Opinion of the Court. Bush. The decree in her favor was, therefore, right, unless, as contended, the appellee had a sufficient remedy at law for the protection of her rights. It is not sufficient that she has a remedy at law; "it must be plain and adequate, or, in other words, as practical and as efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy in equity." Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210, 215; Watson v. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74. Now, what remedy at law is adequate to the relief she seeks, and to which she is entitled if these lands constitute her separate estate and may not be taken for her husband's debts? She is in possession, and, therefore, cannot bring ejectment. Must she remain inactive while the sale proceeds, and until the purchaser obtains and has recorded the marshal's deed to her lands, and then bring an action to have the deed cancelled and the sale set aside, as clouds upon her title? It needs no argument to show that the existing levy upon the appellee's land constitutes itself a cloud upon her title, which, if not removed and the proposed sale prevented, will injure the salable value of the lands, and otherwise injuriously affect her rights. In Orton v. Smith, 18 How. 263, 265, the right of those who have a clear, legal and equitable title to land, connected with possession, to claim the interference of a court of equity to give them peace, or dissipate a cloud on the title, is recognized. And such is the established rule in Arkansas, where the general distinction between the functions of courts of law and equity have been maintained. In Branch v. Mitchell, 24 Arkansas, 431, 439, the court said: "When a party has the only or the better legal title to land, as against that which he wishes to put at rest, he may obtain or regain possession by an action of ejectment, if he is out of possession; and it is reasonable that equity should decline to interfere where he may obtain all the relief he needs at law. If he is in possession, then, as he can bring no action at law, it has been held that he may ask the court of equity to remove a cloud upon his title, which makes it less valuable, and may prevent his disposing of it to others." The same principle is recognized in Miller v. Neiman, 27 Arkansas, 233; Chaplin v. Holmes, 27 Arkansas, 414, 417; Crane v. Randolph, 30 Arkansas, 579, Opinion of the Court. 585. In Pettit v. Shepherd, 5 Paige, 493, 501, the chancellor said: "If a court of chancery would have jurisdiction to set aside the sheriff's deed which might be given on a sale, and to order the same to be given up and cancelled, as forming an improper cloud upon the complainant's title to his farm, it seems to follow, as a necessary consequence, that the court may interpose its aid to prevent such a shade from being cast upon the title, when the defendant evinces a fixed determination to proceed with the sale." "It is better," the court said in Gerry v. Stimson, 60 Maine, 186, 189, "to prevent the creation of a fictitious or fraudulent title, than to compel its cancellation or its release after it has been created." So in Hinchley v. Greany, 118 Mass. 595, 598: "The plaintiff is not required to wait until somebody obtains a title under a sale before he can seek his remedy. Even when this remedy [which in that case was a petition summoning the defendant to show cause why he should not bring an action to try his title] may be availed of under the statute, it is not necessarily so adequate and complete as to supersede the remedy in equity." Irwin v. Lewis, 50 Mississippi, 363, 368; Christie v. Hale, 46 Illinois, 117, 122; Merriman v. Polk, 5 Heiskell, 717, 718; Jones v. De Graffenreid, 60 Alabama, 145, 151. For the reasons stated, we are of opinion that the relief asked was properly granted. Decree affirmed. Statement of the Case. MINNESOTA v. BARBER. UNITED STATES FOR APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA. No. 1346. Argued January 14, 15, 1890.- Decided May 19, 1890. The statute of Minnesota approved April 16, 1889, entitled "an act for the protection of the public health by providing for inspection, before slaughtering, of cattle, sheep and swine designed for slaughter for human food," is unconstitutional and void so far as it requires, as a condition of sales in Minnesota of fresh beef, veal, mutton, lamb or pork, for human food, that the animals, from which such meats are taken, shall have been inspected in that State before being slaughtered. In whatever language a statute may be framed, its purpose must be determined by its natural and reasonable effect; and the presumption that it was enacted in good faith, for the purpose expressed in the title, cannot control the determination of the question whether it is, or is not, repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. This statute of Minnesota, by its necessary operation, practically excludes from the Minnesota market all fresh beef, veal, mutton, lamb or pork, in whatever form, and although entirely sound, healthy and fit for human food, taken from animals slaughtered in other States; and as it thus directly tends to restrict the slaughtering of animals, whose meat is to be sold in Minnesota for human food, to those engaged in such business in that State, it makes such discrimination against the products and business of other States in favor of the products and business of Minnesota, as interferes with and burdens commerce among the several States. A law providing for the inspection of animals, whose meats are designed for human food, cannot be regarded as a rightful exertion of the police power of the State, if the inspection prescribed is of such a character, or is burdened with such conditions, as will prevent the introduction into the State of sound meats, the product of animals slaughtered in other States. A burden imposed upon interstate commerce is not to be sustained simply because the statute imposing it applies alike to the people of all the States, including the people of the State enacting it. THIS was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner had been convicted of a violation of the statute of Minnesota respecting the inspection of fresh meats which will be found at length in the opinion of the court (post 318). The Argument for Appellant. State of Indiana having passed a similar statute, counsel inter vened on behalf of that State and took part in the argument of this case. The Indiana statute will be found in the mar gin. The petitioner was discharged from custody, the court below holding the act to be an unconstitutional interference with commerce among the States. The State took this appeal. Mr. Gordon E. Cole for appellant. The closing passages in Mr. Cole's brief were as follows: I sum up the argument thus: 1st. If inspection in life is necessary to detect disease, it may be required by state legislation, although it may incidentally affect commerce. 2d. If the legislature deem such inspection necessary, and manifest such an opinion by an enactment requiring it, the presumptions which surround a legislative enactment must 1 INDIANA STATUTE, ACTS 1889, c. 84. An act for the protection of the public health by promoting the growth and sale of healthy cattle and sheep, making it a misdemeanor to sell the same without inspection before the slaughtering within this State, and to authorize cities to appoint inspectors. Approved March 2, 1889. SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana, That it shall be unlawful to sell, or offer, or expose for sale in any incorporated city within this State, beef, mutton, veal, lamb or pork for human food, except as hereinafter provided, which has not been inspected alive within the county by an inspector or his deputy duly appointed by the authorities of said county in which such beef, mutton, veal, lamb or pork is intended for consumption, and found by such inspector to be pure, healthy and merchantable, and for every such offence the accused, after conviction, shall be fined not more than two hundred dollars nor less than ten dollars. SEC. 2. That the City Council is hereby empowered and required to appoint, in each incorporated city within the county, one or more inspectors and deputies, furnish the necessary blanks and decree the fees for such inspection: Provided, That where farmers slaughter cattle, sheep or swine of their own raising or feeding for human food, no other inspection shall be required, or penalty imposed, than such as are already provided by law to prevent the sale and consumption of diseased meat. SEC. 3. Nothing herein contained shall prevent or obstruct the sale of cured beef or pork known as dried, corned or canned beef, or smoked or salted pork, or other cured or salted meats. Argument for Appellant. sustain it, unless it manifestly on its face has no relation to its professed object. 3d. No evidence can be received in support of or opposition to the law, as was held in Powell v. Pennsylvania; but if such evidence was competent, the burden of proof is not on those seeking to sustain the law, to show the necessity of inspection in life to detect disease, but upon those who would overthrow it, to show the inadequacy of such inspection, or that the inspection of dressed meats would serve the same purpose. The party who stands upon presumptions is not required in the first instance to support them by evidence. A powerful combine has thrown its gauntlet at the sovereignty of the States and is engaged in a grand duello with both State and nation. Shall the right of self preservation, never yet denied to the States by the most rabid advocate of federal supremacy, yield to the selfish greed of a gigantic, moneyed interest, and their power to adopt such measures as are necessary to detect danger be swept away, because commerce in an article in a particular form may be affected thereby, is the question I herewith submit for decision. Mr. James O. Broadhead filed a brief on behalf of the appellant. Mr. W. C. Goudy and Mr. Walter H. Sanborn for appellee. Mr. George W. McCrary and Mr. Wallace Pratt filed a brief on behalf of the appellee. Mr. Alpheus H. Snow on behalf of the State of Indiana. Mr. Louis T. Michener, Attorney General of the State of Indiana, Mr. Joseph E. McDonald and Mr. John M. Butler were with him on the brief, which concluded as follows: We conclude, therefore, that the statute in question is not an unlawful regulation of interstate commerce but an exercise of the police power proper, affecting interstate commerce, in |