay the judgment claim. Notice having been given to the creditor that the debtor desired to take the oath for the relief of poor debtors, his examination was begun before a United States commissioner. Pending this, charges of fraud were filed against him, in having fraudulently disposed of property, with a design to secure the same to his own use and to defraud his creditors. His examination as a poor debtor was suspended, and a hearing was had on the charges of fraud. After the testimony thereon was closed, the commissioner refused to resume the poor debtor examination, and then sustained the charges of fraud and sentenced the debtor to be imprisoned for six months. His examination as a poor debtor was not read to him and corrected, and he did not sign or swear to it, and the commissioner refused to administer to him the oath for the relief of poor debtors. He was then taken into custody under the execution and lodged in jail. On a hearing on a writ of habeas corpus the Circuit Court discharged such writ and remanded him to the custody of the marshal. On an appeal to this court; Held, that the order must be affirmed. As the commissioner had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person of the debtor, any errors or irregularities in the proceedings could not be reviewed by the Circuit Court on habeas corpus, or by this court, on the appeal. HABEAS CORPUS. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. William E. Jewell for the petitioner, appellant. Mr. Edward W. Hutchins and Mr. Henry Wheeler for the opposing judgment creditor, appellee. MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the court. This is an appeal by William J. Stevens from an order of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Opinion of the Court. Massachusetts, refusing to discharge him from custody on a writ of habeas corpus. The following are the material facts: William G. Fuller having recovered a judgment against Stevens, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts, for $18,000, an execution was issued thereon to the marshal, which commanded him, if he could find no property belonging to Stevens, to take his body and commit him to jail. Accompanying that execution was an affidavit made by Fuller, that the judgment in question amounted to $20, exclusive of costs, and that $20 remained uncollected, and that he believed, and had good reason to believe, that Stevens had property not exempt from execution, which he did not intend to apply to the payment of the judgment claim, and that he intended to leave the State and District of Massachusetts. Thereupon, a commissioner of the Circuit Court certified that, after due hearing, he was satisfied that there was reasonable cause to believe that the charge made in the affidavit was true, and that, satisfactory cause having been shown, he thereby authorized the arrest of Stevens, if his arrest was authorized by law, to be made after sunset. Stevens was arrested and brought before Henry L. Hallett, a United States commissioner for the District of Massachusetts, who interrogated him, and he declared that he did not desire to take any oath, or to recognize, or to give bail for his appearance at any time, and he failed to recognize or give bail. Thereafter, the commissioner gave notice to Fuller that Stevens desired to take the oath for the relief of poor debtors, at a time specified and appointed, at the office of the commissioner. Stevens then gave a recognizance for his appearance, at such time and place, to be examined. He duly appeared and submitted to be examined, protesting that the commissioner was not authorized by law to order him to be examined touching his property, and stating that he did not waive any informalities in his arrest or in any of the other proceedings. His examination was begun and continued for some time. In the course of it, he offered evidence from the court of insolvency for the county of Suffolk, in the district, that proceedings in insolvency had been begun by him and were then pending. There Opinion of the Court. upon, Fuller filed with the commissioner charges of fraud against Stevens, alleging that Stevens, since he had contracted the debt for which the judgment was rendered, had fraudulently conveyed, concealed or otherwise disposed of some part of his estate, with a design to secure the same to his own use and to defraud his creditors, and specifying the particulars of seven different conveyances of land, and a mortgage of land, and three payments of money, by him with such design. The examination of Stevens as a poor debtor was suspended by the commissioner, and a hearing was had before him on such charges of fraud.1 Stevens put in a plea of want of jurisdic 1 These proceedings were had pursuant to provisions in Pub. Stats. Mass. c. 162, set forth as follows in appellee's brief. 66 'SECT. 17. Except as provided in sections five to sixteen inclusive, and except in actions of tort, no person shall be arrested on an execution in a civil action, unless the judgment creditor or some person in his behalf, after execution is issued amounting to twenty dollars exclusive of all costs which make part of said judgment, whether the same have accrued in the last action or in any former action on the same original cause of action, and while so much as that amount remains uncollected, makes affidavit and proves to the satisfaction of some magistrate named in section one, that he believes and has good reason to believe: "First. That the debtor has property not exempt from being taken on execution, which he does not intend to apply to the payment of the plaintiff's claim; or, "Second. That since the debt was contracted or the cause of action accrued, the debtor has fradulently conveyed, concealed or otherwise disposed of some part of his estate, with a design to secure the same to his own use or defraud his creditors; or, Third. That since the debt was contracted or the cause of action accrued, the debtor has hazarded and paid money or other property to the value of one hundred dollars or more in some kind of gaming prohibited by the laws of this Commonwealth; or, "Fourth. That since the debt was contracted the debtor has wilfully expended and misused his goods or estate, or some part thereof, for the purpose of enabling himself to swear that he has not any estate to the amount of twenty dollars, except such as is exempt from being taken on execution; or, "Fifth. If the action was founded on contract, that the debtor contracted the debt with an intention not to pay the same; or, "Sixth. That the debtor is an attorney at law; that the debt upon which the judgment on which the execution issued was recovered, was |